Copyright 1997 Brooks
Once the secrecy ended, battle lines formed almost immediately. Public officials in Prince William County and in Richmond, the state capital, voiced their enthusiasm; they saw Disney's America--projected to open in 1998, with a thematic focus on the nation's history--as a major generator of jobs and tax revenues, and as a significant boost to the state's tourism industry. Others, however, were concerned about the proposed park's potential for damage to northern Virginia in the form of increased pollution, traffic congestion, and urban sprawl. Still others were troubled by the park's proximity to the Manassas National Battlefield, just five miles north of the Disney site. Those with a keen interest in the nation's history were also inclined to question Disney's ability to handle sensitive dimensions of that history--slavery, the Civil and Viet Nam Wars, etc.--without trivializing them. Indeed, by the time the entire issue came to a surprisingly abrupt end nearly eleven months later, each side in the pro- and anti-Disney battle claimed to have more than 60 different groups and organizations working on its behalf.
The battle intensified in the face of Disney's insistence that the state pay a significant portion of the project's start-up costs, including the widening of Interstate 66 (which would bring many of the park's visitors from the Washington, D. C. area), construction of one new I-66 interchange and improvements to a second, and construction of a new road system around the site (Bradley, 12/2/93). Disney argued that the park would eventually pay its own way; the company was proposing a tax-increment financing scheme, wherein the requested state funds (to be raised by issuing bonds) would be repaid out of Disney's future tax payments (Bradley, 12/11/93). Virginia's newly-elected governor, Republican George Allen, having declared frequently that "Virginia is open for business again," became Disney's staunchest ally, and worked vigorously to convince the Virginia legislature that the state should provide the funding that Disney sought. After much political posturing on all sides, the General Assembly passed a bill on March 12, 1994, approving a $152.8 million package for Disney--$131.5 million for bond-backed road and highway improvements, plus $21.3 million for training workers and promoting tourism.
On January 5, 1994, Disney officials submitted a rezoning request to the Prince William County Planning Office. In addition to the theme park, approval was sought for 1,340 hotel rooms, 2,500 residential units (houses, condominiums, and apartments), a water park, a campground, a zoo, two million square feet of commercial space adjacent to I-66, and a 27-hole golf course (Bradley, 1/6/94). Disney officials estimated that the entire project would generate an average of 77,000 automobile trips each day. Clearly the project involved much more than the proposed theme park (ultimately targeted for only 405 of the 3,006 acres included in the project); at stake was the development of an entire new community. Following several months of intense negotiation between Disney officials and Prince William County's planners, on June 27, 1994, the Office of Planning recommended approval of Disney's rezoning request, and on September 21 the county's Planning Commission voted 7-1 to recommend it favorably to the County Board of Supervisors. The Board scheduled a public hearing for October 15 (Bradley, 9/22/94).
Disney won yet another battle on the day of the Planning Commission action. The Clean Air Act of 1990 called for a 15 % reduction in ozone-causing pollutants in the Washington area by 1996, to be followed by additional reductions of 3 % annually until 1999 (Springston, 12/19/93). The regional Transportation Planning Board, operating under the aegis of the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, had responsibility for developing a long-range transportation plan for achieving these targets. At issue was whether the Disney-generated road improvements--with their likely increases in traffic and pollution--could be accommodated within the plan. While neither the Transportation Planning Board nor the Metro Washington COG had direct authority to approve or disapprove the Disney improvements, failure to include these improvements in the long-range plan would have severely compromised the project's prospects for a favorable environmental impact statement, and the likelihood of successful legal action to bar the improvements would have been enhanced. After intense lobbying on both sides of the issue, however, on September 21 the TRB voted, by a 24-7 margin, to approve a transportation plan that incorporated the Disney improvements (Bradley, 9/22/94).
Given these victories, the Disney Company's September 28 announcement of withdrawal from the proposed site in Prince William County stunned most of those who had been following the issue. The company said it would seek a new site, and reaffirmed its interest in locating the park in Virginia (Allen, 9/29/94). State and county officials voiced a strong sense of betrayal; the flag outside the Haymarket Town Hall was flown at half-mast (RTD, 9/30/94). For several months thereafter, jurisdictions elsewhere in Virginia--and, for that matter, throughout the Southeastern United States--regularly stumbled over one another in their pursuit of Disney. The governors of several states publicly expressed interest in hosting the project. Over time these efforts abated, however, as Disney's America gradually disappeared from the front pages--and, ultimately, from the inside pages as well.
Nine major participants have been identified for inclusion here: (1) the Disney Company; (2) state government, including (a) the Governor and (b) the General Assembly; (3) local residents; (4) environmental organizations; (5) historians; (6) the Virginia tourist industry; (7) local officials; (8) regional officials; and (9) federal officials. The roles of, and strategies employed by, these participants will be summarized in Part II of the paper. Part III will examine the role of the Prince William County Planning Office. Part IV contains a brief discussion of the outcome of the Disney case, and Part V will discuss the case's implications for the planning process.
The political battles surrounding the case were fought at virtually all levels of government. Until the General Assembly's approval of a major funding package for Disney in March of 1994, most media attention was focused at the state level. After March 12, attention shifted both to the local level, where Disney needed approval for rezoning, a Comprehensive Plan amendment, and three special use permits, and to the national scale, where a number of organizations were attempting to influence the actions of federal agencies and even the Congress. As already noted, regional organizations had roles to play as well. This variable--the level of government involved--will feature prominently as a basis for organizing the material that follows.
(1) Lobbying. Disney representatives worked closely with Governor-elect George Allen to formulate a package of state assistance for the project. Shortly after his inauguration, Governor Allen asked the General Assembly to support legislation giving Disney funds (ranging at any given time, over the ensuing weeks, from 150 to 163 million dollars) for needed road improvements, job training, and promotion (Hardy and Schapiro, 1/21/94). In support of this objective, Disney mounted a lobbying effort of a magnitude unprecedented in Virginia. Fifteen lobbyists were formally registered with the state, but that figure, said a Washington Post writer, "barely scratches the surface of its army of pollsters, media consultants, telemarketers, economists and other support staff members" (Baker, 2/7/94). Disney wisely concentrated on hiring Virginia lobbyists (for example, James W. Dyke, Jr., Secretary of Education under the previous governor, and Richard Cullen, a U. S. Attorney who had played a major role in securing state-level gun-control legislation a year earlier); one out-of-state member of the team, however, was Jody Powell, formerly a key member of President Jimmy Carter's staff. It was later reported that Disney spent $444,348 on lobbying the General Assembly, a record for the state. (Coming in second was the Piedmont Environmental Council, to be discussed later in this paper; the PEC spent $105,733 during the 1994 session of the General Assembly, of which $77,350 was devoted to fighting the Disney project.) (Campbell, 7/9/94)
These lobbyists conducted the usual array of urgent conversations in the halls of the State Capitol and Legislative Buildings and at special receptions held for members of the General Assembly. Only one lobbying strategy was quickly identified, at the time, to be a mistake: the Company initiated a number of calls to Prince William County residents, asking them how they felt about the proposed theme park. If a resident expressed support, he or she was immediately patched through to the appropriate legislator's office in Richmond. Complaints from both the residents and the quickly-flooded legislators brought an abrupt end to this strategy (Hsu, 1/20/94).
Once the Virginia General Assembly approved the Disney support package, a part of the action shifted to the Federal level, and Michael Eisner, the Company's Chairman, became the major actor. Events included a "Capitol Hill power lunch" hosted by House Speaker Thomas Foley and attended by some forty House and Senate members, as well as a pre-release, invitation-only showing of "The Lion King" for a group estimated at 1,000 people, including Vice President Gore (RTD, 6/12/94). Eisner met with Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt (Fehr and Shear, 6/17/94), and later secured Maryland Governor William Schaefer's endorsement of the project (Bradley, 9/13/94). Disney also had a full-time Washington lobbyist, of course--Richard Bates, former Executive Director of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (Hsu, 3/7/94).
(2) Use of media. Disney personnel and representatives conducted a number of news conferences. In the early stages, these were generally used to report studies or data showing the extent to which the state would derive financial benefit from the project (Bradley, 12/14/93; Odum and Miller, 12/14/93). Later they were more often used to refute the studies or data released by groups hostile to the project, characterizing such groups as "special interests" (Powers, 12/19/93) or as "well-connected Washington insiders" opposing the development so as to protect the value of land owned in the proposed park's vicinity (RTD, 6/14/94). Several Disney officials wrote "op ed" pieces for newspapers in the state and region (e.g. Pacala, 2/8/94, and Eisner, 6/20/94). In one of these, Eisner asked: "How can one review a book when only the table of contents has been written or a movie while the script is being developed? You can't. There will come a time, however, when the project is completed, for everyone to critique our production" (6/20/94). The implication that a developer should have carte blanche until his project is in place reflects an attitude (political naiveté? corporate arrogance?) that tended to plague Disney throughout the process.
(3) Marshaling of expertise. Disney employed real estate analysts (Bradley, 12/14/93), historians (faculty members from Columbia and George Washington Universities, as well as the Fredericksburg-based Association for the Preservation of Civil War Sites Inc.--Bradley, 2/15/94), and environmentalists (including Leon G. Billings who, while an aide to former Senator Edmund Muskie, had helped draft the Clean Air Act of 1972--Hsu, 3/7/94) to assist in arguing its case. Pollsters ran statewide surveys for Disney, showing high levels of citizen support for the proposed theme park (Bradley, 1/28/94). Prestigious law firms, with varying specializations and with strong credibility in Virginia's legal community, were retained by the Company. Indeed, Disney seemed to have all its bases covered, with one or more specialists on board for every major issue (Hsu, 3/7/94).
(4) Threats. On several occasions, Disney officials threatened to pull out unless the "right" decisions were made. This was a major element in the General Assembly's ultimate approval of the Disney support package; while many legislators were concerned about details of the package, none wanted to bear the onus of responsibility for driving the project away (Powers, 12/19/93; Hardy, 3/4/94). Prince William County Planning Director Douglas James noted that during his negotiations with Disney officials, issues were frequently described as "deal-killers," including the timing and frequency of the proposed park's fireworks displays (James, 10/4/94).
Overall, Disney's political strategy might be described as classic: acquire land in secret, then come in strong and overwhelm the opposition before it has an opportunity to mobilize. In retrospect, as will be discussed later, this strategy may well have been flawed from the outset.
While outgoing Governor L. Douglas Wilder had time to express his strong support for the Disney project before leaving office, his successor, George Allen, made it clear that Disney's America was to be one of the hallmarks of his administration. Before his inauguration Allen sent a letter to all members of the General Assembly, inviting them to a full-scale briefing on the matter once he was inaugurated (Bradley, 1/7/94). Allen's personal negotiations with Disney officials were troubling to some legislators; one labeled these "secret talks" a "terrible insult to lawmakers" (Hsu, 1/9/94).
While the cost estimates fluctuated frequently, Allen's proposal included funds for highway and road improvements, job training, and promotion of the project along with other Virginia attractions. (Allen had reportedly rejected one Disney request: that the state provide $10 million in relocation expenses for Disney employees.) Some $137.3 (later increased to $141) million was requested for the road improvements, though Allen and his staff argued that about $80 million of this total was for projects (primarily the widening of Interstate 66) that had been moving forward prior to the Disney proposal. The improvements would be paid for through the sale of bonds, and the bonds would eventually be paid off with the new tax revenues emanating from the Disney development. Significantly, however, Disney was to bear none of the legal liability associated with the bonds; if, in the worst-case scenario, Disney's America were to fail, the state would be left holding the bag (Baker and Hsu, 1/21/94). This was a major sticking point with many members of the General Assembly, as was the very concept of providing huge subsidies to corporations in order to lure them to the state. Virginia had avoided the industry bidding wars until 1990, when a $232 million package was offered to United Airlines to entice its location of a new maintenance facility at Dulles International Airport; United chose Indianapolis instead (Schapiro, 2/17/94).
The Governor's principal strategies were the following.
(1) Use of the "bully pulpit". Allen used the authority and visibility of the Governor's Office to sell Disney's America (Hardy and Schapiro, 3/13/94), dominating media coverage of the project for nearly three months and successfully keeping it on the front pages. What the Governor had to say about the matter was "hotter" news than were the press releases of various opposition groups. Members of his Cabinet wrote "op ed" pieces taking issue with critical editorials or reports. Allen debated Richard Moe, president of the National Trust for Historic Preservation, on CNN's "Larry King Live" (Hardin, 5/25/94). He lobbied the state's Congressional delegation in Washington, asking them to help Disney through the "federal regulatory maze" (Schapiro, 2/11/94).
(2) Control of information. Several state agencies (the Department of Transportation, the Department of Commerce and Trade, etc.) were involved in analyses of various aspects of the development, and the information they generated was tightly controlled. Thousands of pages of internal documents were initially described as "proprietary" or as protected by attorney-client privilege, thus rendering them confidential. The Piedmont Environmental Council ultimately sued the state under Virginia's Freedom of Information Act, with the result that the Allen administration agreed to release almost all of these documents for public scrutiny--one day before Disney announced its withdrawal from the Prince William County site (Bradley, 9/10/94, 9/17/94; Cooper, 9/21/94, 9/28/94). Poring over these materials, reporters and PEC personnel found items somewhat embarrassing to the administration--e.g., a memorandum suggesting that state officials may have known that actual costs of the projected road repairs would vastly exceed the publicly-released figures (Bradley, 10/5/94). The Governor responded with a vigorous denial of any effort to mislead the public (Bradley and Hardy, 10/6/94).
One issue that had not been resolved at the time of Disney's withdrawal had to do with the scope of the environmental impact statement that would be needed as a result of the proposed Interstate 66 widening and interchange projects. Given that the highway is a federal facility, the Federal Highway Administration wanted a full-scale EIS; the state, on the other hand, was arguing for a relatively minor and routine one, on the grounds that state funds would be paying for the improvements. The FHA did step in vigorously, however, when Virginia's Department of Transportation announced that an engineering firm had been awarded an $8.7 million contract to oversee the EIS; the firm, as it turned out, was also doing work for Disney in Prince William County. This was deemed an unacceptable conflict of interest, and the state was asked to find another firm--which it did (Hsu, 7/7/94; Hsu and Fehr, 7/8/94; Bradley, 9/21/94). Whether the administration was attempting to influence the nature of important data in this instance, or was merely naive regarding how the contract would be perceived, is unclear.
(3) Marshaling of expertise. Allen, too, had studies carried out to buttress his position. Roy L. Pearson, Director of the Bureau of Business Research at the College of William and Mary, provided the major body of data that the Governor would cite frequently in the ensuing months: that the construction process alone would generate 4,600 new jobs, contribute $618 million to the state's economy, and generate $34 million in new state taxes; that by the year 2007, more than 19,000 jobs would be added to the state as a result of the Disney development (Disney's own studies had estimated only 12,400); that the overall economic impact of the project would total $641 million; and that tax revenues from the development would eventually be about $41 million per year (Hardy and Schapiro, 1/21/94). Opposition groups devoted considerable attention to questioning the assumptions and projections that had yielded these figures. Allen later increased his estimate of annual tax revenues from the project after its opening in 1998 to $47 million, and compared this favorably with his projected bond costs of $11.5 million annually between 1998 and 2016 (Timmreck, 2/14/94).
(4) Compromise. Faced with a General Assembly that wanted to approve the project but couldn't quite buy all the details of the Allen-proposed package, the Governor offered a small, last-minute compromise that enabled many legislators to vote positively for the bill while claiming that they had held the Governor's feet to the fire. (Note that Allen was the state's first Republican governor in many years, while the General Assembly continued to feature a Democratic majority.)
Of the $131.5 million sought by Governor Allen for Disney-related road improvements, $49 million was for new roads necessitated by the development; the remaining $82.5 million was for the Interstate 66 projects that purportedly would have been forthcoming in any event. Annual debt service on the $49 million was estimated at $3.8 million. Allen's "make or break" compromise, then, was that the Disney Company would "make up the difference" in the event that the project failed to generate at least $3.8 million in taxes for the state in any given year. (Annual tax revenues, remember, were estimated by the Governor at $47 million; his figures, then, would suggest the offer to be an extremely safe deal.) Thus Disney would indeed be legally liable for a portion of the state package--though all its other elements would remain the state's responsibility in the event of tax revenue shortfalls. Despite the relatively minor nature of this compromise, it gave the General Assembly a rationale for approving the project by a sizable margin.
Overall, the Governor's strategy was shaped by his identification of Disney's America as a defining accomplishment of his term in office. His actions on the project's behalf were highly vigorous and visible; he promised, early on, to overcome all barriers in the path of making Disney's America a reality. It is little wonder, then, that Allen's appearance after meeting with Disney officials on September 28, 1994, was described as "grim" and "ashen" (Baker and Hsu, 9/29/94). The name of the game, in the ensuing weeks, was damage control.
And what of the General Assembly? At first, some of its members expressed pique that Disney was talking to the Governor instead of to them--a complaint that disappeared rapidly once Disney's lobbying efforts kicked into gear. The legislature's overall strategy began to materialize early: manifest hard-nosed caution about the project, get the best deal possible for the state, provide a little heat for the Governor--and then pass the bill. The hard-nosed caution took the form of concerns that Governor Allen was giving away too much; that overall costs were too high; that tax dollars were going to be used in support of a private venture; and that the state, not Disney, was to be liable in the event of failure (Baker, 1/26/94).
Responsibility for dealing with Disney's America was given by the two legislative bodies to their respective "money committees." The Senate Finance Committee held a public hearing on February 3, 1994; over 400 people attended, the majority of them Disney supporters, and the event quickly became a rally complete with campaign buttons, placards, and cheers. A few days later, the Committee proposed a one-dollar-per-person tax on admission tickets to the park, to help pay off the road improvement bonds; it also proposed a $17 million reduction in the total bond package. Disney and Governor Allen quickly labeled this a "deal killer" (Schapiro, 2/11/94). The House of Delegates, on the other hand, wanted to require Disney to pay $45 million for road improvements at the outset of the project, with the state eventually refunding the money to the Company. Given their different approaches, the two chambers undertook negotiations through a joint, six-member Conference Committee, but agreement remained elusive as the close of the Session loomed closer. Disney continued its threats to pull out if Allen's plan was not enacted (Schapiro and Hardy, 2/16/94). One member of the Conference Committee reported that he was receiving up to 200 phone calls a day, along with constant faxes (McKelway, 3/11/94). It was in this context, then, that Governor Allen offered his (undoubtedly Disney-approved) compromise (Disney would guarantee up to $3.8 million in tax revenues each year), and the matter was resolved almost immediately.
I will first describe the roles and strategies of the major local organizations that opposed the Disney project, then turn to the groups that supported it.
(1) Piedmont Environmental Council. From the project's outset, commentators noted a discrepancy between the views of Haymarket residents, some of whom had lost jobs and family businesses to the recession, and those of well-to-do estate owners residing in nearby counties, who were keenly interested in preserving the area's rural charm. The Piedmont Environmental Council was viewed as the focal point for organized activity by the latter group.
The PEC was formed in 1972 by a group characterized as "wealthy residents of Virginia's hunt country" (Bradley, 2/20/94). Its avowed purpose from the start has been to preserve the rural landscape in nine northern Virginia counties--not including, but two (Fauquier and Loudoun) of which are adjacent to, Prince William County. Among the owners of estates in the nine counties during the course of the Disney controversy were Pamela Harriman, Ambassador to France; Alice Marriott (of the hotel family); Washington Redskins owner Jack Kent Cooke; Washington Capitals owner Abe Pollin; Washington Post publisher Donald E. Graham; Alice Mills (duPont); Senator John Warner; Willard Scott; Paul Mellon; Russell Baker; Jacqueline Mars (of the candy family); Knight-Ridder publishing heir Marie Ridder; actor Robert Duvall (who had only recently purchased an estate some eight miles from the Disney site); and, at the time of her death, Jacqueline Onassis (Mansfield, 4/18/94). Several of these people were prominent in their support of the PEC, both verbally and financially. Indeed, that the Piedmont Environmental Council became the most significant anti-Disney organization was due in no small measure to the prominence--and deep pockets--of its members and supporters. (Early on, the PEC announced a fund-raising goal of one million dollars for its fight against Disney. As of mid-September, 1994, over two million had been raised--over and above the PEC's annual budget of $860,000.) (Hsu, 10/16/94) Frequently branded as "elitist," PEC representatives asserted that not all of its members were wealthy, and that many of its contributions were of the under-$100 variety (Bradley, 2/20/94).
The PEC first announced its opposition to Disney's American at a news conference in Washington on December 1, 1993. The organization was not opposed to the park in concept, its representatives said, but rather to its proposed location--a site that would enhance urban sprawl and require "billions of dollars" in improvements to roads and highways. How much better it would be, they argued, to locate the theme park in an area where roads, sewers, and other utilities were already available; a specific site near Dulles International Airport was offered as an example (Bradley, 12/2/93). Not surprisingly, this stance led some observers to view the PEC as a reflection of the NIMBY (not in my back yard) mentality.
By September of 1994 the PEC had a staff of 25, about twice the number that had been employed a year earlier (Hsu, 10/16/94). In the scope and sophistication of its own political strategies, the Piedmont Environmental Council proved a strong adversary for the Disney Company. Among its most important strategies were the following.
(a) Creation of a campaign. The PEC launched its assault on Disney's America under the aegis of its "Disney--Take a Second Look Campaign," which became a tangible symbol of organized resistance to the project. Christopher J. Needels, a retired Army colonel, was hired to head the campaign (Bradley, 12/2/93).
(b) Mobilization of opposition. One of the PEC's first stated objectives was the creation of a mailing list of at least 10,000 people opposed to the project (Bradley, 12/2/93). At its December 1 news conference, PEC leaders announced that they had set up a toll-free telephone for receiving expressions of concern, and said they were receiving 300 to 400 calls per day (Odum and Hsu, 12/2/93). As of December 1 the "Disney--Take a Second Look Campaign" was claiming 2,500 members (Bradley, 12/2/93); six weeks later the number had grown to 4,500 (Stallsmith, 1/20/94). The PEC also sought to work closely with other anti-Disney organizations as they emerged.
(c) Studies. A major strategy employed by the PEC was its commissioning of studies of various aspects of the proposed development, with announcement of their findings at news conferences and at briefings of key legislators. A study prepared by two economic consultants asserted that Disney's America would create only half of the jobs projected by the Company (most of them low-wage positions in hotels and restaurants), and only one-quarter of the projected tax revenue (Stallsmith, 1/20/94). Another study, prepared by Synergy/Planning, Inc., suggested 32 alternate sites for the project, including six near Dulles and several within the city of Washington (Hsu, 2/3/94). A study prepared for the PEC by two University of Florida economists sought to rebut the Governor's William and Mary study, claiming that the latter had vastly overstated the economic impact of Disney's America by ignoring the demands for new public services that it would create; this report also argued that Disney World has had an adverse effect on other tourist attractions in Florida (Bradley, 2/15/94). The two economic consultants who had questioned the project's generation of new jobs presented data in support of their contention that Disney's America would cost Prince William County taxpayers at least $1.86 million annually beyond the tax revenue it would generate (Bradley, 5/8/94). The PEC and an organization called Clean Water Action released a study asserting that Disney's America would overwhelm Prince William County's waste-water treatment plan and would therefore force postponement of other developments; would reverse progress in cleaning up the Occoquan River; and would bring higher rates for sewer customers. (The Director of the Prince William County Service Authority promptly expressed his disagreement with this study.) (Shear, 6/14/94). A study prepared by an Orlando, Florida, engineering firm argued that Disney's America could place as many as 300,000 car trips per day on the area's highways, rather than the 77,000 predicted by Disney (Fehr, 7/14/94). Viewed collectively, these studies did not always convince their intended audiences of their inherent correctness. They did serve, however, to vitiate the impact of studies presented by Disney and the Governor; with all those figures floating around, who was to say which ones were correct?
(d) Use of media. Shortly after its initial news conference on December 1, the PEC bought anti-Disney ads on eleven northern Virginia radio stations (Bradley, 12/2/93). News conferences were held frequently thereafter, often to announce the findings of the above-mentioned studies. When the Virginia General Assembly approved its package of support for Disney and the lobbying focus shifted to the federal level, the PEC joined with several other organizations in launching a major radio and television campaign against the project (Bradley, 4/14/94).
(e) Lobbying. The PEC mounted its own lobbying capability; while it spent less in lobbying the General Assembly than did the Disney Company, it finished a strong second in 1994 Session lobbying expenditures. Public relations specialists and attorneys were hired to do battle with their Disney counterparts (Hsu, 3/7/94).
(f) Legal action. From its December 1 news conference forward, the PEC frequently stated its intention to take legal action, if necessary, to block the Disney project, focusing especially on the Clean Air Act of 1990 and on recent transportation legislation linking highway construction to regional efforts at the control of air pollution (Hsu, 3/7/94). One Washington Post writer characterized the PEC's strategy, in fact, as attempting to "raise enough environmental issues to go to court, tying up the proposed theme park for years" (Mansfield, 4/18/94). Late in the process, the PEC brought suit against both the state and Prince William County governments, claiming that they were "hiding" important documents pertaining to the case (Bradley, 9/10/94). As noted earlier, this led to the eventual release of thousands of pages of documents--and to some modestly embarrassing revelations regarding the manner in which reports and data had been handled within the Allen administration.
Overall, the Piedmont Environmental Council was highly effective in its combination of political strategies. In responding to charges that his administration had withheld important data, Governor Allen described the PEC as a "'self-centered group of extremists...who will do and say anything' to defend their role in killing the Disney proposal" (Bradley and Hardy, 10/6/94). On the other hand, in a post-victory letter to all members of the Charlottesville-based Southern Environmental Law Center, Rick Middleton, the SELC's Executive Director, praised the PEC and said that its "Take a Second Look" campaign "will stand as a model for effectual community action" (Middleton, 10/5/94). Whether the PEC should be applauded or condemned is contingent on one's stand on the Disney issue--but even Disney supporters must grudgingly acknowledge the organization's strong role in producing the final outcome.
(2) Protect Prince William County. This organization was formed in December of 1993 for the express purpose of opposing the Disney project. Unlike the PEC, Protect (as it was generally called) was comprised almost entirely of those Prince William County residents who were opposed to the theme park. Protect had no paid staff, and received legal service from a local attorney on a pro bono basis. The group saw itself, according to one writer, as the "community-minded, hard-working people interested in protecting the rural lifestyle they enjoy at the foot of the Bull Run Mountains" (Bradley, 2/20/94). While frequently allied with the PEC, Protect sought to maintain a separate image, and did not want to be "lumped with the wealthy landowners in Fauquier and Loudoun counties" (Bradley, 2/20/94). With about 800 members but significantly fewer resources at its disposal, Protect appeared to rely on the following two strategies.
(a) Rallies. Early in January, Protect held a meeting to mobilize local opposition to the Disney project; about 300 people attended (Bradley, 1/10/94). Plans were made at this meeting for a caravan to Richmond on January 24 to lobby the General Assembly; about 50 people actually made the trip (Hardy and Churn, 1/25/94). Nine months later, Protect organized a march and rally in Washington, complete with a speech by Ralph Nader. This time an estimated 2,500 people turned up for the event, including representatives of 55 organizations from 15 states (Bradley, 9/18/94).
(b) Legal action. Following Disney's victory with the General Assembly in March, Protect filed suits in the Prince William County Circuit Court and in the U. S. District Court in Richmond, challenging virtually every aspect of the government approvals obtained or being sought. The defendants included the Governor and several other state officials, as well as eight of the nine members of the Prince William County Board of Supervisors. The suit involved everything from wetlands programs to an accusation that the state had violated the "Civil Rights Act of 1871" by "stifling opposition" to the proposed park (Bradley, 3/31/94). A month later Virginia's Attorney General asked the County Circuit Court to throw out the suit, labeling it "frivolous" and "preposterous" (Bradley, 4/28/94). Two months later, a judge did as the Attorney General had requested.
Most prominent among the local groups that were supportive of Disney's America were the following.
(1) Welcome Disney Committee. Described as a "group of Prince William real estate agents, lawyers and chamber of commerce members who hope to benefit from a Disney theme park in the county," this group was organized in December of 1993 to lobby on behalf of Disney's America; while Disney did not directly underwrite the group, one member noted that Disney officials had "put us in touch with each other" in recent days (Hsu, 12/21/93). Initially the Committee had 25 members, but by February the group was claiming a membership of 4,700 (Bradley, 2/9/94); by June it was described in the New York Times as a coalition of eleven organizations (Janofsky, 6/19/94). Its stated intention, initially, was to launch a "grass-roots phone and mail campaign to mobilize what the group calls the 'positive majority' supporting Disney" (Hsu, 12/21/93). In January the Committee chartered three buses to take members to Richmond for lobbying with the General Assembly (Baker and Hsu, 1/21/94). Later the Committee reported having sent 300 to 400 lobbying kits to supporters, containing "talking points," "friendly" news clippings, petition forms, drafts of letters-to-the-editor, and the telephone numbers of key officials (Hsu, n.d.). The group was undoubtedly helpful to the Disney cause at the local and state levels, but it had few resources to render it effective at the national scale.
(2) Chambers of Commerce. The Prince William County and Prince William County-Greater Manassas Chambers of Commerce both unanimously endorsed Disney's America early in the process (Bradley, 12/2/93). Their activities were focused on those decisions that would be made at the local level. In July the two groups announced a joint "Road to Success" campaign, intended to rally support for the project; relying on bumper stickers, radio ads, a letter-writing campaign, and the formation of a "Youth for Disney" group, the Chambers' goal was to ensure the presence of at least 500 supporters when the County Board of Supervisors met in December to decide on Disney's rezoning request (RTD, 7/20/94).
Several other groups--the Coalition of Gainesville District Residents, the Northwest Prince William Citizens Association, etc.--made occasional pronouncements during the life of the controversy, but did not play prominent roles. Viewing the local scene in its totality, it is reasonable to conclude that the anti-Disney groups had a much greater impact on the final result than did the favorable groups. The former had more resources and far stronger networks of allied organizations, and were therefore better able to extend their influence beyond the local level.
(2) Chesapeake Bay Foundation. This group--with 83,000 members, the largest environmental organization in the Mid-Atlantic area--concluded that Disney's America would undermine the region's air quality, which in turn would eventually prove harmful to the Bay. Disney's environmental consultant, Leon Billings, attempted to rebut this position on the grounds that the proposed park was too far from the Bay to have such an effect (RTD, 5/1/94; Hsu, 6/30/94). The Foundation later proposed an alternative site for the park--a 400-acre parcel in Fairfax County near Dulles International Airport; Disney officials immediately dismissed the parcel as too small (Bradley, 9/15/94).
(3) Southern Environmental Law Center. An article in the Summer 1994 issue of Southern Resources, the SELC's newsletter, stated the organization's intention to "represent the Piedmont Environmental Council and play a central role in battling 'The Mouse' by ensuring that the environmental impact statement is comprehensive and thorough. SELC will gather and present our own expert analysis and evidence and see that the agencies fully investigate and consider all direct and secondary impacts of Disney's America" (p. 1). The SELC's hope, according to the article, was to "convince Disney to relocate to a more appropriate site where supporting infrastructure already exists" (p. 6).
(4) Citizens Against Gridlock. Through the first two months of 1994, the Piedmont Environmental Council and other opposition groups had directed most of their actions toward Virginia's General Assembly, in a vain effort to persuade the state's legislators to reject Governor Allen's package of support for Disney's America. Having lost this battle, the anti-Disney forces regrouped and shifted their focus to Washington. With the PEC leading the way, seven organizations created a new coalition called Citizens Against Gridlock. The major target of its efforts was the Washington Metropolitan Council of Governments and its subsidiary Transportation Planning Board, which had the capacity to disapprove Disney-related highway improvements if it chose to do so. Using $100,000 provided by the PEC, Citizens Against Gridlock bought radio and television ads arguing the negative traffic and pollution effects of the Disney project. Citizens Against Gridlock wanted the COG to eliminate the General Assembly-approved highway improvements, and also asked the COG to conduct a "major investment analysis" (which, if done, would have ensured additional delay of the project). (Bradley, 4/14/94) A Washington Post writer labeled this the first time in the Washington area that "activists have taken to the airwaves to stop a development project" (Hsu, 4/14/94).
(5) American Farmland Trust. This organization, a "farmland preservation" group with 18,000 members, held a news conference at the National Press Club in March, expressing concern that Disney's America could "wipe out productive farms in Northern Virginia unless local governments adopt safeguards" (Bradley, 3/23/94). Within a 40-mile radius (or one hour's drive) from the proposed Disney site, according to Trust figures, were 6,000 farms and 1.2 million acres of agricultural land, accounting for 14 % of all farmland in Virginia, as well as 57 % of its orchards (Bradley, 3/23/94). Trust representatives said they were not opposing Disney, but wanted adequate protection for the area's farmland.
Overall, environmental groups played a major role in establishing the moral tone of the controversy, portraying Disney as yet another giant corporation putting profits ahead of the environmental well-being of the surrounding region's residents. The Disney Company's image as a sensitive and responsible provider of family entertainment was certainly taking some serious hits. The propensity of the environmentalists for legal action was an additional problem for the Company.
The first shot was fired by a group called the Save the Battlefield Coalition, a local group stirred to action whenever threats to Manassas appear on the horizon. A group representative expressed concern about the "special treatment" Disney was requesting and offered assurances that the Coalition would be monitoring the proposed theme park's likely impact on the Battlefield (RTD, 11/26/93). Shortly thereafter, a Richmond Times-Dispatch writer interviewed several historians and other academics at universities within the state. Their collective fear, he wrote, was that Disney would "produce a Hollywood version of history that will sugarcoat some of the more distasteful moments of America's past. Issues such as slavery and the settler's (sic) treatment of American Indians cannot be seriously presented amid thrill rides" (Bradley, 12/5/93).
Critical references to Disneyfied history continued to appear in print from time to time over the next few months, but it was not until May of 1994 that historians became major players in the controversy. On May 2, an open letter from the National Trust for Historic Preservation to the Disney Company was published in the form of a full-page advertisement in the Washington Post. Included with the letter was its formal endorsement by 24 other groups, including the Chesapeake Bay Foundation, the National Audubon Society, and the Piedmont Environmental Council. The Trust paid $49,000 for the ad, using a donation from an "anonymous member" (Bradley, 5/3/94). Interestingly, the letter focused far more on environmental problems--urban sprawl, pollution, etc.--than on issues of history. In June, however, the Trust placed the northern Virginia Piedmont on its 1994 list of America's Eleven Most Endangered Historic Places (Berke 1994).
More significant yet was a news conference held at the National Press Club on May 11, 1994, announcing the formation of a group called Protect Historic America, comprised of over 30 "leading historians and other authors" who were dedicated to persuading Disney to halt its project. The group's major spokesperson for the occasion was David McCullough, a Pulitzer Prize winner and one of the narrators for the PBS "Civil War" series. Said McCullough: "This is the ground of our Founding Fathers. These are landscapes that speak volumes--small towns, churches, fields, mountains, creeks and rivers with names such as Bull Run and Rappahannock. They are the real thing, and what shame we will bring on ourselves if we destroy them" (Bradley, 5/12/94). The group was not opposed to the park, he said, but to its location--within an hour's drive of 13 historic towns, 16 Civil War battlefields, and 17 officially designated historic districts. John Hope Franklin and C. Vann Woodward were announced as the group's co-chairmen; the roster of members included Shelby Foote, James McPherson, Tom Wicker, William Styron, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., James David Barber, and Mary Frances Berry. A Prince William County member of the group, Annie Snyder, reported four days later that she had identified "chairpersons" in Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Utah in order to "contact a mailing list of 30,000 history buffs" (Hsu, 5/15/94). In contrast to this much cultural fire-power, Disney's initial response--that the Company had contributed $100,000 to the Association for the Preservation of Civil War Sites, and would participate directly in the improvement of Manassas Battlefield (Bradley, 5/12/94)--had little effect.
Protect Historic America took its case directly to Congress. Prompted by a visit from 30 "prominent historians," Senator Dale Bumpers (a Democrat from Arkansas) announced his intention to hold a hearing on Disney's America in mid-June, before the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Subcommittee on Public Lands, National Parks, and Forests, which he chaired (WP, 5/26/94). Not surprisingly, Governor Allen responded that the Congress had no business involving itself in a state issue (a position reiterated a month later in Haymarket by Oliver North during his unsuccessful campaign for a seat in the U. S. Senate). (Baker and Baker, 6/28/94)
On June 16, Congressman Michael A. Andrews, a Texas Democrat and a Civil War buff, introduced a resolution, with 17 co-sponsors, asking Disney to move its proposed park and requesting scrutiny of the project by several federal agencies (RTD, 6/17/94).
On June 21, Senator Bumpers conducted his hearing, with over 400 people in the hearing room. Governor Allen was present to defend the project. No action was taken as a result of this meeting--Bumpers concluded, in fact, that the matter should be left to Virginia, Prince William County, and the ongoing Federal review process--but the session "placed the Disney debate on a national stage," as the historians wanted (Bradley, 6/22/94).
Overall, the historians, commanding respect in the culturally-oriented media and within the nation's community of avocational historians, had an impact not unlike that of the environmentalists--with whom they formed an informal working alliance. Writing in the Historic Preservation News, Arnold Berke competently summarized their joint accomplishment: "The outcry against the Disney project...has expanded the issue from one of initial concern in the Washington, D. C., area to a nationwide debate over the impacts of urban sprawl on history, scenic beauty, and the environment as well as over the ways Americans feel their history should be taught" (Berke 1994). While Disney's supporters were reluctant to recognize this fact, the project was by now in serious jeopardy.
In February Robert Wilburn, President of the Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, wrote an "op ed" piece criticizing the state's subsidy of competition for Williamsburg; if the state was going to spend $13 million promoting Disney's America, shouldn't Williamsburg receive the same? (Wilburn, 2/14/94). Five days later the Boards of Directors of the Williamsburg Area Chamber of Commerce and the Williamsburg Hotel/Motel Association jointly and "unanimously passed a resolution urging the creation of grant programs to provide tax money for tourism promotions statewide" (Petkofsky, 2/19/94).
Soon, however, Virginia's major tourist attractions began to worry not just about equal treatment, but about the possible loss of visitors as well. Speaking to a group of Virginia museum officials meeting in Alexandria, Williamsburg's Wilburn said that focus groups conducted since November in Connecticut, Ohio, and North Carolina suggested that Colonial Williamsburg would "fare poorly among tourists when compared with a Disney park" (Hsu, 5/4/94). A month later Wilburn joined with Donald P. Jordan, president of the organization operating Monticello in Charlottesville, in issuing a news release (said to represent several other state historic attractions as well) urging state officials to ensure that Disney would not "reproduce the themes, buildings and imagery associated with Virginia's historic sites" (Petkofsky, 6/10/94).
Meanwhile, other players in the state's tourism industry saw nothing but dollar signs. A new tourism organization representing facilities along U. S. Highway 29 (which abutted the Disney site for a short distance), for example, expressed their strong support for the project (Allison, 7/5/94).
Overall, the state's tourist destinations would have been strongly affected by Disney's America--some positively, others negatively. Collectively, however, the industry lacked the informed analysis, the resources, and the statewide political cohesiveness that would have been needed in order for the industry to play a major role in the controversy.
While Michael Eisner, Disney's Washington lobbyists, and the environment-and-history forces were doing battle in Washington, all was not silent in Prince William County. The roles and strategies of groups representing local citizens have already been discussed, but what of the County's elected and governmental officials?
The Disney Company announced its intentions on November 11, 1993. The chairperson of the County's eight-member Board of Supervisors, Kathleen K. Seefeldt, emerged at once as a staunch and vocal supporter of the development; six other members were generally supportive, and the eighth--Bobby McManus, representing the district in which the park was to be built--was a frequent and vocal critic of the project. County Executive James Mullen and Haymarket Mayor John R. Kapp were also early endorsers of the project, citing the economic boost it would provide (Bradley, 12/2/93). Given the county's heavily residential character, achieving a balanced budget had become a serious challenge in recent years; a major project such as Disney's America could alleviate, perhaps even eliminate, the annual specter of budget shortfalls.
Local officials were determined from the outset, however, to negotiate the best deal possible with Disney--despite their relatively weak position at the bargaining table. The challenge was to obtain meaningful concessions from the Company without driving it away. Officials deserve high marks for their efforts; as at the state level, however, Disney rarely failed to get what it wanted from the County.
The first test occurred with Disney's request for a reduction in the fees the County assessed for the processing of rezoning requests. Introduced in the late 1980's, these fees were assessed against developers to cover the costs of staff review (RTD, 11/26/93). The current rate was $205 per acre, which in the Disney case would amount to $621,540. Disney requested a reduction; shortly thereafter the Board of Supervisors approved, by a 7-1 vote, a new graduated fee schedule for "large-scale rezoning requests," under which Disney's fee was reduced to approximately $214,000. Opponents labeled this an "undeserved giveaway"; the Supervisors replied that, owing to economies of scale, the new schedule would more closely reflect the County's actual costs of processing large-scale projects (Bradley, 12/22/93).
At the same December 21 meeting, the Supervisors created an 18-member task force to examine, and prepare guidelines for, future development in the vicinity of the proposed park, and requested Disney's financial help in hiring a consultant to work with the task force (Bradley, 12/22/93). Two months later the Board approved spending $395,000 for this purpose, and asked Disney to pay half; Disney refused to do so (RTD, 2/16/94). (This contract later proved controversial when the public learned that the $395,000 figure included $4,700 for a bus tour of the area, $8,000 for a person to facilitate interaction among the task force's members, $10,000 for someone to take notes at its meetings, and $27,000 for new maps which--according to critics--duplicated maps that were already available. Some Supervisors and task force members criticized the contract as "wasteful and unnecessary"; others, however, praised the consulting firm for its "high quality work and responsiveness.") (Wee, 8/19/94)
Occasionally the local officials scored victories. For example, the Virginia General Assembly formulated a plan that would have allowed Prince William County to issue $45 million in bonds to pay for Disney's utilities--without conducting a County-level referendum on the matter. The Supervisors arranged to have this scheme killed (Bradley, 2/2/94).
Overall, however, Disney's officials knew that they held the best cards at the local level; they behaved accordingly and usually won. One local official told me that he always found Disney "receptive--but not very responsive." This is amply illustrated by the interactions (at least in the early stages) between Disney people and the Prince William County Planning Office, which will be discussed in a separate section.
As noted earlier, the Clean Air Act of 1990 had mandated reductions in the region's generation of ozone-causing pollutants, with separate goals for 1996 and 1999.
The Transportation Planning Board had already submitted its plan for attaining the 1996 goal prior to the emergence of Disney's intentions, so the issue was whether a 1999 plan could be formulated--aimed at achieving additional pollutant reductions of at least 3 % per year for the entire region--while accommodating the 77,000 daily automobile trips projected for the Disney project. If Disney was going to add to the region's pollution level, then compensating reductions would have to be accomplished in other parts of the region. The 1999 plan had to be submitted to the Environmental Protection Agency by November of 1994 (Springston, 12/19/93). Not surprisingly, then, the work of the Transportation Planning Board became a major battleground for those on both sides of the Disney issue; indeed one group, Citizens Against Gridlock, was created explicitly to lobby the Board. This group asked the Board to commission a major (and therefore time-consuming) study of Disney-related highway improvements; the Board's attorney advised, however, that studies could be required legally only for federally-financed projects, and the Citizens Against Gridlock request was rejected. At the time this was considered a major Disney victory (Bradley, 5/19/94).
On July 20, 1994, the Transportation Planning Board released a report concluding that all highways currently anticipated for the region--including those related to Disney's America--could be accommodated under a plan that would not exceed federal pollution limits (Bradley, 7/21/94). Heavy emphasis was placed on tele-commuting and ride-sharing, along with stronger enforcement of speed limits, for bringing about the desired results. Anti-Disney groups immediately protested, arguing that the Board's analysis was flawed because it had relied on traffic data provided by Disney and Prince William County (Bradley, 7/22/94).
Early in September the Board held a public hearing on its plan. As expected, Disney's America dominated the discussion (both sides had hired buses to bring their supporters), with 40 people speaking in favor of the park and 29 speaking against (Bradley, 9/4/94). Finally, on September 21, 1994, the Board voted 24-7 to approve its plan for 1999, with the Disney project fully accommodated (Bradley, 9/22/94). Again it was assumed that Disney had surmounted a major hurdle--ironically, one week before the Company announced its withdrawal from the project.
Overall, it is reasonable to conclude that the battle at the regional level featured processes and decisions that were more political than technical. The outcome was helpful to the Disney cause--a cause which was by then so weakened on other fronts, however, as to render this victory relatively unimportant.
The most important federal issue revolved around the need for an environmental impact statement. The Federal Highway Administration would have to sign off on the improvements and interchanges scheduled for Interstate 66, even though state funds would be used. The FHA had the authority to determine the scope of the required EIS--whether it would be a major effort, probably taking 12-24 months to complete, or a more perfunctory review (Hsu, 3/28/94). In mid-April, Transportation Secretary Federico Pena's "policy and legal staff" announced that a full-scale EIS would be required, involving public hearings and review by a number of federal agencies (including the Environmental Protection Agency, the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the National Register of Historic Places) to ensure compliance with all relevant laws and regulations (including the Clean Air Acts of 1990 and 1991, the Inter-Modal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 199l, the Clean Water Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, the National Historic Preservation Act, and others) (Hsu, 4/16/94; Bradley, 4/20/94; Janofsky, 6/19/94) This was a major problem for Disney, of course, given its hopes for a 1998 park opening. Disney and it supporters must have done some effective lobbying of their own, because a news story early in May indicated that FHA officials might be reconsidering the need for a full-scale EIS (RTD, 5/6/94). This matter had reached no resolution by the time of Disney's withdrawal.
Not surprisingly, the land on which the Disney Company had obtained options was not zoned in a manner that would accommodate the proposed development, so rezoning would be necessary. This, of course, was the major vehicle available to local officials for attempting to ensure that the project would be implemented in a manner consistent with the County's general well-being. Accordingly, the Prince William County Planning Office had an important role to play.
In 1993-94 the Planning Office had approximately 50 employees, of whom some 30 occupied professional positions. The Office contained a Land Planning Division, a Zoning Administration Division, a Site and Subdivision Plan Review section, and a Support section. The Planning Director, Douglas L. James, had held the position since 1989; his background included more than two decades of planning experience in both the public and private sectors (most recently a 12-year term as Planning Director for Sarasota County in Florida), as well as a brief period of college-level teaching. Most staff work on the Disney project was carried out by a task force of six members, pulled from all four of the agency's divisions. Based on carefully-maintained management records, James reported that he had spent 34.4 % of his own time on Disney's America during the life of the project.
The tone of the interaction between Disney officials and the Planning Office was established early. As was customary, in December--prior to Disney's submission of its rezoning request--James offered to meet with Company representatives for a pre-application conference. The response was that such a meeting would not be necessary, since the application had already been completed.
Disney's rezoning request, filed on January 5, 1994, listed the proposed development's major elements (see section I of this paper), but provided few specifics concerning the nature and scope of anticipated construction, the anticipated timetable, or the costs of the services (schools, police and fire protection, water and other utilities, etc.) that would be generated by the project (Hsu, 1/14/94). James responded to Disney's application with a 14-page list of questions, and asked Disney to submit a revised application by February 17.
The projected timetable at that point was as follows. By April 8 the Planning Office would issue a "summary letter" outlining its reactions to Disney's "proffers"--that is, the infrastructure costs that the County was hoping Disney would "volunteer" to pay; assuming a response from Disney by April 20, the Planning Office could have a recommendation ready for the Planning Commission by May 23; the Commission would hold public hearings in June and July, leading to its own recommendation to the Board of Supervisors in August. Given that the Board would likely hold one or more public hearings of its own, September was a reasonable deadline for completion of the entire process, and a firm decision on Disney's rezoning request (Hsu, 1/27/94). Things did not work out quite that smoothly, however.
Disney's February 17 submittal offered to donate 55 acres for a combined high school and public library, ten acres for an elementary school, and two acres for a combined police and fire station, all intended to serve the housing and commercial portions of its 3,006-acre development (Bradley, 2/18/94, 3/11/94). Disney also promised to cap residential development at 2,500 housing units, to limit commercial space to two million square feet, to develop a 70-acre "wetlands bank," to ensure high-quality architectural guidelines outside the theme park, to develop an appropriate storm water management system, and to conduct additional transportation studies (Bradley, 2/18/94).
Public safety and school officials wrote letters of protest to the Planning Office, saying that Disney's proffers were "far less generous than those offered by the developer who won approval in 1991 to build a huge subdivision on much of the same property" (Bradley, 3/11/94). Planning Office staff remained dissatisfied and responded with--this time--a 28-page list of questions. The application was still too vague, they said; a phrase repeated frequently in the communication to Disney was that: "It is not possible for the county to determine what public services and infrastructure will be needed when this area is developed nor whether such services will be available" (Bradley, 3/13/94). More detailed information was needed pertaining to water and sewer service; the kind of development anticipated for areas abutting agricultural land; the specific distribution of housing types in each residential area; and the provision of public services (schools, libraries, fire and police, etc.). Disney responded initially that many of these details would be included in its site plan application, to be submitted after the rezoning was approved (Bradley, 3/13/94).
Early in April, James noted that the Disney project would also require an amendment to the County's comprehensive plan, and that the Board of Supervisors would be asked to initiate the amendment process. This would have to be considered concurrently with the request for rezoning and for the special use permits that Disney would need for its golf course, campground, hotels, fireworks, laser light show, battlefield reenactment, air show, and landing strip.
Disney submitted another version of its rezoning application on April 8, including a fiscal impact study asserting that the County would collect more than enough taxes from the project to pay for the public service needs it would generate. The submission also included a sound impact analysis, a plan for a trail, and a revised list of proffers (acres pledged for a high school, for example, were increased from 55 to 58--still substantially below the 80 acres deemed necessary by local school officials). (Bradley, 4/9/94).
On April 21 the Planning Commission held the first of four scheduled work sessions on Disney's rezoning application; members complained that it was still unacceptably vague (RTD, 4/22/94). On May 6 James presented Disney's attorney with a 35-page request for information and commitments. Disney responded on May 23 with the sixth volume of its rezoning application, this time including a 62-page list of proffers. Disney proposed to do some downsizing: the theme park itself would be limited to 405 acres, down from 1,200; housing units would be limited to 2,28l (down from 2,500) and commercial space to 1.9 million square feet (down from 2 million); no major stadia would be erected; 1,245 acres would be dedicated to green space (up from 1,000); eleven miles of bicycle and walking trails would be added; acreage would be increased from 58 to 66 for the high school, from 11 to 13 for the elementary school (RTD, 5/24/94).
Many of the major issues between Disney and the Planning Office remained unaddressed, however, and many of the specific offers were still unacceptable. Early in June, James reported to James Mullen, the County Executive, that the planning staff was not in a position to support the project before the Planning Commission. Mullen then asked James to explain in detail, to policy-making representatives of the Disney Company, why the application remained deficient. In early June a three-and-a-half hour meeting was held involving Mullen, James, and two "higher level" Disney officials. At the meeting's conclusion, the Disney officials asked for an additional six weeks to "fix the problem," and promised to bring a different approach to the negotiations. Between June 10 and July 18, reports James, he was in touch with Disney negotiators at least once daily--by phone, fax, or in person--seven days a week, and those negotiators manifested a spirit of compromise that had heretofore been absent.
On July 20 Disney submitted a revised rezoning application, containing over 100 proffers and addressing most of the issues that had been of concern to the planners. One week later, Planning Director James submitted a two-volume staff recommendation to the Planning Commission, recommending approval of the rezoning. Some minor issues remained; for example, the staff recommended denial of proposed daily air shows with vintage aircraft. The recommendation noted that Disney's transportation plan needed some "fine tuning"; for example, Disney was promising to take steps to reduce traffic if a proposed 77,000-vehicle-per-day cap was reached, but did not identify the nature of these steps. Staff felt that Disney was still deficient in its plans for protecting wildlife and wetlands. Overall, however, the planning staff concluded that the application for rezoning, as well as two of the three special use permit applications, were now consistent with the County's Comprehensive Plan and its proposed site-specific amendments. Not surprisingly, a spokesman for the Piedmont Environmental Council labeled the staff report a "total capitulation" to Disney (Bradley, 8/2/94). "We have said over and over again that the county is not involved in serious, arms-length negotiations with Disney," he said. "We've expected this. That's been our concern all along" (Shear, 7/28/94).
Having received the staff's recommendation on July 27, the Planning Commission initiated its own review process. Five work sessions were held over the next eight weeks, involving the Commissioners, the planning staff, and Disney's representatives in approximately 40 hours of intense negotiations on a number of issues. One major issue was the Commissioners' request for assurances that Disney's America would not secede from the County and become an independent jurisdiction, as had occurred with Disney World in Florida; five of the eight Planning Commissioners said they would vote against the project unless such a pledge was received (RTD, 8/28/94). Disney wanted to limit the pledge to 20 years; planning staff argued that it should be permanent. On another issue, the planning staff had wanted to place limits on the frequency, duration, and height of the theme park's proposed nightly fireworks shows. Showing that they had not completely forgotten how to play hardball, Disney officials declared this a "deal-killing" issue, and the Planning Commission reluctantly yielded on this issue.
The Commission held a public hearing on September 10. In preparation, Disney mounted mass mailing and phoning campaigns, and held a rally at the County's baseball stadium featuring entertainment and free food; attendance was estimated at 6,000 (Tousignant and Hsu, 9/11/94). At the hearing itself, both pro- and anti-Disney forces erected tents where they sold baseball caps and T-shirts with appropriate messages. The pro-Disney group provided free hot dogs, sodas, and chips; the anti-Disney group provided similar fare, but requested a donation (Bradley, 9/11/94). Several hundred people sat in on the hearing, which lasted twelve hours before concluding with 79 people having spoken for Disney, 76 against (Tousignant and Hsu, 9/11/94).
On September 21--as the Transportation Planning Board to the east was approving Disney highway improvements for inclusion in the region's 1999 transportation plan--Prince William County's Planning Commission voted 7-1 to recommend adoption of the proposed Comprehensive Plan amendment, approval of the Disney Company's rezoning request, and approval of all three special use permits. In a last-minute compromise, Disney promised not to secede for 40 years. The Board of Supervisors scheduled a public hearing for October 15.
One week later, Disney officials informed Governor George Allen that they would not be developing Disney's America on the site near Haymarket after all.
James did not think that Disney officials had spent much time lobbying the Supervisors. The strong support of the Board's chairperson, after all, had been clear from the outset. And with the Governor also on board and promising to "kick down any obstacle" in the way of the project, why worry about the County's planning staff? Whatever their recommendation, the final decision would reside with the Supervisors.
And what of the Supervisors themselves; to what extent did they bring pressure to bear on the Planning Office? James said it simply did not occur. He made a distinction between the Board's keen interest in economic development, which was the basis on which most Board members supported the project, and their equally keen interest in land use issues; several Board members realized that there were problems with Disney's early plans, he said, and were looking to the Planning Office to resolve them. Finally, James felt that the highly controversial nature of the project worked to his advantage; elected officials like to keep their options open.
What about the various interest groups involved in the case; did they attempt to influence the Planning Office? Early in the project, said James, he became concerned that his staff was paying too much attention to news articles and other pronouncements in the media. He asked the staff not to dwell on what other groups were saying, and to stay focused on the task at hand. James assumed the role of the Office's primary spokesperson on the Disney issue. Each Monday, he said, all new information acquired during the preceding week was placed in the County's nine libraries, where it was available for public review. Overall, he did not feel that his staff had been subjected to undue pressure from outside groups.
I asked him what he considered to be his major sources of strength in withstanding the political pressures at work in the Disney case. He identified two. First, he believed that the Planning Office (as well as the Planning Commission, with which he felt he had excellent rapport) had developed a strong administrative process that took the "guesswork" out of reviews; this in turn had created a reputation of objectivity, neutrality, and competence in the County. The Office enjoyed considerable respect, he said, and this translated into a measure of strength in withstanding external pressures. Second, he praised the role of his immediate superior, County Executive James Mullen, in supporting the objectivity that the Planning Office must bring to bear on such issues in order to retain its credibility. Despite Mullen's personal enthusiasm for the project, James said that he never felt under pressure to compromise his professional standards.
What should one make of the above viewpoints? Was the Planning Office's role really as efficacious as James suggested, or was this in reality the "total capitulation" that a PEC official claimed it to be?
There can be little doubt that the project's approval by Prince William County's Board of Supervisors was a foregone conclusion. James was probably right, however, in believing that the Supervisors were relying on the Planning Office to work out what they knew to be some serious land use issues. This did indeed provide the Office with a measure of clout that it might not otherwise have enjoyed. Given the intensely political nature of the environment in which they were working, the County's planners manifested considerable professional competence and skill in securing as many concessions as they did. Their options were not without limits, of course; technical reports vigorously advocating the project's rejection, for example, would probably have transcended the bounds of acceptability.
An important element in the analysis of any planning case is an assessment of the constraints on the situation. How far can one push those constraints without running the risk of role breakdown? While I doubt that he conceptualized what he was doing in quite these terms, I think Douglas James did an excellent job of assessing his constraints, and of maximizing what he could accomplish within those constraints.
IV. A Brief Postmortem on Disney's America
On September 21, 1994, Disney officials were able to celebrate major victories at the county and regional levels to go along with their previous triumph with the General Assembly in Richmond. One week later the project was dead. What had happened?
There is always the possibility, of course, that the real answer to this question cannot be ascertained from readily-available information. Who knows what kinds of decisions were being made, and on what grounds, within the upper reaches of Disney's corporate structure? Well-publicized problems with Euro Disney, along with equally well-publicized differences among Disney's top executives, may have impacted on Disney's America in ways that will never be visible to those of us on the outside. Based on the few public remarks made by Disney officials after September 21, however, there appear to have been two major--and closely interrelated--factors at work in their decision.
First, the Disney image was taking a beating. Robert T. Skunda, Virginia's Secretary for Commerce and Trade, expressed a prescient concern in June of 1994 when he said: "Any company eventually reaches a point where they say, 'Our reputation and our public image is far more important to us than an individual undertaking and we aren't going to subject ourselves to this anymore...'" (Smith, 6/24/94). And on the other side of the issue, columnist George Will wrote in July: "It is astonishing that Disney, out of sheer stubbornness, is risking its reputation as a good corporate citizen, and is doing so to put here a project that could be put in many more suitable places. But it is not too late for Disney to learn a lesson from Lee, who is revered by the nation he tried to dismember--revered partly because he knew how to retreat and when to surrender" (Will, 7/17/94).
Disney, the company of wholesome family entertainment, was being characterized as an insensitive and destructive monster. Controlling the image in positive ways was becoming too difficult, and this ultimately translates into bottom line concerns. It was time to cut the firm's losses.
Second, Disney had lost control of its budgeting process for the project. Millions of dollars had been invested in Disney's America with the expectation that a cash flow would begin in 1998. It was clear that the park's opponents were turning to a courtroom-based strategy, both to block the project if possible and, if not, to at least tie it up in the courts for as long as possible; the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, for example, was reported to be preparing a court challenge of the Transportation Planning Board's decision, and several other cases were being planned as well (Bradley, 9/30/94). It was becoming impossible for Disney's leaders to ascertain when, or even if, the project would begin to pay off.
What might Disney have done to produce a different outcome? The conventional wisdom holds that Disney was caught in a time warp, relying on old-fashioned, heavy-handed steamroller tactics that simply don't work any more. The days when a corporation could quietly assemble land, make a public announcement, and expect the polite applause of the surrounding community are long gone, according to this perspective. Rather than backing concerned groups into corners, firms must openly involve them in all phases of the development process. Douglas James expressed the opinion, for example, that if Disney officials had involved the community in developing and critiquing the Company's initial thinking about the project, a sense of community ownership might have emerged, thereby defusing some of the opposition.
In a mid-June (1994) interview with the Washington Post, Michael Eisner observed that "if he had foreseen opposition would be so fierce, he would have delayed the project by a year and taken more time to prepare a public-relations campaign" (Powers, 6/14/94). This statement misses the point of the argument set forth in the preceding paragraph. Good PR was hardly the problem; rather, goes the argument, Disney was done in by its failure to make the community a full partner in its venture.
But could Disney's America really have been saved by the adoption of a "good neighbor" approach to economic development? I don't think so. The most potent opposition groups--the Piedmont Environmental Council, Protect Historic America, and the coalitions of national environmental organizations--were objecting to matters far more fundamental than Disney's operating style. I do agree, however, that Disney would have benefited from more communication and interaction with these groups. Had its officials done so, they probably would have perceived the futility of their effort and withdrawn several months earlier, thereby saving millions of dollars.
As noted earlier, Virginia's counties and the surrounding states continued their mating dances with Disney for several months after the project's termination, hoping to attract the development to their jurisdictions. Even in Prince William County there were diehards who harbored a faint hope that some other corner of the County might prove Disney-worthy. The company kept the door open for a while, and rumors of "Disney sightings" in their areas continued to titillate local and state officials. As of this writing (over two years later), however, it appears that the entire concept has been laid to rest. Why would the Company want to go through such a process a second time?
Was Disney's America going to generate 19,000 new jobs (as claimed in the study done by the College of William and Mary's Bureau of Business Research for Governor Allen), or 12,400 (as claimed by the Disney Company on the basis of its own studies), or 6,000 (as claimed by economic consultants doing analysis for the Piedmont Environmental Council)? Well, it depends on how widely one casts the net; are we talking about direct employment by Disney, or about all the jobs that might conceivably be spawned by the development? Are we focusing on the immediate vicinity of the theme park, or are we talking about new jobs that might be created in tourist attractions elsewhere in the state? What is the relevant time frame? What kinds of multiplier effects are being assumed? And so on.
If rational planning and political processes are viewed as alternative means of resolving important public policy issues, the Disney case offered no contest. Politics won hands down.
This was not the first project to be barred from Prince William County on the basis of political action. Only recently, local and national groups had successfully repelled a developer who wanted to build a major shopping center adjacent to Manassas National Battlefield. Indeed, Virginians have been treated to other major development fiascoes in recent years--for example, Governor L. Douglas Wilder's abortive attempt to relocate the Washington Redskins stadium to Alexandria.
It is worth asking, in fact, whether large-scale developments are indeed possible in the NIMBY (not in my back yard) age, especially those planned for already-settled areas (in contrast, for example, to the area around Disney's World in Florida, which was relatively devoid of activity at the time of Disney's arrival). Special interest groups increasingly have access to resources, to supportive data and analysis, to skills in mobilizing support and making effective use of the media, to competent legal counsel. Virtually any major development proposal quickly generates an organized body of opposition. It is no wonder, then, that such proposals so often devolve into contentious and nasty issues, conducted in a total-victory, take-no-prisoners mode. I suspect we will need to devote increased attention, over the next few years, to acquiring a better understanding of the conditions under which large-scale development will still be feasible.
Few would argue, for example, that the professionals of the Prince William County Planning Office were the most important planners in the Disney's America case. Their role was, in fact, mostly reactive; they had not set out to "plan" a major theme park for the county, but had to deal with the idea when it emerged. In the overall scheme of things, their role--while hardly inconsequential--was relatively minor.
Initially, of course, the major planning entity was the Disney Company itself. Goals had been established, one assumes that a number of alternative sites had been considered, and strategies for achieving their goals were manifest in the Company's behavior. One way of characterizing the final outcome is simply to note that there were too many negative unanticipated consequences associated with the chosen course of action.
Governor Allen and his staff engaged extensively in planning; a strategy for winning the General Assembly's approval of his Disney support package had to be designed and implemented. And the opposition groups planned. Particularly admirable was their skill in regrouping and re-strategizing after each of their early defeats.
Guy Benveniste, in his book on Mastering the Politics of Planning: Crafting Credible Plans and Policies That Make a Difference (1989), emphasizes the importance of negotiation, networking, and coalition-building as strategies for planners who aspire to be politically effective in the implementation of their plans. Certainly the second and third of these strategies were central to the success of the opposition groups. The first strategy, negotiation, was illustrated to some extent by the expressed willingness of most of the opposition groups to support the park if it were moved to a more acceptable site. The sincerity of this claim was never put to the test. Negotiation also played a role in the Governor's last-minute compromise with the General Assembly, giving its members their much-desired rationale for supporting the Disney development. Overall, however, negotiation was the least important of the three strategies stressed by Benveniste.
Further insights on the politics of planning are provided by John M. Bryson and Barbara C. Crosby in Leadership for the Common Good: Tackling Public Problems in a Shared-Power World (1992). They provide useful guidelines for moving issues through the stages of public debate ("forums"), legislative action ("arenas"), and judicial review ("courts"), and argue that reform movements or public interest causes can be successful only to the extent that their participants are skilled at each stage. Their thesis is well-illustrated by the Disney case: the issue was probably a draw at the forum stage, but Disney had attained the upper hand in the relevant arenas. It was only when the court stage was reached that Disney's strategy came apart; the scale--and likely duration--of the battle at that stage had apparently not been anticipated.
What political advice can be given to professional planners who confront unanticipated large-scale developments within their jurisdictions?
First, one should carefully assess the political parameters of the situation, and their implications for one's freedom to act in a professional manner. Will these parameters likely compromise one's values and professional ethics? If not, fine; if so, what is to be done about it? (In the Disney case, it was clear that the County Board of Supervisors would ultimately approve the rezoning application. How much freedom would therefore be available in working with Disney's representatives? Douglas James concluded that he had room for effective action.)
Second, it is important to identify one's clients. (In the Disney case, the County Executive and the Board of Supervisors certainly had to be considered as primary clients. James believed, however, that they had given him leeway to define the residents of Prince William County as his clients, thereby justifying his efforts to obtain as many concessions as possible from Disney.)
And third, one should represent the client's interests as fully, as professionally, and as competently as possible. Professional planners are not likely to have much influence on the final outcome of cases such as this one. Their role does matter, however, to the extent that it has an impact--whether great or slight--on the manner in which the land is used, and thus on the quality of life enjoyed by the jurisdiction's citizens.
ENDNOTES
Mike Allen, "Disney abandons Northern Va. site," Richmond Times-Dispatch, September 29, 1994, pp. A1, A13.
Wes Allison, "Group thinks Disney may help on U.S. 29," Richmond Times-Dispatch, July 5, 1994, pp. B1, B8.
Peter Baker, "Va. Lawmakers Less Enchanted With Disney," Washington Post, January 26, 1994, pp. B1, B2.
Peter Baker, "Those Persuasive Guys in the Mickey Mouse Ties," Washington Post, February 7, 1994, p. D3.
Peter Baker and Donald P. Baker, "North Gives Senate an Earful on Disney," Washington Post, June 28, 1994, pp. C1, C4.
Peter Baker and Spencer S. Hsu, "Allen Lays Out a No-Strings Deal for Disney," Washington Post, January 21, 1994, pp. A1, A7.
Peter Baker and Spencer S. Hsu, "Disney Gives Up on Haymarket Theme Park, Vows to Seek Less Controversial Virginia Site," Washington Post, September 29, 1994, pp. A1, A15.
Guy Benveniste, Mastering the Politics of Planning: Crafting Credible Plans and Policies That Make a Difference (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1989).
Arnold Berke, "Going National," Historic Preservation News, 34:4 (August/September 1994), p. 21.
Paul Bradley, "Group to oppose Disney park plan," Richmond Times-Dispatch, December 2, 1993, p. B1, B8.
Paul Bradley, "Some worry about Disney-esque history," Richmond Times-Dispatch, December 5, 1993, p. C4.
Paul Bradley, "Will pay its way, Disney says," Richmond Times-Dispatch, December 11, 1993, p. B1, B4.
Paul Bradley, "Disney cites tax impact of $2 billion," Richmond Times-Dispatch, December 14, 1993, pp. A1, A6.
Paul Bradley, "Disney wins lower fees for rezoning," Richmond Times-Dispatch, December 22, 1994, p. B4.
Paul Bradley, "Disney plans include housing, golf course," Richmond Times-Dispatch, January 6, 1994, p. B1, B4.
Paul Bradley, "Allen is going to bat for Disney," Richmond Times-Dispatch, January 7, 1994, p. B4.
Paul Bradley, "Disney foes urged to join caravan," Richmond Times-Dispatch, January 10, 1994, p. B4.
Paul Bradley, "Disney poll says 65 % in state support park," Richmond Times-Dispatch, January 28, 1994, p. B4.
Paul Bradley, "One bill to aid Disney fails," Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 2, 1994, pp. A1, A9.
Paul Bradley, "State's first lady helps Disney open office," Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 9, 1994, p. B4.
Paul Bradley, "Historians to help Disney with accuracy," Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 15, 1994, pp. B1, B5.
Paul Bradley, "Supervisors may hire consultant to work with citizens' task force," Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 15, 1994, p. B5.
Paul Bradley, "Disney offers land for projects," Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 18, 1994, pp. A1, A13.
Paul Bradley, "'Elitist' tag upsets park foes," Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 20, 1994, pp. A1, A21.
Paul Bradley, "Officials dislike Disney land offer," Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 11, 1994, pp. B1, B6.
Paul Bradley, "Disney hasn't hit finish line yet," Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 13, 1994, p. C4.
Paul Bradley, "Farmland group fears effect of Disney sprawl," Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 23, 1994, p. B4.
Paul Bradley, "Disney foes file federal, state suits," Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 31, 1994, pp. B1, B4.
Paul Bradley, "New park papers still leave questions," Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 9, 1994, p. B4.
Paul Bradley, "Disney opponents seek to block highway upgrade," Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 14, 1994, p. B4.
Paul Bradley, "Study may delay park," Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 20, 1994, pp. A1, A7.
Paul Bradley, "State blasts Disney lawsuit," Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 28, 1994, p. B4.
Paul Bradley, "Disney park site criticized," Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 3, 1994 (page unknown).
Paul Bradley, "Park foe says taxpayers will lose out," Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 8, 1994, p. C1.
Paul Bradley, "Prominent historians join Disney foes," Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 12, 1994, pp. B1, B6.
Paul Bradley, "Board's decision a victory for Disney," Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 19, 1994, p. B4.
Paul Bradley, "Senate panel won't enter Disney fight," Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 22, 1994, pp. B1, B4.
Paul Bradley, "Disney details traffic cap, rest of plans," Richmond Times-Dispatch, July 21, 1994, P. B4.
Paul Bradley, "Disney foes challenge air study," Richmond Times-Dispatch, July 22, 1994, p. B4.
Paul Bradley, "Park foes attack planners' report," Richmond Times-Dispatch, August 2, 1994, p. B4.
Paul Bradley, "Negotiations approaching critical stage," Richmond Times-Dispatch, September 4, 1994, p. C1.
Paul Bradley, "Suit says Va., county hid Disney papers," Richmond Times-Dispatch, September 10, 1994, pp. A1, A8.
Paul Bradley, "200 raise voices on Disney," Richmond Times-Dispatch, September 11, 1994, pp. C1, C4.
Paul Bradley, "Maryland governor backs Disney park," Richmond Times-Dispatch, September 13, 1994, p. B4.
Paul Bradley, "Fairfax proposed for Disney park," Richmond Times-Dispatch, September 15, 1994, p. B4.
Paul Bradley, "Court reviews Disney papers," Richmond Times-Dispatch, September 17, 1994, p. B4.
Paul Bradley, "2,500 rally against Disney park," Richmond Times-Dispatch, September 18, 1994, pp. C1, C4.
Paul Bradley, "VDOT hires another firm for park impact study," Richmond Times-Dispatch, September 21, 1994, pp. B1, B5.
Paul Bradley, "Disney clears 2 hurdles," Richmond Times-Dispatch, September 22, 1994, pp. B1, B4.
Paul Bradley, "Decision driven by delays and money," Richmond Times-Dispatch, September 30, 1994, p. A10.
Paul Bradley, "Disney road data hidden," Richmond Times-Dispatch, October 5, 1994, pp. A1, A8.
Paul Bradley and Michael Hardy, "Allen takes offense in Disney defense," Richmond Times-Dispatch, October 6, 1994, pp. A1, A16.
John M. Bryson and Barbara C. Crosby, Leadership for the Common Good (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1992).
Tom Campbell, "Disney sets record for lobbying; park foe is No. 2 in spending," Richmond Times-Dispatch, July 9, 1994, pp. Al, A6.
Alan Cooper, "More Disney documents turned over," Richmond Times-Dispatch, September 21, 1994, p. B5.
Alan Cooper, "State settles document access suit," Richmond Times-Dispatch, September 28, 1994, p. B4.
Michael D. Eisner, "Let's Celebrate America," Washington Post, June 20, 1994 (page unknown).
Stephen C. Fehr, "Disney Traffic Plan Disputed," Washington Post, July 14, 1994 (page unknown).
Stephen C. Fehr and Michael D. Shear, "For Disney, Fight Takes New Twist," Washington Post, June 17, 1994, pp. A1, A10.
Howard Fox and Carl Pope, "Welcome, Disney. Welcome, Pollution.", Washington Post, March 22, 1994 (page unknown).
Bertram M. Gross, "The City of Man: A Social Systems Reckoning," in William R. Ewald, Jr. (ed.), Environment for Man: The Next Fifty Years (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967), p. 154.
Peter Hardin, "Allen backs park during TV show," Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 25, 1994, p. B4.
Michael Hardy, "Disney delivers warning on park," Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 4, 1994, pp. A1, A12.
Michael Hardy and Virginia Churn, "About 50 protest Disney project," Richmond Times-Dispatch, January 25, 1994, p. A8.
Michael Hardy and Jeff E. Schapiro, "Asking for $150 million, Allen calls park good deal," Richmond Times-Dispatch, January 21, 1994, pp. A13.
Michael Hardy and Jeff E. Schapiro, "Disney overshadows productive session," Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 13, 1994, pp. A1, A10.
Spencer S. Hsu, "Pro-Disney Forces Get Organized," Washington Post, December 21, 1993 (page unknown).
Spencer S. Hsu, "Disney Working With Allen To Outline Road Funding," Washington Post, January 9, 1994, p. B4.
Spencer S. Hsu, "Disney Plans Sent Back for More," Washington Post, January 14, 1994 (page unknown).
Spencer S. Hsu, "Disney's Calls Leave Some Ears Burning," Washington Post, January 20, 1994, pp. B1, B6.
Spencer S. Hsu, "Threatened Planning Office Key to Disney Proposal," Washington Post, January 27, 1994 (page unknown).
Spencer S. Hsu, "Opponents of Disney's Park Plan Suggest Alternative Sites," Washington Post, February 3, 1994, pp. B1, B5.
Spencer S. Hsu, "Disney Picks All-Star Team To Lobby for Theme Park," Washington Post, March 7, 1994 (page unknown).
Spencer S. Hsu, "Disney Braces for Environmentalists," Washington Post, March 28, 1994 (page unknown).
Spencer S. Hsu, "Disney Foes Launch an 'Air' Attack," Washington Post, April 14, 1994, p. B1.
Spencer S. Hsu, "Washington to Require Environmental Study for Disney Park," Washington Post, April 16, 1994, pp. B1, B3.
Spencer S. Hsu, "Other Va. Attractions See Threat in Disney," Washington Post, May 4, 1994, pp. B1, B5.
Spencer S. Hsu, "Legacy of the Land Casts Long Shadow in Disney Debate," Washington Post, May 15, 1994, pp. B1, B5.
Spencer S. Hsu, "Studies Differ on Disney," Washington Post, June 30, 1994, pp. 1, 3.
Spencer S. Hsu, "Conflict Alleged in Va. Hiring of Disney Consultant," Washington Post, July 7, 1994, pp. B1, B3.
Spencer S. Hsu, "Rural Activists Turn Attention To Urban Issues," Washington Post, October 16, 1994, pp. B1, B3.
Spencer S. Hsu, "Disney: Into the Back Yard Via the Mailbox?", Washington Post, date unavailable, p. C4.
Spencer S. Hsu and Stephen C. Fehr, "Citing Disney Contract, U.S. Rejects Firm for Road Study," Washington Post, July 8, 1994, pp. C1, C7.
Douglas L. James, Director of Planning, Prince William County, Virginia, personal interview with author, October 4, 1994.
Michael Janofsky, "Opponents of Disney Park Find Allies in Congress," New York Times, June 19, 1994, p. 16.
Stephanie Mansfield, "Eek! A Mouse! Step on It!", Washington Post, April 18, 1994, pp. C1, C5.
Bill McKelway, "It's a goofy, daffy time down at the Capitol," Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 11, 1994, pp. C1.
Rick Middleton, Executive Director, Southern Environmental Law Center, letter to "All SELC Members," October 5, 1994.
Maria E. Odum and Bill Miller, "Park to Spur 12,400 Jobs, Disney Says," Washington Post, December 14, 1994, p. B8.
Maria E. Odum and Spencer S. Hsu, "Environmental Group Vows to Fight Disney's America Park," Washington Post, December 2, 1993, p. D1.
Mark Pacala, "Yes: The State Will Gain Jobs and Tax Revenues," Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 8, 1994, p. A13.
Andrew Petkofsky, "Williamsburg-area groups seek aid like in Disney plan," Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 19, 1994, p. B5.
Andrew Petkofsky, "Park stirs concerns at historic sites," Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 10, 1994, p. B4.
William F. Powers, "Tax Dollars Called Vital for Disney," Washington Post, December 19, 1993, pp. A1, A24.
William F. Powers, "Eisner Says Disney Won't Back Down," Washington Post, June 14, 1994, p. A1.
Richmond Times-Dispatch (RTD) - no author cited:
"Disney requests break on county zoning fees," November 26, 1993, p. B3.
"Prince William approves study of Disney proposals," February 16, 1994, p. B4.
"Planners press for more detail from Disney," April 22, 1994, p. B4.
"Bay foundation to fight Disney theme park plan," May 1, 1994 (page unknown).
"Break for Disney?", May 6, 1994, p. B4.
"Disney proposes to downsize park," May 24, 1994, pp. B1, B4.
"Eisner to sing his proposed park's theme song," June 12, 1994, p. C2.
"Eisner puts down Disney critics," June 14, 1994 (page unknown).
"Congressmen urge Disney to select new park site," June 17, 1994, p. B3.
"Disney's supporters start counterattack," July 20, 1994, p. B4.
"Secession pledge becomes park issue," August 28, 1994, p. C5.
"Dream of Disney-made boom goes bust," September 30, 1994, pp. A1, A10.
Jeff E. Schapiro, "Two firms say if Disney gets help, so should they," Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 10, 1994, p. A10.
Jeff E. Schapiro, "Disney park visitor tax is proposed," Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 11, 1994, pp. A1, A17.
Jeff E. Schapiro, "Disney confident despite Assembly action," Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 17, 1994, p. A14.
Jeff E. Schapiro and Michael Hardy, "Disney plan inducements move ahead," Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 16, 1994, pp. A1, A7.
Michael D. Shear, "2 Sides in Disney Debate Argue a Sewer Point," Washington Post, June 14, 1994 (page unknown).
Michael D. Shear, "Disney Clears a Hurdle," Washington Post, July 28, 1994, p. B5.
Randolph P. Smith, "Disney funding plan is untested in state," Richmond Times-Dispatch, January 12, 1994, pp. A1, A9.
Randolph P. Smith, "Skunda promises fight for Disney," Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 24, 1994, p. B6.
Southern Resources, A Newsletter of the Southern Environmental Law Center, Summer 1994, pp. 1, 6.
Rex Springston, "Disney park's impact on air quality debated," Richmond Times-Dispatch, December 19, 1993, p. E6.
Rex Springston, "Environmental groups oppose park," Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 12, 1994, p. A9.
Pamela Stallsmith, "Disney economic data challenged," Richmond Times-Dispatch, January 20, 1994, p. B4.
Paul Timmreck, "Virginia Will Reap Far More Than It Sows in the Disney Project," Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 14, 1994, p. A9.
Marylou Tousignant and Spencer S. Hsu, "Supporters Dominate At Hearing on Disney,"
Washington Post, September 11, 1994, pp. A1, A23.
Washington Post (WP) - no author cited:
"Senator to Hold Disney Hearings," May 26, 1994 (page unknown).
Eric L. Wee, "Consulting Fees Catch Flak in Prince William," Washington Post, August 19, 1994, pp. B1, B6.
Robert Wilburn, "The State's Disney Deal Exceeds the Bounds of Fairness," Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 14, 1994, p. A9.
George Will, "Disney Would Mar Historic Landscape," Richmond Times-Dispatch, July 17, 1994, p. F7.