Session: Mixed-Income versus Low-Income Housing

April 2, 10:15 AM

Kirk McClure
University of Kansas

Much has been learned about the development and operation of low-income housing. The consensus is that concentrating low-income households into designated assisted housing projects creates social, political and economic problems. Adopting an approach striving for mixed-income housing can alleviate these problems.

Methods to foster mixed-income housing range across housing types—single-family and multi-family as well as owner-occupied and renter-occupied. The methods vary from regulatory mechanisms to financial incentives.

Creating successful mixed-income housing requires that planners understand the market conditions, the design constraints, the management skills and the marketing strategies necessary.

The concept of mixed-income housing—developments that are occupied by households of varied income levels—is an idea gaining popular support at many levels. This support is for good reason. Assisted developments serving only the poor are often associated with social, political and economic problems. Some and possibly all of these problems can be alleviated through the redesign of housing assistance where the assisted households comprise only a small portion of the total households in the development.

Planners need to take a leadership position in implementing this approach. Elected decision makers cannot be expected to be fully informed of the housing options available to them when setting the housing strategies for the community. Planners should adopt the role of educator when guiding decision makers on housing strategy selection. Mixed-income housing is a policy option that all planners should be exploring for use in their communities.

Schwartz and Tajbakhsh (1997), in their review of the research on mixed-income, warn that much of the advocacy for the concept of mixed-income housing is “based largely on faith and on dissatisfaction with the previous thrust of low-income housing policy.” As planners, we should not simply rush toward mixed-income housing because we are rushing away from the problems created by low-income housing. However, there is much merit in the concept of mixed-income housing. Planners’ time and effort in this area will be rewarded. Fortunately, the concept is not new, and as a result, a great deal of research is available which will guide the planner in understanding when and where mixed-income housing can be effectively developed.

Many definitions of mixed-income housing exist. No one definition is necessarily superior to all others. Each has an appropriate application depending upon the setting. However, at its core, the concept of mixed-income housing implies that the mixed-income housing development have residents with a range of income levels. This range would normally include some households who are of low-income and some households who are not.

Given the many and varied definitions of low-income that exist, defining mixed-income housing is as difficult as defining low-income, especially to those uninitiated with the variety of program constraints that confront a housing planner. For example, low-income is usually defined in relation to the metropolitan area median family income (AMFI) level. Low-income is typically defined by HUD as an income that places the household at or below 80 percent of the metropolitan area’s median family income. This is often adjusted for household size with lower levels for smaller households and higher levels for larger families. However, this 80 percent level does not apply to all programs. The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program defines low-income as being at or below 50 percent of the area median family income and refers to those between 50 and 60 percent of the area median as being of moderate-income. HUD often refers to those below the 50 percent mark as being of very low-income and goes still further calling those below 30 percent as being of extremely low-income. This last group with income at or below 30 percent of the area’s median family income approximates the group that is below the poverty level.

Thus, the definition of low-income is subject to some variation. If the concept of mixed-income involves mixing low-income households with households of higher income, then is important to understand just what is meant by low-income. One approach to mixed-income may mean mixing households below poverty (at or below 30 percent of AMFI) with households who would be thought of as the working poor (between 50 percent and 80 percent of the AMFI). However, under this definition, all of the residents would meet HUD’s broadest definition of low-income. An alternative approach may involve mixing households with modest income such as teachers and other city employees (50 to 80 percent of AMFI) with households whose income places them above the AMFI. This approach may mix low-income with middle- or upper-income households, but it may only skim the least worst off of the low-income households for assistance. Still other definitions may seek a mixing of a full range of households by income including those below poverty (less than 30 percent of the AMFI) with those who are the working poor (30 to 80 percent of the AMFI) with those who are middle- or upper-income (above 80 percent of AMFI).

The published research on mixed-income housing makes it clear that the concept of mixing households by income goes beyond income alone. In these efforts, the goal is to mix low-income families with children with other families. In some efforts, the notion of mixed-income housing involves the employment status of the residents. Here the goal is to mix low-income households who suffer from chronic unemployment with households who are gainfully employed in steady jobs. Still other efforts merge the concept of mixed-income housing with mixed occupancy across racial and ethnic groups.

Some research has narrowed the scope of mixed-income housing. This research has, for example, sought to limit the definition of mixed-income housing to just rental housing (Wilkins 2001). Given the higher incidence of low-income households among the renter population, this narrowing of the definition is not without justification. However, many low-income owner occupants exist, and successful programs to serve their integration into a mixed-income housing setting exist to serve the needs of these households.

The concept of mixed-income housing is gaining in popularity, in some measure, due to the problems found in developments serving only low-income households. The high incidence of crime, unemployment, drug usage and other social problems resulting from concentrations of poverty are more than enough to cause people to search for new alternatives to housing developments that concentrate poverty. The benefits of mixed-income housing have been found in several areas.

Impact upon adults. Mixing households from different income levels is meant to provide social interaction so as to reduce the culture of poverty associated with concentrated poverty. Here the notion is that low-income households can gain from living and interacting with households who are employed and exhibit the work ethic so often missing in areas of concentrated poverty. It is well known that finding employment requires more than just physical proximity to the jobs; it requires membership in the network through which open positions are announced, applied for and filled. The hope is that the interaction between neighbors of mixed-income housing can facilitate bringing low-income persons into the network providing information and access to employment and out of poverty. However, research by Brophy and Smith (1997) suggest that employment gains among formerly unemployed low-income adults are very much a function of intensive job training and job placement program associated with the housing assistance. Simply offering mixed-income housing without additional social welfare programs will not generate the significant employment gains that are expected.

Reducing the culture of poverty means more than just assisting the poor in finding employment. It seeks to improve the conduct of the low-income residents. If non-working adults and their children live in a setting dominated by working families, the poor are less likely to participate in anti-social conduct than would be the case when living in a development with concentrated poverty (MHC 2001). Even if the direct interaction between the residents of a mixed-income development is minimal, the change in conduct should provide benefits simply from the improved expectations for that conduct.

Impact upon children. Mixing households from different income levels is also meant to provide social interaction among children. Children raised in areas of concentrated poverty may suffer from the absence of role models who are regularly employed. Children from families with chronic unemployment should benefit from attending the same school as children with families who are working (MHC 2001). Having children attend schools with children from a full array of income levels will increase social interaction. It is also hoped that the culture of poverty can be removed for low-income children through this interaction.

The impact of mixed-income housing upon children may well go beyond the classroom. There is evidence that children need role models. Mixed-income communities permit children to grow up in a social setting where working for a living is the norm among adults. If children are not exposed to working adult role models early in life, it decreases the probability that as adults these individuals will be able to gain and hold regular employment (Wilkins 2001).

Impact on abutting properties. The research indicates that benefits from mixed-income housing may well be economic as well as sociological. A great debate has been waged over a long period of time examining whether or not assisted housing has a detrimental effect upon abutting properties. It is safe to say that no consensus has been reached on this issue. Research can be found for all possible answers. Some research finds that assisted housing has a detrimental effect upon abutting properties. Some research finds that assisted housing has a positive effect upon abutting properties. Still other research finds no relationship between assisted housing and abutting properties (Lee at al 2000). Wherever the truth may lie, mixed-income housing is likely to calm the debate. Projects containing only a small portion of units for low-income households with the remainder of the units offered at market-rate prices can reduce the risk of negative impact upon the neighborhood by lowering the value of abutting properties (MHC 2001).

Political benefits. Anyone who has worked in the field of affordable housing is painfully familiar with the word NIMBY, “Not In My Back Yard.” Existing residents of a neighborhood will often oppose the development of affordable housing in their midst. While asserting that they are not opposed to the development of low-income housing, they simply do not want it in their neighborhood. The motivation for this attitude is difficult to discern. It may be motivated by a class attitude where the middle-class do not want encroachment into their neighborhood by the poor. It may be motivated by fear of loss of value, based upon the belief that the presence of the low-income housing will reduce the value of the middle-class housing. It may be motivated by fear, a concern that the low-income residents will introduce new or increased crime into the neighborhood. Developers of housing know about these fears and the difficulties of developing housing, whether these difficulties result from zoning issues, financing issues or management issues. Adding a number of low-income units to a development making it into mixed-income housing can increase the degree of difficulty that a developer confronts in making the development feasible. However, the difficulties gained by the inclusion of units for low-income households can be outweighed by the reductions in the NIMBY attitudes (U. Cincinnati 1999). Opposition to the development of housing can be lessened if the development is mixed-income rather than entirely low-income. As is so often the case, the details matter. If a mixed-income development is dominated by market-rate occupancy and the design and construction of the development meets local market standards, the likelihood of opposition is reduced.

Political costs. Ironically, the shift from low-income housing toward mixed-income housing may engender opposition by advocates of housing for the low-income (U. of Cincinnati 1999). This may manifest itself either as an objection to the incursion of middle-income households into an area previously dominated by low-income households, or it may take the form of a budget battle over the use of funds. Displacement of low-income households is always a matter of concern in areas experiencing gentrification. As older neighborhoods once populated by low-income households become fashionable for middle-income households, the natural market process raises the price of housing in these neighborhoods for all households, rich and poor alike. This can displace the poor who are unable, given their limited means, to pay the higher prices being charged for the housing after gentrification. Advocates for the poor actively oppose this gentrification process and may view the development of mixed-income housing as encouraging the gentrification process rather than protecting the poor from its harmful effects.

Older central cities typically see a need to attract middle-class residents back to the central city, reversing the capital flight toward the suburbs that has taken its toll on cities for so many years. Any strategy that has the potential to attract the middle-class back to the neighborhoods that have become dominated by the poor will be seen as an effective strategy for the city. Despite a backlash by the advocates for the poor, cities will value the increased properties values and household income that the mixed-income housing can generate.

Opposition to mixed-income housing can also take the form of simple arguments over budget priorities. Funding for housing assistance can be viewed as a zero-sum game; any diversion of funding for low-income housing into any other initiative can be seen as a loss for the low-income. Some advocates for housing for the poor see mixed-income housing as competing with low-income housing for available scarce resources. However, the subsidy mechanism is structured, the concern is that any use of housing assistance for mixed-income housing sends dollars away from the poor and toward the middle-income. This diversion away from the more needy low-income toward the middle-income is deemed to be a reduction in the redistribution goals of assisted housing (Rosenbaum et al 1998). At the extreme, advocates argue that scarce housing dollars should serve the poorest of the poor, and only the poorest of the poor.

Programmatic benefits. Mixed-income housing may hold promise for correcting some of the problems now being experienced with existing housing programs. Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers now represent the nation’s largest housing assistance program. Over 1.5 million households receive help in paying their housing costs through the program. This program was designed to make maximum use of existing housing in the marketplace. At its most simplistic level, the program pays the difference between what a household can afford to spend on housing (about 30 percent of its income) and the cost of occupying that housing. This form of assistance is supposed to permit a low-income household to surmount the price barriers that restrict the housing choices of the poor. With the Section 8 assistance, the argument goes, the household can move into any good quality housing that is reasonably priced within the marketplace.

Unfortunately, the Section 8 program has not been able to perform as expected. Section 8 recipient households are not dispersed across the nation’s metropolitan areas, rather they tend to be concentrated into areas with high levels of poverty (Leger and Kennedy 1990). The law does not required landlords to accept Section 8 vouchers. This has had a limiting effect upon the spatial distribution of Section 8 assistance. Landlords with units available in desirable neighborhoods with high income levels, good schools and ample services will enjoy adequate demand for their units without having to accept Section 8 vouchers. Landlords with units available in undesirable neighborhoods with low income levels, poor schools and few or no services may have to actively seek Section 8 as one of the few ways to find a reliable revenue source for their properties.

Mixed-income housing has shown the potential to correct this problem. The nation’s largest program to assist in the development of housing for occupancy by the low-income is the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit program. This program has demonstrated both a capacity to be used for mixed-income applications and the capacity to make entry into suburban middle-income areas where Section 8 seems to be unable to locate (McClure 2001). Despite the presumed ease of use and lower-cost associated with a voucher approach to assisting the poor, the Section 8 voucher program is not breaking down the barriers to economic integration of the poor. Instead, the more costly LIHTC program is demonstrating that mixed-income assisted rental properties can do a better job of providing units for the low-income in neighborhoods low-income households are not otherwise present.

There is also hope that mixed-income housing has the potential to improve the quality of the stock of assisted housing. Public housing and other forms of assisted housing are often viewed as housing that has not been maintained in good condition, at least in part, due to the absence of market discipline. Mixed-income housing, by definition, is housing that has a portion of its units offered to the market at whatever price the market will bear. This creates pressure on the part of developers and property managers to keep the housing competitive within the market so that the units can capture their share of the market demand (MHC 2001).

The concept of market failure has long dominated the formation of housing policy. The concept argues that government should not intervene into private markets if the private markets are functioning well on their own. The corollary is that government intervention is only justifiable only if the market is failing to function properly. This raises the question can mixed-income housing happen on its own? The answer is that yes it can, and it does occur in many settings. Khadduri and Martin (1997) find that more than one quarter of unassisted poor renters living in the nation’s metropolitan areas live in census tracts where the population is less than 10 percent poor. This suggests that income mixing is more than norm than the exception. However, this mixing may reflect more of a mixing of incomes among households headed by workers than a mixing of working and non-working households, not the mixing of the non-working poor into the mainstream population.

The non-working poor tend to be concentrated into specific neighborhoods within our urban areas, and assisted low-income housing may be exacerbating this problem. Newman and Schnare (1997) find that the probability of living in a neighborhood with social ills increases among poor households who reside in assisted housing. This is because the assisted housing is not located throughout the metropolitan areas of the nation; rather, the assisted housing tends to be concentrated in areas with high incidences of poverty and unemployment. Recognizing the problems of concentrated poverty and HUD’s own inadvertent contribution to this concentration, HUD has responded by favoring mixed-income housing in many of its assisted housing initiatives

Among the most direct of efforts to further mixed-income housing is the HOPE VI program. This program restructures the ownership, management and occupancy of troubled public housing projects. Prior to HOPE VI, these troubled housing projects were owned and managed by the local housing authority with occupancy only for the poorest of the poor. After the HOPE VI intervention, the property comes under new ownership that is typically a partnership between private sector developers and the housing authority. Frequently, the partnership involves the participation of local non-profit community development organizations. The new partnership renovates the property and markets it to a new set of tenants who are a mixture of the low-income households previously found in the projects plus moderate- and middle-income households. This program has received $4.5 billion dollars over the last 10 years, but the most recent budget message from the White House calls of discontinuation of the program.

HUD has also taken steps to transform the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program. The recipient household of the Section 8 voucher continues to have the power to select the location for the housing. However, as part of the Section 8 Management Assessment Program (SEMAP), HUD evaluates the administrators of Section 8 housing programs in terms of how well they are able to guide households away from areas of concentrated poverty and into areas with lower levels of poverty. Through this SEMAP process, HUD is demonstrating its bias toward deconcentration of impoverished households and toward mixing assisted households by income level.

Although not under the control of HUD, the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit program has demonstrated its capacity to serve not only developments designed as low-income projects but mixed-income projects as well (McClure 2000). While always planned as a program to subsidize the develop of either mixed-income or only low-income units, the early years of the program witnessed a tendency for most developments to be 100 percent low-income occupancy. Few developments had any significant level of market-rate units in the mix. However, in recent years, the trend has been toward mixed-income housing. Individual states have changed their Qualified Allocation Plans to guide the allocation of tax credits among competing development proposals. The plans now favor mixed-income housing where it is feasible. In addition, the revenue that can be raised from the sale of tax credits has increased over time. This results in fewer units within a development needing to be subsidized with tax credits in order for a development to attain financial feasibility. In addition, in 1994 a procedure was adopted to compel states to review all development proposals ensuring that no more tax credits are awarded to a development than are minimally to bring it to financial feasibility. Finally, LIHTC developments have become mainstream. No longer are these developments associated only with impoverished areas of older central cities, they are now found in the suburbs sitting side by side with market rate developments. All of these trends favor the development of mixed-income housing rather than just low-income housing.

Can these efforts to create mixed-income housing succeed? Joseph E. Corcoran (2002) heads the prominent Boston-based property development and management firm CMJ Management. The firm has developed mixed-income housing throughout the Boston area. Corcoran states, “Everyone—bankers, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) officials, representatives of local and state agencies, and, particularly, other builders—trashed the concept. They said that it would never work. ‘Market-rate households will never live with subsidized households.’” Corcoran has proved them wrong. Mixed-income housing is operational throughout the nation. Many progressive cities require new developments to make some provision for low-income households. In Boston, Mayor Thomas M. Menino has adopted a policy that requires all proposals for new luxury housing projects to include at least 10 percent affordable units.

The Millennial Housing Commission, a bipartisan taskforce appointed by Congress to study affordable housing problems and to recommend future policy directions for the federal government. The Millennial Housing Commission has come to the position that failing to further mixed-income housing is too risky. The Commission states,

“Some argue that, because of the severity of the adverse consequences of concentrated-poverty properties, it is good public policy to pursue mixed-income approaches even if it cannot be convincingly demonstrated that mixed income approaches are superior. A variant of this argument is that mixed income approaches must be pursued vigorously even though we may not know exactly how to make them work well consistently, because the chance that we will not discover how to make mixed income approaches work is outweighed by the near certainty of failure if we continue to pursue concentrated-poverty approaches.”

Can mixed-income housing work anywhere? The body of research on this topic suggests that the answer is no. Some housing markets are well suited to the successful mixing of assisted households across a broad range of income levels. Some housing markets are less well suited. This means that planners must learn when and where successful mixed-income housing developments can come into being.

The Millennial Housing Commission offers a word of caution.

“It must be said that mixed income housing runs contrary to the very prevalent – though not universal – tendency of Americans to segregate themselves by income. It is therefore not surprising that mixed income housing requires care in design and operation, in order to succeed.”

A tight housing market. One factor has been recognized as contributing to the success of mixed-income housing, and this is a tight housing market. Khadduri and Martin found, in their examination of several mixed-income housing developments, that the successful projects tend to be located in housing markets characterized by strong demand for housing and low vacancy rates. Mixed-income housing can be seen as a positive, a negative or a neutral attribute of a housing development. If housing is scarce, more households will be willing to take up residence where low-income households are part of the mix. This suggests that mixed-income housing is not seen as a positive attribute of a development. If households searching for housing are indifferent to the income mix in a development, then there should be no relationship between the housing market conditions and the presence of mixed-income housing. Households would locate in the housing based upon factors other than mix of incomes in the property. If households searching for housing view mixing of incomes as a positive attribute, then they would seek out such developments, whether the market is tight or soft. However, only if households view mixing of incomes as a negative attribute would market tightness be a factor. Households seeking housing appear to be willing to accept mixed-income housing where it is part of a trade-off. They are trading the mixed-income attributes of the development (a negative attribute) for the housing that is otherwise hard to find in the tight market (a positive attribute). As long as consumers continue to view mixed-income developments as less desirable than developments that contain only a single strata of the income distribution, the pressure will be on developers, property managers and marketing agents to make the mixed income housing sufficiently attractive so as to overcome this market-based preference.

If a market is not tight, instead vacancy rates are normal and prices stable, what type of housing market will be suitable for mixed-income housing? It is apparent from the published research that mixed-income housing needs to be located in desirable markets. This means a viable neighborhood with low poverty rates, good schools, low crime rates, and good access to jobs, shopping and other community services.

Poverty and crime rates in the market. Khadduri and Martin go further in their assessment of the market conditions where mixed-income housing succeeds. They find that most privately owned, mixed-income rental housing developments assisted by HUD are not located in high-poverty neighborhoods. Exceptions may exist. The authors suggests—admittedly with only limited data—that a market can have a very high incidence of poverty and still be able to attract middle-income households if, for example, the neighborhood is characterized by an upwardly mobile set of immigrants who are using the assisted housing and a gateway to full participation in the community. Another version of this exception may be the gentrifying area where the market has become appealing to a new set of residents who are willing to accept the risks of living in the area in exchange for the special locational or architectural features provided by the mixed-income housing. Absent such special circumstances, it does not appear that mixed-income housing is likely to succeed if the neighborhood suffers from widespread poverty. This is equally true of crime rates. Mixed-income housing is unlikely to succeed if located in areas suffering from high crime rates. While it is unfortunate that the mixed-income approach to assisted housing does not seem to work well in all market settings, experience suggests that for a mixed-income development to be successful, it must be located where only a small share of the market’s population falls below poverty and where crime rates are relatively low.

What attracts higher income renters? Brophy and Smith address this issue directly. They find that good location, attractive design features, and effective management are all essential to attracting higher income households. The upper-income households have relatively more options in the marketplace compared to their low-income counterparts. Given this greater array of choices, the mixed-income housing must offer amenities and a quality of living that is competitive with or exceeding what is found elsewhere. This means the mixed-income housing must offer close proximity and easy access to the employment and shopping that all the residents need. The “curb appeal” must be high enough to make the residents want to live there. Finally, the residents must have confidence that the property managers will maintain the property in good shape over time so that all residents, but especially the upper-income residents who can more readily relocate, will want to continue to reside in the development.

The importance of schools. One of the often-voiced benefits of mixed-income housing is the interaction between poor children who may be lacking sufficient role models in their lives and other residents of the developments. To the extent that all of the children attend the same schools, this interaction can occur in the classroom. However, research suggests that the interaction found in schools may be largely limited to the classroom. The higher income households who choose to reside in mixed-income developments tend to have fewer children or no children compared than the low-income residents (MHC 2001). This means that to fully engage the children of low-income households into the social interaction hoped for in mixed-income housing, it is necessary to attract upper-income households with children to these developments.

Schools are an extremely important determinant of the desirability of a housing development. Mixed-income developments in an area served by poor quality schools will encounter great difficulty attracting significant numbers of upper-income households with children (Wilkins 2001). These upper-income households have many options in terms of their housing choices, and these households will not sacrifice the quality of their children’s education just to participate in a mixed-income housing development. This suggests that the success of mixed-income housing is very dependent upon the quality of the schools serving the housing. In fact, the MHC report suggests that unless the schools serving the development are particularly high, there is little chance of being able to sustain any significant percentage of upper-income households in the development.

Selecting neighborhoods. At is most simplistic level, if a mixed-income development is located in a desirable neighborhood with low poverty rates, good schools, negligible crime, attractive architectural or historical features, and with good proximity to jobs and shopping, it is likely to be successful. If the property is located in a troubled neighborhood, it is likely to fail (MHC 2001). The MHC recommends that mixed-income housing should not be attempted in high-poverty areas except where the housing development is part of a widespread neighborhood revitalization effort with intensive management and social welfare programs covering both housing and non-housing services.

If the plan is to generate mixed-income housing in a troubled neighborhood, that plan must accommodate significantly increased total development costs (MHC 2001). In order to fund the intensive support programs that are needed and to provide attractive prices to higher-income households, significant subsidies will be needed to write down the costs of development. In addition, the scale of the development must be sufficiently large to have a significant impact upon the character of the neighborhood.

Mixing by income level. One very clear message is found in the research on mixed-income housing, the occupancy by low-income households must be no more than a minority of the households in the development. The research speaks to a need for a critical mass of upper-income households who must dominate the development in order to maintain the character of the development as mixed-income development.

The research also suggests that the management of the mix is critical to the success of the development. The suggestion is that if the mixed-income development is perceived as another low-income development, with all of the problems associated with low-income projects, then the development is doomed to failure. Brophy and Smith report on the Harbor Point development in Boston, an early and much contested mixed-income development created out of a troubled public housing project. They found that, after redevelopment, one section of the development began occupancy with a relatively high percentage of non-working poor families. This section quickly became entirely non-working poor households due to the unwillingness of the higher-income working households to live in this section of the development with its impoverished nor-working environment. This demonstrates the skill needed by the management to carefully arrange for the occupancy of the development in such a way as to avoid the kind of problems that can transpire even within a development.

A formal agreement must usually exist between the property owners and the providers of the subsidy funding specifying the level of low-income and upper-income occupancy that is to be maintained in the development over time. At the very minimum, such an agreement is need to ensure that the number of low-income households in the development does not fall below the expected minimum. However, the Millennial Housing Commission argues for flexibility in the agreement. Management needs some latitude in its operation in order work around and to remedy problems such as those encountered in Boston’s Harbor Point development. Rigid percentages specifying the income levels of the tenant population can be hard to achieve over time. The key to successfully maintaining a healthy mix of incomes in any development is to secure high quality management who can be trusted to serve the goal of mixed-income occupancy but adjust to periodic shifts in the demand for the housing. Markets and neighborhoods change over time. Rigid occupancy requirements can fail to grant the necessary maneuverability to property managers and marketing agents.

The Millennial Housing Commission suggests that the percentage of low-income households in a mixed-income development should be about 15 to 20 percent of the total. MHC suggests that, ” A mix with more than 20% non-working families should be attempted only with a very experienced sponsor, with a qualified and experienced management team, and with significantly more intensive management.” Experience suggests that keeping the percentage of non-working poor families at or below 20 percent is necessary to maintain the mixed-income character of the property. However, evidence exists that occupancy mixes containing 20 to 40 percent non-working poor families can succeed but only if very intensively managed in just the right market settings.

Khadduri and Martin agree. They find that a number of owners and managers have reached a commonly held opinion that a mix of 15 to 20 percent non-working low-income families in an otherwise working-family property is likely to be feasible if managed competently. Higher proportions of non-working families are likely to threaten the feasibility of the development and demand even greater levels of management involvement. Greater than 40 percent occupancy by non-working poor families is a very high risk strategy. This approach should be attempted only under the most promising circumstances, such as a property owner and manager who has a lengthy track record of success with a very similar property.

Disparity in the income distribution. Ironically, the smaller the disparity between the lowest and the highest income levels, the higher the level of success. Brophy and Smith find a high incidence of problems between households–including vandalism of cars by low-income teenagers–in properties with relatively large disparities between the incomes of the non-working families and the incomes of the working households. Alternatively, the properties that maintained a significant level of moderate-income occupants, social tensions appeared to be less frequent, even if some higher income households reside at the property. There suggests that the social benefits of income mixing may not be automatic.

A very wide range of incomes may be more difficult to achieve and maintain than a modest range of incomes. In particular, a wide gap between the very low-income and higher-income groups is likely to be counterproductive. Brophy and Smith find that at some point when the gap between the income of the lowest and highest earning households become too large, this gap becomes a source of envy, resentment, and tension, rather than a source of encouragement for self-improvement. This problem of resentment can be mitigated by having the occupancy cover a full range of incomes from low, to moderate, to high. Brophy and Smith suggest that a mix which more closely mirrors the income mix of the local population will draw the most political support necessary to make the project feasible.

Design of the units. One final factor in the design of the income mix involves the design the housing units themselves. The research argues that the units should all look the same. The low-income units must be identical to the units offered to the middle- and upper-income households. This issue furthers the argument for flexibility in the powers given to the management team. In an ideal setting, all the housing units are the same, and only the property manager or the marketing agent knows which households are low-income and which households are not. This approach avoids the stigma that seems to go with low-income units. In a development for owner-occupancy, only the marketing agents know the incomes of the households purchasing the properties. In rental developments, only the property managers know which tenants meet the low-income requirements and which are in market-rate units.

Mixing by race and ethnicity. HUD’s research suggests that racial and ethnic diversity may not be a factor in predicting the success of mixed-income housing. From their study of privately owned but federally subsidized apartment properties, Khadduri and Martin find that housing with a resident population that is diverse in terms of race and ethnicity has only a modest effect on the likelihood of having a widely mixed incomes as housing in which one racial or ethnic group predominates. This modest effect is, in fact positive. If the project has a racially or ethnically diverse population, it is slightly more likely to have a diverse range of incomes. While creating and maintaining mixed-income housing is a challenge, this research suggests that integrating this mixed-income housing along racial or ethnic lines will not present any significant additional problems.

Joseph Corcoran (2002) speaks about his extensive experience in developing racially and ethnically diverse housing developments:

“Racially mixing all income groups also is important, and we make a concerted outreach effort to do so. Harbor Point is home to 3,000 people living in 1,283 units. Thirty-five percent of the market-rate units are inhabited by members of minority groups, 20 percent of whom are African American. Twenty percent of the low-income families are white. Our marketing and social service staff works hard to achieve this mix, by reaching out to local employers, community centers and publications, government agencies, and even elected officials. For example, in urban public housing turnaround projects, in which African American and Hispanic families typically dominate the low-income component, our on-site social service workers go to low-income, nonprofit agencies and offer our units to white families on housing wait lists. In suburban mixed-income communities, we do the reverse. Our marketing staff also visits corporate human services departments and actively markets market-rate units to minority workers, stressing our objective of creating racially mixed communities.”

Racial and ethnic mixing can be achieved as well as income mixing, but it will not happened without a concerted effort on the part of the property developer and manager. Efforts must be focused and ongoing. Outreach to social service agencies must be made and maintained.

Too often the concept of mixed-income housing has been narrowly constrained to multi-family rental housing developments. While this remains an important form of mixed-income housing, it is only one among many. Efforts to foster mixed-income housing can follow may paths.

Owners and renters. Mixed-income housing can provide housing for either owner-occupants or renters. The developments served do not need to be just rental developments; they can be any of many types of owner-occupied housing, whether in the form of condominiums in multi-family structures or as owner-occupants of single-family units.

Single parcels and scattered-sites. The mixed-income housing can be on a single land parcel or can be spread across multiple sites. Whether a single contiguous site or several non-contiguous parcels, the goal is to create close interaction between people of different economic strata. This can be accomplished on one or many sites. The scattered sites approach can work by providing housing opportunities for low-income households in otherwise low poverty neighborhoods. Research has shown this to be a successful approach in urban as well as more rural settings. The social interaction that generates the benefits of mixed-income housing can be achieved at the neighborhood level if sufficient contacts can happen between the occupants of the newly developed scattered-site housing and the existing residents of the neighborhood. Unfortunately, experience with scattered-site public housing is not encouraging. Briggs’ (1999) study of scattered-site housing suggests that identifiable low-income buildings, even if containing only four units and located inside of neighborhoods with low levels of poverty, the social isolation of low-income households survives. The social interaction sought through mixed-income housing is not achieved.

Scattered-site housing is widely recognized to generate higher operating expenses. Managing, maintaining and insuring properties over several sites is more expensive than if the housing were to be located on a single parcel. This means that the planners who pursue this approach must recognize this cost premium and provide for it.

While the scattered-site is capable of working well, the research makes it evident that dangers exist. Depending upon the setting, scattered-site developments usually take the form of small buildings located within existing neighborhoods. The residents of the neighborhood are generally aware that the scattered-site dwellings are assisted and to be occupied by low-income households. This knowledge can cause all of the political opposition so often confronted with any low-income housing development. Even individual buildings of small scale will not lessen the opposition. If one of the goals of mixed-income housing is to reduce the stigma associated with living in a low-income project, then scattered-site buildings may accomplish little more than exporting the stigma from large low-income projects that often comprise their own neighborhoods into smaller buildings that may be unwelcome in otherwise low-poverty neighborhoods.

New construction, rehabilitation or existing housing. The housing in question can be of many types. It can be newly constructed. It can be existing housing that is rehabilitated for new occupancy. It can be existing housing leased or purchased for new occupancy with little or no construction work included in the mixed-income initiative.

Regulatory requirements. The style of government intervention may vary across applications. The government may hope to stimulate the development of mixed-income housing from a regulatory approach. Here the government may require the inclusion of mixed-income housing in all new developments through restrictions imposed through the zoning and subdivision regulations.

Subsidy mechanisms. Alternatively, the government may provide financial incentives in an effort to entice developers and property owners to participate in various mixed-income housing initiatives. The subsidy mechanisms used to development the mixed-income housing may take many forms. The subsidy may be attached to the dwelling unit, following the more traditional project-based approach to assisted housing. The subsidy may instead be attached to the household. The assistance may be designed to help specific households consume housing that furthers the goal of income mixing.

Vouchers can be used to give low-income households entrance to housing that would otherwise be available only to working families. The attractiveness of Section 8 vouchers as a means to achieve mixed-income housing is that the property owner continues to obtain market-rate rents on the units even if occupied by a low-income household. The government pays the differential between what the low-income household can afford and what the market will pay for the unit. Unfortunately, Section 8, as previously noted, has not fostered a great deal of movement by the poor out of areas with concentrated poverty and into areas with low levels of poverty. Property owners often refuse to accept Section 8 when offered. Property owners and managers recommend significant reforms to the voucher program in order to make this approach viable. Problems most frequently mentioned include the revising the local payment standard, adjusting the rent reasonableness test, the lease terms, the timeliness of inspections, and timeliness and accuracy of payments (MHC 2001).

Some have argued for mixed-income within the context of housing developments that are fully covered by Section 8. Khadduri and Martin have examined such configurations with at least 20 percent of the occupants having incomes that are above $20,000 per year placing them in the category of modest income or working poor and at least 20 percent of the occupants having income under $10,000 per year placing them below poverty. Here the goal is less one of mixing across a full range of incomes and more one of mixing across those who are gainfully employed and those who are not. Khadduri and Martin suggest that this can be a productive approach if the dominant share of the households in the development have wages as their primary source of income.

Use of existing federal subsidy programs. Some existing programs are well suited to applications to mixed-income housing. HOPE VI directs the bulk of its funds toward mixed-income housing. Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers can be utilized in a variety of settings beyond the conventional rental assistance approach. Section 8 can be used as a project-based form of assistance. Section 8 can be tied to various welfare-to-work initiatives which can make mixed-income housing part of the package. Section 8 can be implemented with local preferences to guide households to mixed-income neighborhoods. CBDG and HOME funds can also be used in creative ways to further the cause of mixed-income housing.

Low-Income Housing Tax Credits can be a very effective tool for the development of mixed-income housing. The LIHTC program is changing over time. When first created, the program was able to leverage only a little over 42 cents on the dollar of credit awarded. Now it is commonplace for projects for receive over 70 cents on the dollar of credit awarded. This increase in leverage means a shift away from developments that are 100 percent covered by tax credits and toward developments that have only a portion of their units covered. Those units that are not covered by tax credits are offered at market rates. Thus, a by-product of the increasing leverage of the LIHTC program is the shift toward mixed-income housing.

Skewed rents. The inclusion of market-rate units in a LIHTC development (or any other form of mixed-income rental property) raises the issue of skewed rents. Skewed rents have many meanings. For purposes of mixed-income housing concerns, skewed rents usually mean lower rents on the market-rate units than would otherwise be paid in the market if the development contained no low-income households. The Millennial Housing Commission asked if higher-income households should receive a rent that is below the market level? The answer is yes. The argument of the downward skewing of rents for higher-income households is to attract the higher-income household to the development. If the household who can afford to live elsewhere is going to be attracted to the mixed-income setting, then a lower price is the logical form of an inducement. Brophy and Smith report that several of the seven properties they studied offered rents below the rents that the property could command in the market. They conclude that this rent discount is essential for properties to be successful in attracting and retaining the higher income residents. The argument is made that the economic incentive of the lower rent must be larger and larger the more the development is seeking to attract the upper-income household to live in lower-income neighborhoods. To the extent that the mixed-income housing is in an otherwise low-poverty neighborhood, then the reduction in rent for the higher-income household may be very small.

Shallow subsidy. One last subsidy mechanism used leverage mixed-income housing has been the use of below market interest rate financing subsidies. These subsidies are deemed shallow in that they do not provide the extensive, or deep, level of subsidy provided through the LIHTC program, which heavily subsidizes development costs, or the Section 8 program, which heavily subsidizes the income stream of a development. The shallow subsidies usually take the form of below market interest rate financing. The developer of the property obtains a break in the interest rate on the debt. This lowers the costs of financing which makes it possible to accept lower rents on a small percentage of the units in the development. This approach has been used successfully by state housing finance agencies to develop mixed-income housing. The state agencies are able to provide the below market financing by passing through to the developer the lower interest rate paid on tax-exempt debt (Schwartz and Tajbakhsh 1997).

The research on mixed-income housing offers almost as much information on the management of this specialized type of housing as it does on its development. The managers of these properties must possess skills beyond those normally expected of property managers. They must engage in programs usually associated with social workers and case managers. These managers should be able to expect compensation commensurate with this skill level and workload and should be extended the trust necessary to carry out their mission.

Skill level necessary. The MHC warns planners to pay attention to the selection of a management agent for mixed-income housing. This specialized form of housing makes greater demands upon the property managers demanding more experience among the management staff and more intensive management programs. In the MHC’s terms, ”Evidence from mixed income communities suggests that there is powerful public benefit in having not merely adequate but excellent management.”

Corcoran agrees but suggests that in order to succeed--even with these skills--property managers should apply rules uniformly to all residents whether low-income or upper-income. The management should avoid income-segregated buildings or areas within the development. Income mixing should exist throughout the development; no identifiable buildings or areas should be identifiable as having low-income occupancy. Rather, the skill is found in the property mangers ability to enforce rules and demand a high standard of conduct throughout the property. This, MHC indicates, is essential for a property to be successful.

Intensive programs expected. Experience in mixed-income developments demonstrates, unequivocally, that simply placing households together in a mixed-income setting is not enough to generate the positive social outcomes planned. Intensive social programs must be a part of the management plan. Only when management engages in significant non-housing programs will the mixed-income housing succeed. These programs include job training, job placement, childcare, general education degree programs, computer training, plus before- and after-school activities. The programs must also command adherence to high standards of resident conduct. Funding for these programs must either be found externally or their costs built into the operating expenses of the development.

Compensations expected and trust extended. Property managers in mixed-income housing will need to be compensated for the higher skill level that they must possess. It is important to recognize that managing mixed-income developments are more difficult than managing developments that are all market-rate. This difficulty factor must be acknowledged in the management plan and the management fees paid must compensate for it.

Trust managers to carry out the mission: If the property managers are to be given greater challenges and greater fees than their counter-parts in market-rate development, experience suggests that they should also be given greater trust. This trust takes the form of discretionary power to manage the property so as to achieve the goals of mixed-income housing. The temptation is to have the property manager work under a rigid plan calling for fixed percentages of households for each of the targeted income strata. The MHC has examined this trend and finds it ill advised. Instead, the MHC calls for flexibility for the property managers. Decisions about the desired mix of tenants should be set as goals for the property manger, and the manager should be evaluated periodically for its performance in achieving these goals. However, the day-to-day decisions concerning who should be placed in a specific unit need to be left to the manager. Rigid rules can hinder, rather than help, efforts to create a successful development. In addition, the surrounding market conditions can change and change rapidly. Property managers need to have the freedom to adjust their management practices as the market around them changes.

This flexibility also carries over into marketing a development or property. The best marketing strategy for mixed-income developments will vary from property to property. Even the degree to which the property is marketed as a mixed-income development has been found to vary. Brophy and Smith report that the seven properties they studied mentioned the mixed-income nature of the community but did not emphasize it. If the upper-income households are receiving a below market rent, the mixed-income character of the development is generally not a marketing disadvantage. In some communities the mixed-income character of the community may become the primary attraction offered in the marketing approach. Mixed-income developments may be particularly attractive to certain upper-income households who value a mixed-income development and want to live in such a community. In select markets with significant numbers of households holding these values, marketing the mixed-income nature of the development becomes a viable marketing strategy. MHC found that owners and managers report that individual markets vary in their receptiveness to mixed-income approaches. Areas that had positive experience with affordable housing responded favorably to mixed-income housing.

Below are a few examples of effective efforts toward mixed-income housing:

Case: Langham Court
South End, Boston, Massachusetts

Type: New construction, mixed-income, 84 units.

Background: Very tight housing market in Boston’s South End driving demand.

The original plan was to mix condominiums with rentals. That plan was changed to a limited-dividend co-operative, demonstrating the need for flexibility in management and marketing. Property managers worked with residents encouraging participation in events so that neighbors can meet.

Design: The design employs features found in the historic South End. This includes textured brick, dormer windows, vaulted entries, a mixture of mansard and flat roof, and a scale that fits area buildings.

The south-facing courtyard provides a sunny landscaped retreat for all residents. During the community design process, neighbors expressed an interest in a public park on the street. The development team eventually convinced the community that the open park would be a security and maintenance problem. The interior courtyard is visible from the street and is used by both Langham residents and the low-income senior residents of the adjacent Washington Manor apartments.

Management: There are approximately 40 children of all age groups, and they are the main users of the courtyard. The courtyard is U-shaped and well positioned for good observation from both the manager’s office and many of the apartments.

Langham Court exemplifies the success of mixed income housing, a model in which the housing for all income levels must aspire to high standards to minimize a sense of hierarchy within the development. As ten year old Blanca Hernandez wrote in a winning essay sponsored by the National Council of State Housing Agencies, " I 'specially like living in Langham Court because where I used to live it was a bad neighborhood with drugs everywhere. Here, I really don't see drugs, and it's a good neighborhood, and I can play outside and sleep without worry."

Case: Lake Parc Place
Chicago

Type: Restructured public housing into mixed-income rental housing

Subsidy: Financial incentives to new partnership.

Background: Lake Park Place is an experiment in creating mixed-income housing in buildings that were previously low-income public housing owned by the Chicago Housing Authority.

Reduced rents are offered to households whose income is too high to qualify for low-income housing.

Studied by Rosenbaum (Rosenbaum et al 1998) through a large survey. Study finds that the development is accomplishing the prerequisites for making mixed-income housing into a community. Low rents and promises of safety appeal to all households and are attracting middle-income households.

One-half of units are “non-project” for residents of middle-income level. Middle-income households insist that the management rules be strictly enforced leading to improved levels of satisfaction with the environment of the development.

Although some social interaction is being experienced, residents have not seen significant employment outcomes over the four-year period of the study.

Experiment is not without critics. Vale (1998) argues that Lake Park Place does not indicate that mixed-income housing is working. The project has become a well-managed development with improved amenities and strict management policies. None of these outcomes required conversion to mixed-income housing. Public housing can enjoy these outcomes without the conversion to mixed-income occupancy.

Case: Old City Hall
Kansas City, Kansas

Type: Conversion of municipal building to lofts.

Old City Hall, built 1911, on the National Register of Historic Places.

Subsidies: Low-Income Housing Tax Credit.

Historic Rehabilitation Tax Credit.

Land and building donation by the city.Background: 40 lofts (24 tax credit and 16 market-rate units)

Units from 540 to 1,670 square feet with rents $291 to $935 per month

Located in downtown Kansas City, Kansas

Downtown is suffering from considerable deterioration

Revitalization assisted by construction of Federal Court housing, EPA offices, plus new municipal office building and small convention center/hotel.

Location is on dividing line between commercial area and aging Strawberry Hill neighborhood, which is enjoying some gentrification.

Overall market is soft, but two recent multi-family developments nearby have waiting lists.

Nearby loft market in adjacent Kansas City, Missouri is vibrant with rapid sales of condominiums and high occupancy rates on leased space. This market includes many converted warehouses and office buildings. Rents are rising at 9.5 percent per year; most are 100 percent occupied. The subject property will compete directly with other recently renovated loft developments in the Kansas City, Missouri area. The average rent for loft apartments are $870 for a one-bedroom unit and $1,040 for a two-bedroom unit. The lower rents of the Old City Hall Building will make it competitive with the higher priced lofts in adjacent areas.

The household income required to rent a city hall unit ranges from $16,600 to $41,400; ample downtown employees should be attracted.

Case Mixed-Income Inclusionary Zoning
Montgomery County, MarylandType: Inclusionary zoning at the county level.

Montgomery County, Maryland, middle-class suburb of Washington, D.C.

Subsidy: None, regulatory.

Illustration: Timberlawn Crescent, mixed-income development.

Total development costs: $7.6 million ($71,000/unit);

"Although numerous meetings were held to solicit neighborhood input during the planning process and suggestions were included, residents of the surrounding community vigorously opposed the development before the planning commission. They did not believe that we were telling them the truth about our design." But when they saw the actual buildings the neighbors' opposition vanished.

Background: One of Montgomery County’s key tools is its Moderately-Priced Dwelling Unit (MPDU) ordinance.

Enacted in 1973, the MPDU law requires private developers to build mixed income housing everywhere.

The law covers any new subdivision, townhouse complex, or apartment development with at least 50 housing units.

Under the county law up to 85 percent of the new housing can be "market rate" (at whatever income level the builder targets), but at least 15 percent must be "affordable" housing, or MPDUs.

To qualify for an MPDU, a family’s income cannot exceed 65 percent of the county’s average household income.

To help integrate poor households into middle-class society, the county law further specifies that one-third of the MPDUs, or 5 percent of all housing created, must be available for rent or out-right purchase by the Housing Opportunities Commission, the county-wide housing authority.

Montgomery County does not build public housing projects. It purchases standard housing units scattered across the county as rental housing for its poorest households.

Complying with the County’s ground rules, private homebuilders and apartment developers have produced over 10,000 MPDUs — two-thirds for sale, one third for rent.

Many buyers are local school teachers, county deputy sheriffs, office workers, super market clerks, fast food cooks, the civil servants, retail trade and service industry workers who serve local communities.

To house welfare recipients and other poor residents, the Housing Opportunities Commission has purchased over 1,500 of the new MPDUs. (Church groups and private, non-profits have bought others.)

The 85 percent market, 10 percent low, and 5 percent very-low income mix produces few social problems, according to HOC officials and resale prices have risen in mixed-income subdivisions faster than for non-mixed income housing developments. Many social successes, such as low school drop out rates, have been documented.

Case: Mixed-Income Inclusionary Zoning
Sacramento, California

Type: Inclusionary zoning at the municipal level.

Illustration: Southside Park Co-Housing, Sacramento, California

Subsidies: None, regulatory approach.

Background: In October of 2000, the Sacramento City Council adopted City Code 17.190 establishing a Mixed-Income Housing Ordinance for New Growth Areas within the City limits. This ordinance requires that any new residential development of ten units or more include an affordable component.

Ten percent (10%) of residential units in the entire development must be affordable to households with incomes at or below 50 percent of the area median ($26,450 for a four-person household), which is the definition of a "very low-income" household.

Five percent (5%) of residential units in the entire development must be affordable to households with incomes at or below 80 percent of the area median ($42,300 for a four-person household), which is the definition of a "low-income" household.

Housing Type: Units can be single family, alternative ownership housing, duplex, multifamily, or a combination. Developer should take full advantage of multiple housing type and target average densities in the applicable Community Plan.

Developer can choose to build affordable units, sell or donate land to affordable housing developer, partner with others, or dedicate land to SHRA.

Planning Director can approve developer's request to dedicate land to SHRA if more cost-efficient solution.

Units must be dispersed to maximum extent feasible, and built contemporaneously with other residential components.

Inclusionary units must remain affordable for at least 30 years.

Exemptions:

• Residential projects with nine or fewer residential dwellings in one location (a defined term);

• Rehabilitation of existing residential dwellings;

• Market rate units produced as a density bonus;

• Residential projects which had approved Development Agreements before June 20, 2000.

Many definitions of mixed-income housing exists; none can claim superiority over the others. The definitions set different levels to demarcate low-income from upper-income, and many go further to distinguish between working households of non-working households. Planners need to adopt the approach that is most suitable the economic, social and political environment of their jurisdictions.

The benefits of mixed-income housing are found in many forms, but the source of the benefits is in the social interaction between people of different economic circumstances. The interaction can reduce the culture of poverty that can pervade low-income housing projects. The interaction can provide access to networks of contacts crucial to becoming gainfully employed. The interaction can provide the role models that children need both in the classroom to succeed academically and outside the classroom in the form of working adult role models. Given these benefits, mixed-income housing can mitigate the political opposition that often arises when low-income housing is proposed in a neighborhood with little or no poverty.

Experience suggests that mixed-income housing works best in a tight housing market, but this is not a perquisite. Mixed-income developments are working in many normal and soft markets, but these require additional attention. Upper-income households have choices, thus attracting them to mixed-income housing requires some combination of rent breaks, high quality design and management of the development, and usually, a resident population dominated by other upper-income households. This usually means a full range of income levels among the residents and efficient management that will strictly enforce rules of behavior across the development.

The MHC gives advice in assessing success: have patience. “Perhaps the most important measure of the success of a mixed income community is whether children who grow up there are working steadily, ten years later. It may therefore be the case that we will need to pursue mixed income approaches for some time before the actual level of success becomes apparent.”

Briggs, Xavier de Souza, et al. 1999. "In the Wake of Desegregation: Early Impacts of Scattered-Site Public Housing on Neighborhoods in Yonkers, New York," Journal of the American Planning Association 65(1):27-49.

Brophy, Paul C. and Rhonda N. Smith. 1997. “Mixed-Income Housing: Factors for Success.” Cityscape: A Journal of Policy Development and Research 3(2):3-31.

Corcoran, Joseph E. 2002. “Making Mixed-Income Housing Work.”

ULI–the Urban Land Institute.

Khadduri, Jill and Marge Martin. 1997. “Mixed-Income Housing in the HUD Multifamily Stock.” Cityscape: A Journal of Policy Development and Research 3(2):33-69.

Leger, Mireille L. and Stephen D. Kennedy. 1990. Recipient Housing in the Housing Voucher and Certificate Programs. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development Research.

Lee, Chang-Moo, Dennis P. Culhane and Susan M. Wachter. 1999. “The Differential Impacts of Federally Assisted Housing Programs on Nearby Property Values: A Philadelphia Case Study.” Housing Policy Debate 10(1):75-93.

McClure, Kirk. 2000. “The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program as an Aid to Housing Finance: How Well Has It Worked?” Housing Policy Debate 11(1):91-114.

__________. 2001 “The Twin Mandates Given to the GSEs: Which Works Best, Helping Low-Income Homebuyers or Helping Underserved Areas?” Cityscape: A Journal of Policy Development and Research 5(3):107-143.

Millennial Housing Commission, Preservation and Production Task Forces. 2001. “Policy Option Paper: Mixed-Income Housing.” Washington, D.C.: Millennial Housing Commission.4

Newman, Sandra J. and Ann B. Schnare. 1997. “’…And a Suitable Living Environment’: The Failure of Housing Programs to Deliver on Neighborhood Quality.” Housing Policy Debate 8(4):703-42.

Rosenbaum, James E. et al. 1998.” Lake Parc Place: A Study of Mixed-Income Housing,” Housing Policy Debate 9(4): 703-740.

Sacramento, California. 2000. “City Code 17.190 establishing a Mixed Income Housing Ordinance for New Growth Areas within the City limits.”

Schwartz, Alex and Kian Tajbakhsh. 1997. “Mixed-Income Housing: Unanswered Questions.” Cityscape: A Journal of Policy Development and Research 3(2):71-92.

University of Cincinnati. 1999. “Mixed-Income Housing - Idealistic or Realistic?”

Real Estate Property Newsletter (Nov./Dec. 1999 ).

Wilkins, Charles S., Jr. 2001. “Preservation and Production Task Forces Concept Paper: Mixed-Income Rental Housing.” Washington, D.C.: Millennial Housing Commission.

Vale, Lawrence J. 1998. “Comment on James E. Rosenbaum, Linda K. Stroh, and Cathy A. Flynn's ‘Lake Parc Place: A Study of Mixed-Income Housing.’” Housing Policy Debate 9(4): 749-756.

Author and Copyright Information

Kirk McClure is an Associate Professor with the Graduate Program in Urban Planning at the University of Kansas. His
teaching and research interests are in the area of affordable housing finance and development. McClure has also worked as a professional planner
at both the state and local levels, working on many low-income and mixed-income housing developments.

Kirk McClure, Associate Professor
Graduate Program in Urban Planning
University of Kansas
1465 Jayhawk Boulevard, 317 Marvin Hall
Lawrence, Kansas 66045-7614
Voice: (785) 864-3888
Fax: (785) 864-5301
E-mail: mcclure@KU.edu