Implementing an Urban Mass Transit System
		Stephen D. Marks
		Session:	Author Info

Introduction

In November, 1983 Governor Thomas Kean issued Executive Order Number 53 committing his administration to the development of the Hudson River waterfront. The governor's order created a "Hudson River Waterfront Development Committee" composed of various top-level members of his administration directed to meet with local officials, developers and community leaders to solicit their views on development and infrastructure needs. Most importantly, the committee was to analyze and recommend solutions to improve the riverfront's transportation problems and alleviate its chronic traffic congestion.

Seventeen years later, in the Spring of 2000 the first phase of the Hudson Bergen Light Rail Transit (LRT) system will open amidst much fanfare and celebration. The LRT is a modern version of the traditional trolley which transported people along the same congested corridors more than 50 years before. The LRT has been described as nothing less than a panacea which will spur housing and commercial development, create jobs, reduce traffic congestion and improve the region's air quality. When completed, the mass transit system will transport more than 100,000 commuters daily, allow for the development of 33 million square feet of commercial development, create 58,000 new jobs and spur an additional 40,000 housing units.

At this juncture, we can examine the events which transpired over the 17 years between the first policy initiative by the Kean administration and the grand opening of the mass transit system. We can examine the process of implementation over that period including the twists, turns and permutations of various policies and plans as shaped and re-shaped by individuals, agencies and events. However, it is still premature to conduct an evaluation of the policy implementation because the transit system is not yet open and has not, to date, delivered the desired or promised results.

The Taoist Book of Time, defines "planning" as a search for "clarity." The same can be said about the study of public administration. It is an effort to examine the past, learn lessons from both successes and failures and move on to apply that knowledge toward future endeavors to improve efficiency, effectiveness and to preserve valuable scarce resources.

An examination of the implementation of an urban mass transit project will reveal a complex process involving policy-making and execution, planning, financing and politics. At first blush, transportation policy and implementation in the United States entails a complex web of intergovernmental relations between many layers of government on the local, state, and federal levels. Just below the surface, to complicate matters further, is a maze of formal and informal relationships between offices, agencies, administrators, elected officials, the community and special interests.

The objective of this research paper is to examine the process of policy, planning and politics as related to the implementation of an urban mass transit project. More specifically, the objective is to determine how each one influences the others, and to explore how each has an impact upon the final shape and outcome of a project. In this scheme, policy is the formally adopted goals and objectives of a government through either legislative enactment, executive order, or administrative action. Planning is inextricably related to policy, but includes the earliest components of implementation; in other words, it is the process by which officials and agencies carry-out the policy directives of government. Politics, in this context, can be described as a glue which binds the process of implementation together. Politics includes the reaction and interaction of elected and appointed officials to both each other and to the specific policy or plan at hand.

Related to implementation of transportation projects, policy-formation and execution is not a static or black-and-white matter. Instead, it is dynamic in nature, alive and able to adapt and change according to the situation. In other words, policy and plans are often shaped and melded through both community input as well as the desires of officials and the enactment of laws by either state the legislatures or Congress. Nothing is written in stone. An objective as written into law by a legislative body, may or may not succeed given the political will of the community and the desire of officials to implement it.

Likewise, policy as a stated goal or objective can come from a variety of places. A policy initiative may appear in a speech by an official, the expressed desires of a community, or even the demands of a special interest group. However, a policy is only legitimized once it is formally enacted or adopted and given the power and resources of a government.

The most formalized enactment of policy occurs as a result of the passage of laws. However, due to the shear volume of legislation in both Congress and state legislatures, the goals, objectives, initiatives and even strategies are not always consistent and may sometimes run contrary to one another. This complicates matters and presents particular challenges to administrators from different levels of government when interacting and carrying out their objectives.

Planning is an activity conducted by officials at all levels of government. It is often the difficult and pain-staking matter of examining public policy as it relates to both internal (administrative) data as well as external (environmental) data. Planners must examine and interpret physical data (geography), socio-economic and demographic data (such as census information), administrative records, examine environmental changes and trends and forecast what everything means to their particular organization. Planning, by its very nature, is steeped in history and tradition and limited by a dearth of resources. Planners are often torn between broad policy goals and the nitty-gritty of specific actions. In planning, the phrase: "the devil's in the details" takes on new significance.

In New Jersey, there is a significant disconnect between government planners on the local level and those planning on the state level. With only a few exceptions, land-use planning in the Garden State has been and continues to be the sole domain of municipal and county governments. However, transportation planning is primarily conducted by officials on the state level in the New Jersey Department of Transportation (NJ DOT), New Jersey Transit (NJT), and Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs). While much talked about, economic development planning as a formal public practice is a relatively new government activity.

On the regional level, metropolitan planning organizations, or "MPOs," have become a forum, or vehicle, whereby representatives from various state agencies meet with county and select municipal government representatives to discuss, deliberate and prioritize the region's transportation, infrastructure and economic development needs. The MPOs are primarily funded by the federal government. While existing for many years as cooperative institutions to discuss regional problems and issues, the MPOs have been empowered and were legitimized by several acts of Congress. Today, MPOs have essentially become "shadow governments" ranking and prioritizing federal funds for transportation projects and in some respects superceding the powers and policies of the state Department of Transportation and even the state legislature.

Politics is the influence that officials utilize over both policy and planning. Politics can be as formal as an executive order or legislative enactment. It can also be as subtle as a telephone call or meeting to reach consensus, smooth things over, or even to bring things to a crashing halt. Informal influence by officials can resolve administrative and technical impasses, or create significant logjams.

It should be noted that government officials can exert influence well outside the purview of their roles as elected or appointed officials. For instance, while most Congressman are perceived as working primarily on federal issues within the context of Washington D.C. they can and sometimes do exert a great deal of influence over policies and plans on the local and state levels. Likewise, a local official or agency with little or no formal authority, may be able to successfully coordinate, facilitate and lobby to change state and federal policy. In this respect, the late Speaker Thomas "Tip" O'Neill's now famous maxim "all politics is local" certainly applies.

While prevailing thought in our culture today, perpetuated in part by the news media, is that politics is something "bad" and something to be avoided, it should not be. Rather, it should be recognized as part and parcel to our system of representative democracy. Elected officials at every level of government have a duty to represent the interests of their constituencies; while administrators have a likewise duty to be responsive to the interests of those elected representatives and their communities. It should be acknowledged that politics plays a significant part of the process of implementation and therefore studied for future insight and consideration.

The implementation of a mass transit project in an urban environment is an especially complex and difficult endeavor. Because public resources (i.e. funds) at every level of government are scarce, only the most feasible, well planned and politically favored transportation projects are ever able to advance. The entire process is collaborative in nature, with officials from one level of government having to work closely with those from other levels. It is a system of checks-and-balances. The process is extremely fragile because it demands near full cooperation and consensus. Since federal funds are so competitive nation-wide, a wrong signal perceived in Washington, D.C. may delay or even doom a project.

Brief History and Background

New Jersey's Hudson River waterfront stretching 18 miles from Bayonne in the south to Fort Lee in the north was extremely valuable property during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries because of its close proximity to the markets and population of New York City. The landscape was dominated by vast spans of railroad, numerous ports and port-related warehousing facilities and heavy manufacturing plants. As the northeast's economy reeled from industrial decline, changes in the transportation industry forced the bankruptcy and retreat of many railroad companies and steamship operators. As a result, thousands of previously unavailable riverfront acres were sold to developers during the late 1970s and early 1980s.

This disposition of property created unimaginable opportunities for both the public and private sectors to create new commercial and housing developments close to Manhattan, but without the prohibitive costs of New York City. In 1983, Governor Thomas Kean issued Executive Order 53 creating the "Hudson River Waterfront Development Committee." ⁽¹⁾ The governor conceived of the committee as a forum for seeking consensus on infrastructure and transportation needs. The committee was comprised of the Governor's Director of Policy and Planning, who was appointed chairman; the Commissioner of the NJ Department of Transportation (NJ DOT); the Commissioner of the Department of Commerce and Economic Development; the Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Protection (NJ DEP); a representative of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANY&NJ); and private five citizens appointed by the governor. By 1986, the governor's commission grew by three members with the addition of two private citizens; and the Commissioner of the Department of Community Affairs (DCA). ⁽²⁾ Kean, Thomas, "Executive Order 152," December 22, 1986.

In April 1984, Governor Kean directed the NJ DOT to conduct a transportation study to "analyze the transportation implications of waterfront redevelopment and define a possible course of action which could facilitate this redevelopment, without attendant undesirable consequences." ⁽³⁾ The study was undertaken by the state because the area of waterfront redevelopment transcended both municipal and county boundaries. It was a preliminary plan which called for widespread

public discussion and judgements by municipalities, counties, developers and a number of transportation agencies. While the report identified a preferred course of action, officials acknowledged that the recommendations must be fully understood, scrutinized and ultimately accepted in their proposed or revised form. The NJ DOT hoped that if the reports' recommendations received widespread public support, it would work to ready elements necessary for "implementation."

The Hudson River redevelopment area spans 18 miles of coastline from Bayonne to Edgewater. It encompassed eight municipalities with a population of over 450,000 people. Most of the redevelopment area was in Hudson County with a small portion in Bergen County. The study found that residential developments were widely dispersed along the waterfront, while commercial developments tended to be confined to the south near the PATH (Port Authority Trans Hudson) subway system. The study found that development was stymied between Hoboken and Edgewater due to limited access and the absence of infrastructure. Development was occurring in a "piecemeal" fashion with no apparent provision for future adjoining development. Thus, the report concluded, absence of an overall transportation plan would be a serious stumbling block for continued rational development.

The plan recommended a series of transportation improvements including: expansion of existing bus and heavy commuter rail service; construction of light rail and "people mover" systems; and, establishment of park-and-ride lots with improvements to the existing roadway network. The report recommended a variety of funding sources including the federal and state governments, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, the NJ Turnpike Authority, and private developers through the creation of a special district to assess development impact fees. ⁽⁴⁾

Two subsequent reports issued in 1986 and 1987 developed financing strategies and continued engineering design. ⁽⁵⁾ NJ Transit, "Hudson River Waterfront Study: Draft Transportation Plan Engineering Report," September 1987. The proposals called for much of the funding to come from private developers whose office and commercial projects were straining the local roads and bus systems and who would benefit from the major transportation improvements. By 1987, the original $800 million price-tag had climbed to $1.2 billion. However, softening commercial real estate markets, and staggering time and cost estimates made developers unwilling to pay for more than just a fraction of the elaborate plan. The plan was also hampered by lack of an agreement on routing by local officials, and longer than expected negotiations for right-of-way (ROW) acquisition. In addition, competition among state and local governments for scarce public transit dollars during the Reagan era made the plan appear even more elusive.

Acquiring the Right of Way "ROW"

In June, 1989 after almost four years of negotiations, the Kean administration and the Conrail Railroad Corporation signed an agreement that the state of New Jersey would acquire Conrail's 5.5-mile "River Line" running along the Hudson River from North Bergen to Jersey City, which included a rail tunnel through the Palisades in Weehawken. According to the agreement, Conrail, which owned and used the line for freight movement, would move its operations to a parallel line called the "Northern Branch" on the western side of the Palisades. Under the conditions, the State would have to upgrade the Northern Branch, which it hoped to complete by 1993.

The federal Urban Mass Transit Administration (UMTA) had awarded a $20 million grant for the acquisition of the Northern Branch right-of-way. However, the cost of upgrading the Northern Branch for Conrail's use was estimated between $40 million and $42 million with additional items to be determined through a contracted arbitration procedure. In addition, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, had committed $50 million towards the cost of the rehabilitation work. The bi-state Port Authority's rationale for contributing $50 million to help relocate Conrail to the Northern Branch was to help improve the movement of both goods and people as well as helping maintain the region's economic competitiveness.

Under the terms, NJ Transit using $20 million in federal funds from UMTA and $50 million from the Port Authority would purchase the River Line and pay for an estimated $41 million worth of track and bridge improvements to the Northern Branch needed to allow Conrail to switch its trains to the new route. A major difficulty in reaching the agreement was finding a way to build a rail connection at "Marion Junction" in Jersey City that was acceptable to local industries, residents and officials.

A major impasse in the negotiations had been linking the Northern Branch to the waterfront at Marion Junction. To upgrade the Northern Branch, the line would have to be maneuvered around several factories and a ramp constructed over Newark Ave. In addition, the State would have to build new overpasses carrying Paterson Plank Road and Secaucus Road over the Northern Branch. "It's not 100 percent clear whether we'll be able to move Conrail off the River Line by 1993," said NJ Transit Waterfront Transportation Office Director Martin Robbins. "We have to make some judgements when the (overpasses) can be built." ⁽⁶⁾

State officials defended the role of negotiators in reaching a deal with Conrail, given the many complicated issues which had to be resolved. "I am sure a lot of people think it took too much time, but we've had 10 municipalities, two counties and rail systems on either side of the Palisades involved," commented Judy Barry, chief of staff to NJ DOT Commissioner Hazel Gluck. "Unfortunately, we did not have a situation like Docklands in London where they leveled the site, put in a light rail system and then permitted the development," she continued. ⁽⁷⁾

At one point, the slow pace of the negotiations for the line caused UMTA regional administrator Leonard Braun to meet with Commissioner Gluck to ask her to shift the $20 million federal transit grant to another project with a greater likelihood of being built. But Gluck responded that the River Line was "the cornerstone for putting a light rail line on the waterfront," and refused to shift the money because it was the governor's top priority. ⁽⁸⁾

In order to reach the agreement, the contract left the setting of the final price of the line to an outside arbitrator. Under the terms, if the two sides could not agree on a price themselves, the arbitrator would be able to set the price somewhere between the $6 million offered by the state and the $17 million sought by Conrail. The agreement also allowed NJ Transit to acquire at no added cost an abandoned Conrail railbed in Jersey City, known as the "Bergen Arches". For Conrail, the agreement would help provide improved rail freight service in the region by speeding up operations and allowing higher overhead clearances needed to move modern double-stacked container cars on the line.

At the celebration marking the signing of the agreement, Governor Kean said "when I took office seven and a half years ago I looked at this waterfront and realized that it could be properly developed only if we could provide the transportation needed to make it accessible. Transportation is absolutely the key to developing the waterfront. Without it we will fail." Kean, whose second term would in January, continued "There were times I thought we would never reach this day." ⁽⁹⁾

GOVERNOR KEAN AND THE "CIRCLE OF MOBILITY"

The increasing cost, complexity and time of the transit plans led one major developer, Hartz Mountain Industries, to offer to dig a new tunnel next to the existing Weehawken tunnel. Hartz would then build a monorail and roadway system to provide alternate access to development sites in Weehawken and Hoboken. Eugene Heller, President of Hartz, had grown so impatient with the state's progress that he offered to construct the system in three years and charge the state a fixed price of $150 million. An additional $95 million would be needed to construct a new exit to link the system to the New Jersey Turnpike.

The Hartz plan, originally proposed in 1987, called for construction of a highway tunnel and monorail line from a proposed baseball stadium in Secaucus next to the New Jersey Turnpike in the Meadowlands thorough the Palisades, just north of the Lincoln Tunnel, to the waterfront. The monorail would then turn south along the waterfront to NJ Transit's commuter rail and PATH terminal in Hoboken. A north-south waterfront boulevard would provide auto and bus access to the various development sites. Commuters could park at the proposed stadium, or possibly at the existing Meadowlands Sports Complex, if the monorail were extended. Commuters bound for New York could take the monorail, drive or take buses to an existing ferry dock in Weehawken, where frequent ferry service was offered to midtown and downtown Manhattan.

Mr. Heller said the new highway-transit plan was needed to open the development potential of the northern portion of the Hudson waterfront, which included Hoboken, Weehawken, West New York and Edgewater. Most of the office and residential development that had happened along the Hudson waterfront during the 1980's had been concentrated south of NJ Transit's Hoboken Terminal, primarily near PATH stations at Exchange Place, Pavonia and Newport, all in Jersey City.

Citing a study by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey which inventoried 900 acres of mostly vacant development sites north of the Hoboken terminal, Mr. Heller said that construction of 9 million square feet of office space and 17,000 housing units were being stymied by inadequate access routes. By comparison, he said the inventory of 576 acres of development sites south of Hoboken Terminal allowed for 22 million square feet of office space and 21,000 housing units to be built, under construction, or planned. Heller, whose company was seeking to develop at least three large waterfront sites north of Hoboken terminal, said "we're hoping the tunnel, along with our ferries, can do for the northern part of the waterfront what PATH has done for the southern part." ⁽¹⁰⁾

The Hartz proposal prompted a meeting among high-level Kean administration officials responsible for overseeing waterfront development, including: Brenda Davis, Director of Policy and Planning for the Governor's Office; NJ DOT Commissioner Hazel Gluck; Ralph Loveys, chairman of the New Jersey Turnpike Authority; Martin Robbins, Director of NJ Transit's Hudson River Waterfront Transportation Office; and Christopher Daggett, Commissioner of state Department of Environmental Protection (NJ DEP).

Mr. Heller said that he had detected some resistence by state officials during preliminary discussions. "Some people seem to feel that since our whole plan is on one sheet of paper, it can't be any good because no plan that's on one sheet of paper can be any good," he complained. ⁽¹¹⁾ State officials responded that there were serious questions about how the Hartz plan could be financed and how it would fit into the overall transportation needs of the entire waterfront.

Borrowing a "page" from the Hartz proposal, two weeks after the celebrated Conrail agreement, the Kean administration announced an ambitious $2.5 billion plan to link the Meadowlands, the Hudson waterfront and the NJ Turnpike. The "Governor's Mobility Plan," as it was first called at a Trenton press conference, represented "a new chapter in New Jersey history." The plan would "mine the motherlode of what we have called the richest undeveloped area in the world." ⁽¹²⁾ Governor Kean reported that the plan would open access to the waterfront while relieving NJ Turnpike congestion, make the Meadowlands more accessible, and improve air quality.

The plan combined a number of existing proposals (See Table One) that would tie 25,000 parking spaces at Giants Stadium with a new rail transfer station in Secaucus, a new tunnel under the Palisades, new bus ramps from the Hudson County extension of the New Jersey Turnpike in Jersey City to local city streets and a bypass road to the Lincoln Tunnel in Weehawken, as well as construction of a "people mover" along the waterfront from Jersey City to Weehawken consisting of either a monorail or light rail system.
 

Table One	Governor Kean's original "Circle of Mobility" Plan
I.	A passenger rail link from the proposed Secaucus Transfer to the Meadowlands Sports Complex in East Rutherford.
II.	A roadway from the proposed NJ Turnpike interchange at the Secaucus Transfer to the Jersey City and Hoboken waterfronts via the abandoned Bergen Arches rail bed.
III.	Construction of new bus ramps from the Hudson County extension of the New Jersey Turnpike in Jersey City to local city streets and a bypass road to the Lincoln Tunnel in Weehawken
IV.	A north-south busway, monorail or trolley system linking major development sites along the Hudson River waterfront from downtown Jersey City to Weehawken.
V.	A new tunnel under the Palisades in Weehawken to link new NJ Turnpike interchange with the waterfront, as proposed by Hartz Mountain Industries.

Governor Kean conceded it would take at least a decade to complete, but the Secaucus Transfer/Allied Junction rail station and a road from there through the Bergen Arches rail bed to Jersey City could be completed in just five years. Officials admitted that the "people mover" could be built as one of the last phases of the plan. A dispute over whether to use a monorail or some other system pitted the NJ Turnpike Authority against both the NJ DOT and NJ Transit. Both the NJ Dot and NJ Transit favored light rail systems. "We all have our turfs and its kind of tough sometimes to step back. This kind of cooperation is the only way we can go," said NJ DOT Commissioner Hazel Gluck. ⁽¹³⁾

However, Governor Kean made a point of saying that the exact technology of the proposed people mover was something that had to be studied by the various agencies. The Governor said that the it was the first time so many agencies had worked together. He said the "extraordinary" consensus reached among the agencies was at least in part due to the uniformly positive reaction that the plan had garnered. Mr. Kean hoped that the positive reaction would mean that the plan would continue to be a priority under future governors.

The Governor ordered the state agencies to work together to flesh out the details by the fall. Applications could then begin for environmental and other permits. NJ Turnpike officials said that two new interchanges that would be keys to the new tunnel and Secaucus Transfer/Allied Junction could be built without any new bonding. The money could come from funds that had been earmarked for expansion of the NJ Turnpike's western spur. The NJ Turnpike's participation was a critical component of the plan because much of the funding was supposed to come from tolls for the new tunnel and Secaucus Transfer/Allied Junction interchanges.

The price-tag of the ambitious plan was sketchy. The estimated cost of the Allied Junction/Secaucus Transfer rail station with connecting interchange was put at $600 million. The new "people mover" from the Meadowlands Sports Complex with complementing rail tunnel was estimated at $476 million. And, the waterfront boulevard with bus lanes and the "people mover" from Jersey City to Weehawken was estimated at $1.3 billion. The figures were in 1989 dollars and did not estimate any environmental clean-up or wetlands mitigation costs. It was speculated that almost half of the cost would be raised by the NJ Turnpike Authority and funded by new tolls at the respective interchanges. The remaining portion would come from federal, state and private sources.

NJ Turnpike Chairman Ralph Loveys, pledged his agency would shift monies from its $2 billion widening program toward building a new Palisades tunnel, a new 17E interchange 1* miles north of the existing interchange that would feed commuters to the Weehawken waterfront and a new interchange to serve the Secaucus Transfer rail station and feed commuters through the Bergen Arches. The original widening plan was announced in 1985 and was scheduled to add between two and three lanes on the western spur of the NJ Turnpike north of Exit 15W to alleviate traffic congestion. The engineering and design plans, which cost $40 million, were eventually shelved due to significant environmental problems adjacent to the highway.

THE ALTERNATIVES ANALYSIS PROCESS BEGINS

The next concrete planning step after the 1987 preliminary engineering report occurred in May, 1989 when the New Jersey Transit Board voted to spend $2 million on a federally required study designed to determine whether commuters and residents along the Hudson River waterfront should ride buses, trolleys, monorails or cars in the future. Officials called the decision the most significant step toward improving transportation along the riverfront since Governor Kean first proposed transportation improvements in 1985. The "Alternatives Analysis/Draft Environmental Impact Statement" (AA/DEIS) was a requirement of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) which called for a thorough review before the investment of federal funds into large public works projects. It was estimated that the "AA/DEIS" study would take 18 to 24 months to complete. The study would be conducted by private consultants and would provide an opportunity for local officials, developers and private citizens to participate.

The objective of the study was to improve transit mobility to the diverse and overlapping markets in the redevelopment area. Specifically, the goals of the study included: maximizing mobility for area residents and workers; supporting the continued economic development of the waterfront area; preserving and protecting the environment; maximizing the efficiency of the waterfront transportation system; and, developing a consensus for a transportation plan.

The study explored at least seven alternative plans for the corridor (see table two), including: a "no-build" scenario; making small improvements to the existing network of streets, bus-lanes and PATH (Port Authority Trans Hudson subway system); building a system of busways for the exclusive use of buses; the original 1985 proposal which included a combination of trolley lines, busways and park and ride lots; constructing monorails on elevated tracks; building a north-south roadway for automobiles; and, a final option would blend two or more of the alternatives. ⁽¹⁴⁾ Officials conceded that the final recommendation would almost certainly propose a blend of the various alternatives.
 

Table Two	Original Alternative Analysis study
I.	A "no-build" base-line scenario maintaining all existing transit and roadway services;
II.	Relatively low cost transit and traffic improvements making small improvements to the existing network of streets, bus-lanes and PATH
III.	Building a system of busways for the exclusive use of buses
IV.	The original 1985 proposal which included a combination of trolley lines, busways and park and ride lots building a system of busways for the exclusive use of buses
V.	Constructing monorails on elevated tracks
VI.	Building a north-south roadway for automobiles
VII.	And, a final option would blend two or more of the of the alternatives

 

The consulting firm chosen for the study was Parsons, Brinkerhoff, Quade, & Douglas, a large New York planning and engineering firm that had conducted the preliminary planning for Kean's 1985 proposal. In addition to meeting federal requirements to make the project eligible for federal funding, the study was to help officials form a consensus on what option to pursue and to design a feasible financing package to pay for the project.

Mr. Robbins reported that the financing was probably the most difficult issue facing the project. The project would be competing with a limited pot of money and there would be no assurance of federal funding. Besides federal funds, Robbins reported that the Port Authority "PANY&NJ" would have to be tapped and Hudson County officials would have to form a "Transportation Development District" under state legislation pending in Trenton. The special district would have power to impose uniform fees on developers to pay for transportation improvements that would benefit the district. ⁽¹⁵⁾

In August 1989, the North Jersey Transportation Coordinating Council, (NJTCC) endorsed a $2 million study aimed at constructing a similar transit system between the cities of Newark and Elizabeth. The NJTCC was the metropolitan planning organization (MPO) for northern New Jersey which was composed of representatives from each of the 13 counties within its jurisdiction. As explained later in this paper, the MPO was empowered to approve or disapprove all federally funded transportation projects within its 13 county region. The Council's vote made the Newark-Elizabeth proposal eligible to go to the Urban Mass Transit Administration (UMTA) in Washington, D.C. for further review.

Representatives from Hudson County and Jersey City abstained from the vote. Hudson County transportation planner John Lane said the abstentions were caused by fears that the Newark-Elizabeth project could compete for federal construction funding with the waterfront transit line. The NJ DOT representative's vote was conditioned on the project's "not jeopardizing" the Hudson Waterfront project. But, Mr. Lane responded that he was not convinced of the practical value of those assurances.

Under federal guidelines at the time, federal transit funds could only be used to study one major new transit line at a time in each planning region. This created an immediate competition with the Hudson River waterfront proposal, which Governor Kean and NJ DOT Commissioner Gluck had designated as the state's top priority "new start" project for northern New Jersey. The UMTA officials said the Newark-Elizabeth study could not be funded until the Hudson Waterfront alternatives analysis study was completed.

In response, U.S. Senator Frank Lautenberg called on the U.S. Transportation Secretary Samuel Skinner to change the UMTA rules to allow more funds to go to New Jersey and other densely populated areas. He said the one "new start" limitation was unfair to urban areas which rely heavily on mass transit. In a letter to Secretary Skinner, Senator Lautenberg wrote "the federal government should be encouraging active development of transit systems as a part of state and local planning. Instead, UMTA forces a state like New Jersey to pick out one area for a 'new start' process at the expense of others which may have equally legitimate and pressing needs." ⁽¹⁶⁾

COMPETING COMMITTEES

In July 1989, the NJ Turnpike Authority took two more steps toward implementation of the "Circle of Mobility" plan. First, the authority assigned consultants to begin mapping the agency's role in linking the Hudson waterfront and the Meadowlands with roads and mass transit. Second, NJ Turnpike chairman Ralph Loveys announced that he had asked Hudson County Executive Robert C. Janiszewski to chair a "Citizens' Advisory Committee," which would give local input on the "Mobility Plan." "It's very important that we continue the communication," said Loveys, referring to the many meetings the authority had with citizens groups in Middlesex County during the planning stage for road widening projects. The authority had been praised for responding to residents' concerns about noise, property condemnation, and other issues. ⁽¹⁷⁾

The county executive praised Mr. Loveys and the Authority's other commissioners for dropping plans to widen the road's western spur in favor of building key portions of the mobility plan. In a letter to the Mr. Loveys, County Executive Janiszewski wrote "the committee's establishment is a major milestone that signals an end to backroom, closed-door, drafting-table planning and opens this critical process to a new era of public input and participation." "Anyone who favors an open door governmental policy should join in congratulating the NJ Turnpike Authority for this decision," he continued. ⁽¹⁸⁾July 24, 1989.

Mr. Janiszewski was a natural choice for the committee chair. He had been an early supporter of the idea of linking the Sports Complex with the waterfront using some form of "people mover" and constructing a new road through the abandoned Bergen Arches railbed. He lent his "qualified" support to the idea of a monorail, taking the position that he would support whichever system could get the job done efficiently and in a timely manner. "Anything that takes 10 years to do is too long," he said. ⁽¹⁹⁾

A month later, another panel was created by New Jersey Transit, also naming Mr. Janiszewski as committee chairman. The second committee's name, task and appointments were announced by Robert Innocenzi, Acting State Commissioner of Transportation, who also sat as chairman of the New Jersey Transit Corporation Board of Directors. Though required by federal law, the creation of a second committee signaled a split within the Kean administration.

NJ Transit's committee was named the "Hudson River Waterfront Advisory Committee" and its mission was to develop a plan acceptable to both NJ Transit and local interests. Specifically, it was to offer comments on the $2 million Alternatives Analysis/Draft Environmental Impact Statement (AA/DEIS) begun by NJ Transit the month prior. Innocenzi said the 18 to 24 month study was designed to determine "the most cost effective, efficient, financially feasible and environmentally compatible transportation system" possible for the Hudson waterfront between Bayonne and Edgewater. ⁽²⁰⁾ The federally required AA/DEIS effort called for extensive public participation from both the advisory committee and through public meetings, designed to help NJ Transit select a "Locally Preferred Alternative" (LPA) for which federal and state funding would be sought.

State transportation officials welcomed Janiszewski's participation because they saw him as an advocate of mass transit who had the political sophistication and clout to put together the local consensus that had eluded state policymakers during the prior four years. Since the Governor's original proposal in 1985, no agreement on the plan had emerged among local officials and developers, and no physical work had even been started.

Besides Janiszewski, NJ Transit's advisory committee had 49 other members, including: Albio Sires, resident of West New York as Vice Chairman; the mayors of the 11 municipalities from Edgewater to Bayonne; Rep. Frank Guarini (D-14); Rep. Robert Torricelli (D-9); State Senator Thomas Cowan (D-Hudson); Assemblymen David Kronick (D-Hudson); Bernard Kenny (D-Hudson); and D. Bennett Mazur (D-Bergen). In addition several developers and community activists were included on the panel: Morton Goldfein of Hartz Mountain Industries; Jack Houston of Colgate-Palmolive; Thomas Lean of Harsimus Cove; Hoboken resident Helen Manogue; Weehawken resident Susan O'Kane; New Jersey Association of Railroad Passengers president Douglas Bowen; and Jersey City resident John Lyons.

As the dueling advisory committees highlighted, there were deep difference in the positions taken by the NJ Turnpike Authority, NJ Transit and the NJ Department of Transportation on a number of key issues. The first was whether priority should be given to the proposal by Hartz Mountain Industries for a tunnel under the Palisades in Weehawken, as favored by the NJ Turnpike Authority. Instead, NJ Transit favored the Allied Junction development, which was linked to construction of the Secaucus Transfer rail station and Bergen Arches road plan.

The second dispute involved the mode of mass transit, to utilize, along the waterfront. The NJ Turnpike favored an elevated monorail, while NJ Transit favored a more traditional trolley (light rail) as proposed by Governor Kean in the original 1985 waterfront transportation plan. Some transportation planners feared that a monorail would be inadequate and that its construction would deter the more substantive rail systems that would better serve the long-term development along the waterfront.

NJ DOT chief of staff Judy Barry, who headed the Governor's interagency work group openly admitted there was "reason to worry" on how the collective decisions by the agencies could be reached and then enforced. ⁽²¹⁾ "Right now, you have seven equals sitting at the table. There's a question of who will have overall authority, who will have the power to see it through," she continued. ⁽²²⁾ Part of the difficulty was that a large part of the funding for key parts of the mobility plan were expected to come from the NJ Turnpike authority. Approximately $800 million in capital funds were available for "mobility" projects because of the Authority's decision not to widen its western spur.

There was some fear among other agencies that the NJ Turnpike, because of the size of its contribution and independent status, would dominate the decision-making process and possibly ignore the interagency's report if it objected to it. The interagency working group included state DOT Commissioner Robert Innocenzi, NJ Turnpike Authority Chair Ralph Loveys, NJ Transit Executive Director S. Thomas Gagliano, NJ Transit Waterfront Office Director Martin Robbins, NJ DEP Commissioner Christopher Daggett, NJ Sports Authority Director Robert Mulchay, and NJ Department of Community Affairs (DCA) Commissioner Anthony Villane, Jr.

But, Governor Kean's Director of Policy and Planning, Brenda Davis, who oversaw negotiations among the agencies, said that the disagreements that had arisen were minor compared to the issues everyone agreed upon. "We're doing well. There is much more agreement than disagreement, which is pretty good considering these are agencies that haven't worked together before," she said. ⁽²³⁾ Nearly all of the officials agreed that the major elements of the mobility plan were important. And, while the various agencies had their own priorities they conceded that environmental and funding constraints would dictate the order in which the projects would be accomplished.

"The big breakthrough is that everyone agrees that the NJ Turnpike has a big role in the Circle of Mobility, including mass transit, and that the federal government, the Port Authority, the DOT and the private developers will also have to participate," Davis continued. However, attorneys from the NJ Turnpike Authority warned that neither money from the widening bonds sold in 1985, nor the NJ Turnpike's toll revenues could be used for mass transit or track work. The only NJ Turnpike money available for mass transit was between $120 million and $150 million in interest collected on the bond funds since 1985.

The final interagency proposal sent to Governor Kean for his consideration laid out a comprehensive list of individual projects that would comprise the "Circle of Mobility" plan. The proposal suggested that the group be made into a permanent interagency body with the Commissioner of the NJ DOT sitting as its chair. The appropriate agencies would be responsible for planning, constructing, and financing each project. The group would also oversee construction of the projects through completion by 2001. However, the NJ Turnpike Authority would first need formal legislative approval to fund projects outside of its traditional road building charter.

In October 1989, Governor Kean codified the interagency's proposal through Executive Order number 218. It stated that the revitalization of the Hudson River Waterfront and Meadowlands was dependent upon improving the area's mass transit and highway access. The order established the "mobility plan" as a group of 55 "projects," with 19 "segments," in seven "clusters," along three "corridors," (see table three). The plan's major objectives were to: improve access to and mobility around the Hudson River waterfront; relieve congestion on the NJ Turnpike; and, improve access to and mobility around the Meadowlands region and the Meadowlands Sports Complex. It also formally established the interagency work group as "The Governor's Mobility Plan Coordinating Committee." ⁽²⁴⁾
 
 
 

Table Three	Revised "Circle of Mobility" list of projects.
I.	"Allied Junction Corridor" included construction of Secaucus Transfer rail station and roadway through Bergen Arches to waterfront bypasses to Holland and Lincoln Tunnels.
II.	"Waterfront Corridor" including the construction of a "People Mover" from Bayonne to the south, through Jersey City, Hoboken, the Weehawken Tunnel and terminating at the Meadowlands Sports Complex.
III.	"Twin Tunnels Corridor" included construction of a new tunnel north of the existing "Weehawken Tunnel" to accommodate three lanes of traffic from a new NJ Turnpike interchange '17E' to the waterfront and Lincoln Tunnel.

 

Upon completion of the recommendations to the Governor, administration officials conceded that it was uncertain if the plan would ever be carried out. "In the future, the next administration, if they're interested, will have to keep the parties together," said Brenda Davis. ⁽²⁵⁾ Her comments highlighted the fact that the initiative was unveiled only three months before the end of Governor Kean's second term.

The state's mobility proposal came under immediate fire by environmental, community and transit advocates. The NJ Association of Railroad Passengers (NJARP) said the roadway projects would only worsen automobile congestion along the already crowded waterfront and add to the area's severe air pollution problems. Douglas Bowen, president of NJARP, and a member of the Alternatives Analysis Committee, complained that making it easier for cars to get to the waterfront would only attract more of them. He added that making highway improvements before constructing making mass transit was a bad idea and would only undermine later efforts to get people to switch to mass transit. He suggested the state should be working to provide "efficient, safe, clean and fast" transit service along the waterfront instead of encouraging more motorists to drive to work in what is already the most densely populated county in the state. ⁽²⁶⁾ And, he called the transportation plan a 'Circus of Immobility.' ⁽²⁷⁾

Even members of Governor Kean's "North Jersey Transit Advisory Committee" were critical of the plan upon its release. The committee said that the development boom along the waterfront had occurred over the previous decade because the attractive sites were available near Manhattan. But they warned that the upsurge could not continue if the emerging problems of traffic congestion, highway safety and poor air quality were not solved.

The committee specifically called for the state to create a "transportation development district" encompassing the areas covered by the "Circle of Mobility" plan. They said the state should impose parking fees within the district on employer-provided parking spaces as a way to reduce rush hour traffic congestion and as a way to fund mass transit service. They also recommended that private developers within the district help fund some of the capital costs of building the transportation improvements.

A NEW ADMINISTRATION IN TRENTON

In 1989, both major party gubernatorial candidates running for election addressed the proposal. Republican candidate Rep. James Courter (R-12^th Dist.) supported the "Circle of Mobility" plan, calling it "a step in the right direction." ⁽²⁸⁾ However, he said some projects were clearly more important than others and that the large number of proposed projects would have to be pared down to a manageable size.

On the other hand, Democratic gubernatorial candidate Rep. James Florio (D-1^st Dist.) called the plan "a press release initiative," saying "we're going to have to be a little more real in what it is we're talking about." ⁽²⁹⁾ Related to the waterfront transportation system, Florio said he would support funding coming from the state's "Transportation Trust Fund" and one or more state bond issues for transportation. But he expected funding to also come from private developers benefitting from the planned improvements.

Upon taking office, Governor Florio and his administration remained skeptical of the "Circle of Mobility" plan. Officials said that by refusing to prioritize or "say no" to any of the 55 projects, including those supported by the NJ Turnpike Authority and Hartz Mountain Industries, the Kean administration left a hugely expensive and environmentally difficult plan with little chance of ever getting built. They questioned the environmental, political and financial feasibility of building a tunnel and roadway "in Hudson County where they don't even like you to appoint someone, much less blast a tunnel under their town." ⁽³⁰⁾ "You had people pushing their own agendas and no one was making sure it added up to something that could be done at a reasonable cost and within a reasonable time period," said an anonymous Florio administration official. ⁽³¹⁾

Hartz Mountain President Eugene Heller, after meeting with Florio on the subject, said that he welcomed Governor Florio's apparent determination to make decisions and move ahead. "Governor Kean was sort of in la-de-da land. He said 'yes' to everything but nothing got done. I think Governor Florio is one of the smarter governors that I've seen." ⁽³²⁾ "He's a hands-on guy," Heller continued, "and I know he realizes that $3 billion for all these things, moving Conrail, putting in light rail, building Allied Junction, is not all going to happen and he's got to make decisions." ⁽³³⁾

Under the Florio administration, decision-making would be centralized under the state Commissioner of Transportation, with the state's independent authorities required to mesh their policies and plans far more closely with those of the Department of Transportation than had been the case in the past. Governor Florio promised to conduct an aggressive and far-reaching review of the mobility plan. State officials said that "decisions will be made, whether it costs political capital or not, whether it upsets regional war lords or not. The bottom line is: Tough decisions will be made and they will be made on the merits," officials stated. ⁽³⁴⁾

Governor Florio appointed Thomas Downs as Commissioner of the state Department of Transportation. Mr. Downs was the former head of the federal Urban Mass Transit Administration (UMTA) and had served as President of New York City's Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority. Commissioner Downs said the "Circle of Mobility" plan would have to be reshaped from "ground zero." "There has to be an agreed upon set of priorities for spending what scarce resources are left and it's unclear even what is left," said Mr. Downs. ⁽³⁵⁾ To serve economic development in New Jersey transportation planners would have to better recognize the interrelationships between airports, seaports, highways and transit systems.

In December 1990, the waterfront transit project received an important endorsement when Governor Florio's "Transportation Executive Council" released a list of highway and transit projects for northeastern New Jersey totaling $3.6 billion. The Council, comprised of the NJ DOT and various independent agencies, was a re-make of Governor Kean's interagency work group from the year before. The council's plans were "sharply scaled-down" from the "Circle of Mobility." Commissioner Downs described Governor Kean's proposal as "not coordinated and not constrained by finances." ⁽³⁶⁾ He said that the list of recommended projects was limited to those that could reasonably win environmental approval and be paid for with state, federal and authority funds.

The Council split the plans into projects which could be completed within five years and longer term projects. The Council also selected five urban areas, ripe for revitalization, to be supported by new infrastructure investments. Among the projects which received an endorsement from the council were: the waterfront light rail, a waterfront busway and the "Secaucus Transfer" with its Bergen Arches component. A key part of the plan called for the state legislature to raise the cap on spending from the state's Transportation Trust Fund (TTF) from $365 million a year to $565 million a year. Doing so would allow the state to draw additional federal funds and spend in excess of $1 billion annually for NJ DOT and NJ Transit capital projects over the following four years. ⁽³⁷⁾

Reflecting the administration's concern for austerity, NJ Transit's Hudson River Waterfront Transportation Office scrapped plans to study several alternatives for the 18-mile stretch of waterfront. Mr. Robbins, said he wanted to streamline the list in part to insure that whatever plan the state finally picked was financially feasible. "We have to recognize the funding situation is very uncertain," and that an overly expensive plan would have little chance of being built. ⁽³⁸⁾

Mr. Robbins and his staff, with the help of consultants, eliminated three alternatives, including: the Hartz monorail proposal, the use of conventional commuter trains (heavy rail) for the corridor, and the use of the Conrail's rail freight tunnel under the Palisades, known as the "Weehawken Tunnel" for a trolley line to the Meadowlands. Instead, the waterfront office put together a revised list of five alternatives to be studied over the following six months (See Table four).
 
 
 

Table Four	Revised list of Alternatives Examined by NJ Transit
I.	A "No Build" scenario as required by federal rules, which examined the current situation.
II.	"Transportation Systems Improvements" which entailed fairly limited improvements to existing road and transit systems.
III.	"Core Light Rail and Busway" which projected a limited trolley system from Lincoln Harbor in Weehawken south through Hoboken to Exchange Place and Liberty State Park in Jersey City. The system also entailed a bus-only roadway, or "busway" from the NJ Turnpike through the Weehawken Tunnel and south to the Lincoln Tunnel. A continuous four-lane road from Weehawken to Bayonne was also part of the plan.
IV.	"Core Light Rail with Extensions" entailed a core trolley system from Lincoln Harbor in Weehawken south through Hoboken to Exchange Place in Jersey City, with possible extension to either western Jersey City or south into Bayonne. Both extensions would be built using abandoned rail rights of way.
V.	"Neighborhood Express" which envisioned an extensive system of busways and park-and-ride lots linking the Meadowlands and with major development sites along the waterfront. The system would include a "busway" through the Weehawken Tunnel south to the Lincoln Tunnel, a four lane bypass road through Hoboken to the NJ Turnpike's Holland Tunnel extension, and tight controls on waterfront parking and bus exhaust.

 

Under the federal guidelines at the time, the state would have to raise a large share to match the federal funds. This was because the Bush administration had insisted that half of the cost of any new federally funded transit project be paid for locally. Mr. Robbins said he believed it was possible to get a 50 percent local match, but it would not be "simple or straightforward." Besides the possibility of tapping into surplus NJ Turnpike funds, he identified the Port Authority (PANY&NJ) as a potential donor. He also said the state would try to count the value of right-of-way easements given-up by developers as part of the local match. In addition, he said it was possible to assess development sites through the creation of a transportation development district.

Federal law allowed the Urban Mass Transit Administration (UMTA) to pay up to 75 percent of the cost of new mass transit projects. However, the head of the UMTA, Brian Clymer, warned New Jersey officials that they could not count on the federal government to pay more than a fraction of the costs for the projects being considered by the state. In reaction to the Florio administration's plans, Clymer stated that "New Jersey has three corridors where they are looking at billion-dollar projects," including the Hudson waterfront, the Newark-Elizabeth "Growth Connection," and the West Shore commuter rail line in Bergen County. ⁽³⁹⁾

"The dollars just aren't there," said Mr. Clymer, noting that his agency distributed about $500 million annually in federal grants for "new start" projects. ⁽⁴⁰⁾ He said the shortage of funds had caused many states and cities seeking to build transit projects to go after federal grants covering 50 percent or less of constructions costs. Mr. Clymer stated that cities and states which were willing to pay a large share of the costs of a new project would get preference both from his agency and from Congress. He explained that a large contribution showed strong local commitment and helped ensure that federal funds go as far as possible and were spent on projects that were well-conceived. He advised that as a practical matter, the bulk of the New Jersey's transit funding would have to come from other sources, despite how much "political clout" New Jersey had in Congress.

THE INTERMODAL SURFACE TRANSPORTATION EFFICIENCY ACT "ISTEA"

In 1991, federal transportation policy and financing would be significantly revised with the reauthorization of the Surface Transportation Act. In June, the US Senate approved the legislation which shaped the five year funding plan for federal transportation spending. The $123 billion program for highway and mass transit was approved by a 91-7 margin. It was important for mass transit in two ways. It called for spending an average of $620 million per year on new rail lines and extensions in two dozen cities across the nation. This amounted to a 50 percent increase over what the federal government had spent over the preceding five years.

The proposed legislation would give states, like New Jersey, which violated the standards of the federal Clean Air Act, much more latitude to use federal highway aid to pay for mass transit projects. In his testimony before Congress earlier in the spring, Governor Florio said that "in the Northeast, improving and expanding mass transit is a logical and effective way to reduce air pollution and reduce traffic congestion at the same time. It's a win-win situation," he continued. ⁽⁴¹⁾ While most of the federal funding was used for roadway maintenance, rehabilitation and modernization, NJ DOT officials estimated that at least $50 million per year could be "flexed" from highway to mass transit construction if the federal rules were changed. New Jersey had been receiving an average of $400 million a year in federal highway aid.

The Senate version of the bill allowed the federal government to pay up to 80 percent of construction costs. The legislation also abandoned a Reagan administration policy prohibiting more than one "new start" project per metropolitan area. Specifically, the bill eliminated the "one-new-start" rule if the metropolitan area's air quality did not meet federal standards. The change greatly benefitted New Jersey since all but 2 of its 21 counties were out of compliance with clean air mandates.

In addition, the Senate bill required the Urban Mass Transit Administration (UMTA) to change the way it ranked projects that were in competition for scarce funds. The agency had given the greatest weight to a project's cost effectiveness, as measured by its cost per new rider. During the Reagan administration, UMTA set $6.00 per new rider as the unofficial cut-off for deciding what projects would be funded. While the bill did not eliminate the criterion, it required UMTA to take into account additional factors like economic development potential, air quality impacts, reductions in traffic congestion. The Urban Mass Transit Administration would also have to adjust the cost effectiveness criteria to take into account regional cost differences and inflation since the $6.00 rule was set in 1984.

The Bush administration had proposed limiting federal contributions to 50 percent or less, with the rest coming from state and local governments. Federal transportation officials had argued that a lower federal contribution toward new projects allowed federal funding to go further and helped ensure that projects were well planned and cost effective.

In July 1991, Congressman Robert Roe (D-NJ 8th Dist.), chairman of the House Public Works and Transportation Committee introduced his version of the federal surface transportation reauthorization. His legislation promoted the development of a national transportation system which was "economically efficient and environmentally sound." ⁽⁴²⁾ In the act's policy declaration, its sponsors expected to foster the reduction of energy consumption while supporting the nation's "preeminent" position in international commerce. The bill gave special emphasis to the social benefits of reduced air pollution, reduced traffic congestion and increased mobility for elderly persons, people with disabilities, and the economically disadvantaged in both urban and rural areas. ⁽⁴³⁾

Congressman Roe's bill included a controversial "Nickel for America" proposal which raised an additional five cent tax on gasoline. Mr. Roe's legislation contained a $153.5 billion five-year transportation program which was far in excess of the Senate's $123 billion bill and the administration's $103 billion proposal. At a press conference announcing his legislation, Congressman Roe vowed to press forward despite opposition from the White House and the likelihood of confrontation with the Senate. President Bush had promised to veto any bill which contained a gas tax increase.

Mr. Roe's bill took the Senate's flexibility provision a step further. It allowed any state in which 90 percent of the population lived in a non-attainment area, as set forth by the federal Clean Air Act Amendments, to use all of its highway funding for transit. The only states which qualified were New Jersey and Rhode Island.

Congressman Roe promised that his measure would "be the key to a redirection of transportation policy in New Jersey." ⁽⁴⁴⁾ Under his plan, New Jersey would receive an additional $4 billion in transportation funding, including an unprecedented $1.1 billion in special transit and highway aid. The bill included $2.8 billion in highway funds for New Jersey for fiscal years 1992 through 1996 with an increase from $361 million to $529 million in year one, and reaching $674 million in year five. In addition, the legislation included a $625 million earmark for an ambitious list of transit projects in northern New Jersey labeled the "Urban Core" (See Table Five). ⁽⁴⁵⁾
 
 
 

Table Five	Earmarked "Urban Core" Projects in  federal ISTEA legislation
I.	The "Secaucus Transfer"
II.	The "Kearny Connection"
III.	The "Waterfront Connection"
IV.	The "Northeast Corridor Signal System"
V.	The "Hudson River Waterfront Transportation System"
VI.	The "Newark-Newark International Airport-Elizabeth Transit Link"
VII.	A "Rail connection between Penn Station Newark and Broad Street Station, Newark"
VIII.	And, the "New York Penn Station Concourse"

During the 1980s, Congressional advocates of local transit proposals began earmarking federal funds for specific projects as a way to get around the Reagan administration's reluctance to fund most new rail projects. This practice was continued in Mr. Roe's bill which effectively limited UMTA and the Bush administration's ability to pick which new rail projects were to be funded. The earmarking of federal funds for specific projects was conducted in congressional committees.

"This is the kind of spending we should do in America," said Rep. Bud Schuster (R-Pa.), the ranking Republican on the House Surface Transportation Subcommittee which adopted the measure by a 37-3 vote. ⁽⁴⁶⁾ "It's not money down a rat hole... (It is) the kind of progress conservatives in particular should support," said Rep. Schuster. ⁽⁴⁷⁾

In an effort to comfort legislators with the idea of a tax increase, the lobbying group "America's Coalition for Transit Now," released the results of a poll which showed that 55 percent of Americans would support a gas tax increase. The survey conducted by a Michigan based marketing firm found that 66 percent of 1,000 people questioned believed the federal government was not doing enough to encourage the use of mass transit, and that 79 percent believed that state and local officials should be given greater authority in deciding how to spend federal transportation funds. Most striking was the fact that 23 percent of respondents said they "strongly favored" the "Nickel for America" proposal and 32 percent would "somewhat favor" the plan. The poll had a reported margin of error of plus or minus 3.2 percent. ⁽⁴⁸⁾

The House Public Works and Transportation Committee approved Mr. Roe's bill by a 49-7 vote, including its more controversial provisions. However, US Transportation Secretary Samuel Skinner responded that the administration opposed the bill's funding levels, it's gas tax increase, it's lowering of state matching requirements and the billions of dollars the bill contained for special projects. "The tax increase is non-negotiable, I heard it from (the President's) lips. The President will veto the bill if it contains a gas tax increase. There's no question about it, there's no doubt about it," Skinner said. ⁽⁴⁹⁾

Congressman Roe responded that the administration's transportation proposal was "woefully inadequate" to meet the nation's needs. "I think the White House is entirely premature in taking that approach. They don't even know what's in the bill," he said. ⁽⁵⁰⁾ With its committee passage, Mr. Roe acknowledged that the bill had jumped its first hurdle, and a fierce battle would surely lay ahead beginning with the House Ways and Means Committee which would have to approve the bill's gas tax provisions.

Next, the House Ways and Means Committee approved Rep. Roe's legislation with its "Nickel for America" tax by a 19-17 margin. The committee defeated an amendment offered by Rep. Jim Moody (D-Wisconsin) which would have eliminated funding for special projects. "Congress has decided to pork it up," complained Mr. Moody, about the billions of dollars for special highway and transit projects. Committee chairman Rep. Dan Rostenkowski (D-Illinois) responded "I'm a little disappointed really that we have become so soft-skinned about trying to do something for our constituents in our congressional districts. I know as much about pork as anybody else." ⁽⁵¹⁾

Moving simultaneously through Congress was the fiscal 1992 transportation spending bill which contained the first year installment of $65 million for Mr. Roe's Urban Core package. The one-year appropriation was approved by the full House on a largely bi-partisan vote of 379-47. The bill's passage was applauded by Rep. Dean Gallo (R-11th Dist.) who said "A decade ago, NJ Transit inherited a fragmented and poorly maintained commuter rail network from Conrail and the goal since that time has been to complete missing links and upgrade service. The North Jersey Urban Core Project is a critical part of these efforts." ⁽⁵²⁾

In September 1991, the one-year appropriation bill was approved by the Senate Appropriations Committee. Overall, the bill raised the amount to be spent on transportation nationally by 18 percent from $14.5 billion annually to $17.1 billion annually. Senator Frank Lautenberg (D-N.J.), chairman of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Transportation, and the sponsor of the fiscal 1992 spending measure, dedicated $70 million toward the Urban Core. "The Urban Core project will take the New Jersey transportation system into the next century. It will make mass transit a serious alternative for commuters," said Lautenberg. ⁽⁵³⁾

The following week, the full Senate had enacted Senator Lautenberg's spending measure with a largely bi-partisan 95-3 vote. The Senate included language in its bill opposed to Rep. Roe's "Nickel for America" and reference to an increase in the gas tax. "Even though this puts the Senate at odds with the House leadership... it is clearly the view of the Senate," said Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.), the sponsor of the Senate version of the five year transportation reauthorization. ⁽⁵⁴⁾

Despite a line-item for the "Urban Core" project in the Senate's appropriation bill, the Senate's five year transportation authorization bill had no special projects and contained no "Urban Core" language. Spending on mass transit and highway projects in the one-year appropriation was only contingent upon passage of the multi-year surface transportation authorization bill which was simultaneously pending before Congress. Without an authorization from a multi-year piece of enabling legislation, no spending can take place from a one year budget bill. To complicate matters, the current surface transportation authorization was set to expire on October 1, 1991.

When confronted with the reality that the nickel gas tax did not have enough support, Congressman Roe worked out an agreement with House leaders. Under the revised proposal, half of an existing nickel gas tax which was due to expire at the end of fiscal 1995, would be extended through the end of 1998. The other half of the existing nickel gas tax, which was dedicated for deficit reduction under the 1990 budget agreement, would expire. And, the agreement would extend the length of the transportation authorization from five years to six years. "As far as New Jersey stands, we're doing everything we can to maintain the funding for those important New Jersey projects," said Mr. Roe. ⁽⁵⁵⁾

Two months later on November 25, 1991 the House-Senate conference committee released the final version of the transportation authorization legislation. The 92 member super conference committee, which was chaired by Congressman Roe, emerged after 10 days of "around-the-clock" negotiations. The final measure was a six-year authorization with a $151 billion price-tag. It included $119.5 billion for highway projects, $31.5 billion for transit projects. For New Jersey, the bill contained $3.3 billion for highways and bridges, $634 million for the "Urban Core" projects, and $1.5 billion for a variety of transit and research projects.

The final package was approved by the House with a 372-47 vote and in the Senate by a 79-8 margin. On December 18, 1991, after a 10 month saga, the "Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act" or "ISTEA" (pronounced "Ice-Tea") was signed into law. The bill signing ceremony was held at a construction site in Dallas, Texas. "It's summed up by three words," said President Bush as he signed the bill into law "...jobs, jobs, jobs." ⁽⁵⁶⁾

The Alternatives Analysis Process Continued

As the project's funding was being debated on Capitol Hill, NJ Transit Waterfront Office Director Martin Robbins was reporting to the Board of NJ Transit about the preliminary findings of engineering, planning and ridership data. He stated that a $500 million transit system could be constructed and begin serving an estimated 33,000 daily riders by the year 2000. The prospect appeared quit promising since it would exceed the national cost-effectiveness standards used by the Urban Mass Transit Administration (UMTA). This was crucial since a large portion of the funding was expected to come from the federal government.

While NJ Transit's waterfront office had been studying the use of automated trains operating on elevated tracks like the monorail system used at Disney World, Mr. Robbins reported that he was now leaning toward light rail. A "light rail" or modern version of the traditional trolley, appeared to offer some construction cost savings and permitted more flexibility in routing and operations, including the ability to operate at street level.

Mr. Robbins said that his office had expanded the original Alternatives Analysis from studying five proposals to nine. The ninth proposal would be a combination of the best parts of the previous alternatives. "This new plan is based on a reading of the data we've collected that shows where we could get the most ridership. This pieces together the most promising light rail segments that we've studied," he told the board. ⁽⁵⁷⁾ Using largely existing right-of-way from Conrail's River Line, the new transit system would be built from downtown Jersey City west to a park-and-ride lot on Route 440 in Jersey City; next it would go north along the Hudson River waterfront through Hoboken and Weehawken, and under the Palisades through the Weehawken Tunnel to another park-and-ride lot to be located near the junction of Routes 3, 1&9 and 495.

Six weeks later, at a press briefing in his Waterfront Transportation office, Mr. Robbins unveiled his staff's final $550 million proposal. The system included a 15-mile "light rail" system, an express "busway" from the NJ Turnpike to the Lincoln Tunnel, and four large park-and-ride lots with 12,000 parking spaces. The one major revision to previous plans was an extension of the light rail north to the Vince Lombardi rest area on the NJ Turnpike in Ridgefield Park. Mr. Robbins said the cost of the newest proposal was higher than previous options. But, the cost could be justified because it would serve a wider area and attract a larger number of commuters, between 35,000 and 45,000 riders per day.

The plan called for a 2,500 to 5,000 space commuter lot adjacent to the NJ Turnpike toll plaza at Exit 14C in Jersey City and a 1,000 to 3,000 space commuter lot on Route 1&9 in North Bergen. Transit planners found that by extending the system to the Vince Lombardi rest area and adding a 2,000 to 4,000 space lot many more riders would be attracted from Bergen County and northern New Jersey. Likewise, by adding a $50 million western extension through an existing railroad cut, and a 2,000 space lot on Route 440 in Jersey City several thousand more commuters could be easily added to the equation.

Transit officials had no specific financing plan for the project. Since development along the waterfront had slowed down due to the recession little in the way of cash contributions could be expected from developers. However, passage of the $153 billion ISTEA legislation gave the transit proposal a critical boost. While the federal transportation bill allotted $634 million for North Jersey's "Urban Core," Mr. Robbins said that the light rail would still be in stiff competition for funding with the Secaucus Transfer and the Newark Elizabeth rail link.

Mr. Robbins said he hoped to finish work on the plan and conduct public hearings by either March or April 1992. Following those hearings, local officials and the NJ Transit Board would agree on a "Locally Preferred Alternative" (LPA) and apply to the federal government for a grant to produce a Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) and begin final design of the system. "If everything goes smoothly, I think we can get our grant by mid to late 1992," said Robbins. ⁽⁵⁸⁾ Actual construction would not begin until the middle of the decade.

Since 1990, a group of north Hudson County municipal officials and a coalition of community, environmental and transportation advocates had condemned the plan to construct busways from the NJ Turnpike to the Holland and Lincoln Tunnels. Weehawken Mayor Richard Turner said the state's plans did not go far enough in addressing the transportation problems of developments along the waterfront. Helen Manogue, a spokesperson for COATS (Committee on Alternative Transportation Solutions), and a member of the NJ Transit's "Hudson River Waterfront Advisory Committee" criticized the "busway" scheme saying that any funding for the waterfront "would be better used to immediately start construction of a permanent, non-polluting, efficient solution to one of New Jersey's perennial congestion problems." ⁽⁵⁹⁾ Representatives asserted that a busway would hurt air quality along the waterfront by encouraging more bus traffic, while at the same time jeopardizing efforts to construct a light rail line along the same route.

Building Consensus

In June 1992, Commissioner Downs and other state transportation officials met with various Hudson County municipal and county leaders at the office of the County Executive Janiszewski to discuss a number of problems. After the lengthy meeting and "substantial" negotiations, Mr. Downs agreed to several compromises, including: 1) an effort to put less emphasis on the express bus proposal, including banning Manhattan-bound buses from the Weehawken Tunnel; 2) committing NJ Transit to study the feasibility of extending the light rail system six miles south to the end of the Bayonne peninsula; 3) Committing NJ Transit to study the possibility of adding another station at 48^th Street and Bergenline Avenue in Union City, above the Weehawken Tunnel. A Union City station would add tens of millions of dollars to the cost of the project because a deep shaft would have to be mined to provide room for elevators and a platform.

The meeting laid the ground-work for a four-page "memorandum of understanding" which was drafted by the NJ DOT and signed by Commissioner Downs. One month later, the document was executed by a half dozen local officials at a press conference in the Hudson County Court House.

NJ Transit Assistant Executive Director for Engineering and Construction Rick Richmond, who was at the June meeting with Commissioner Downs, said that reaching an agreement with the officials in Hudson County was "very important because there is a lot of competition for funds for these kinds of projects." ⁽⁶⁰⁾ Without nearly unanimous support from local and county officials, NJ Transit would face significant difficulties in gaining approval for the project from the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), formerly the Urban Mass Transit Administration (UMTA). "One of the easiest ways that federal officials have to weed out projects is to weed out those without sincere local consensus and support," Richmond continued. ⁽⁶¹⁾

Political consensus in Hudson County came at a critical time to state officials because NJ Transit's seven-member Board of Directors was expected to adopt a final plan for the project in October 1992. The final plan adopted by the board would designate the Locally Preferred Alternative (LPA) and serve as the basis for the project's application for federal funding.

The FTA approved NJ Transit's Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) in November 1992. The action came 2* years after the study first began by NJ Transit. However, by that date, the NJ Transit Board had still not adopted the Locally Preferred Alternative and had postponed its consideration from the October board meeting to sometime in January.

Despite a consensus by transit and local officials, federal guidelines required the transit agency to conduct a series of meetings and hearings for the public. The first four public meetings were briefings by transit officials where they distributed executive summary copies of the DEIS and answered questions about the Alternatives Analysis report. The four town meetings were held in the municipal buildings in Bayonne, Jersey City, Weehawken and West New York. The final two sessions were formal public hearings recorded for public comment held in the county administration building in Jersey City and at the Hoboken City Hall. Upon the conclusion of the meetings, the public comment period was officially over.

At the first public hearing held in the county administration building in Jersey City, the light rail plan won strong support from a wide array of government officials, business leaders, and environmental advocates. Immediately before the hearing, all 12 Hudson mayors formally signed a 10-page "Intergovernmental Consensus Agreement" detailing support for alternative "9A." That alternative contained the options spelled out in the "memorandum of understanding" signed by Commissioner Downs and various local officials between June and July. County Executive Janiszewski said that given his county's tradition of rough-and-tumble politics, he could not remember any inter-municipal agreement being signed "unless people were under court order." ⁽⁶²⁾ He conceded that shaping the "consensus" plan for the proposal to win unanimous support of all 12 municipalities was not easy, but essential for the project's success.

Members of the business community testified in favor of the plan. New Jersey Business and Industry Association representative Dawn Perrotta said that the light rail was a "cost effective" way to move people in urban areas and would help large employers meet the requirements of the federal Clean Air Act. Under the law, work sites with more than 100 employees were required to reduce the number of people commuting by automobile by 25 percent.

Jersey City commercial real estate broker William E. Dolan said that waterfront sites were often found uncompetitive with Manhattan and other sites because they lacked easy transit and road access. He said the project was needed to revive lagging office development along the waterfront.

Rutgers Environmental Law Clinic staff attorney William Sullivan testified that his office endorsed the "consensus" plan because it would boost mass transit usage in the state and concentrate development in urban areas, which would help improve air quality and avoid suburban sprawl. Another important point of the "consensus" agreement was the plan's insistence to eliminate all road improvements not directly related to the light rail project. Noting NJ Transit's original plan to widen local roadways to provide "high speed" access to the waterfront, Sullivan said the road improvements were "bad public policy and are unacceptable for all the same reasons that building the light rail line is a good idea." ⁽⁶³⁾

Even the Speaker of the Republican state General Assembly Garabed "Chuck" Haytaian (R-Warren) came to endorse the project. Mr. Haytaian said that the project would "revive public transportation in New Jersey in the way that similar projects have done across our nation in cities like San Diego, San Francisco, Portland, Boston, St. Louis, Philadelphia, Sacramento, and Baltimore." ⁽⁶⁴⁾ The light rail would "create a viable center for positive growth" in the state and "should be the first step in an ever-growing network of light rail transit systems throughout our state," he continued. ⁽⁶⁵⁾

In February, 1993, after 43 months of planning and negotiations NJ Transit's Board of Directors adopted the "Locally Preferred Alternative" for the Hudson River waterfront. The meeting took place at one of the proposed LRT stations, the Liberty Science Center in Jersey City. The agency's Board of Directors adopted the resolution with a 6-0 vote, with one abstention.

NJ DOT Commissioner Thomas Downs, who chaired the Transit board, said "the stakes are very high. There is a consensus in Hudson County and it is a consensus to let it begin. It's not a perfect plan. It will go through various permutations as we go along, but let us begin now. That's the most important thing," he said. ⁽⁶⁶⁾ Mr. Downs stated that strong, unified, local support was the key to gaining support for federally funded projects. He said that many worthy transit projects around the country were stalled and never funded because local residents and officials never reach an agreement on how to proceed.

The one abstention was by board member James Kellogg. Mr. Kellogg stated that while he supported the project's goals, he was concerned that if the initial segment did not receive enough funding that it would parallel service already provided by the PATH (Port Authority Trans Hudson) system.

According to the plan adopted by the NJ Transit board, the $657 million project would run 15.3 miles from the Ridgefield Park in the north, to Jersey City in the south. It would consist of 44 light rail vehicles running on a set of double tracks with 24 stations. It would attract nearly 50,000 riders per day and take an estimated 13,600 cars off northern New Jersey's congested roads.

Commissioner Downs admitted that the plan left some contentious issues undecided, but said the importance of moving ahead brought officials in Hudson and Bergen counties together. The plan put off a decision to allow Manhattan-bound commuter buses to share the Weehawken Tunnel with the trolley. It included a provision to study an extension to Bayonne. It delayed a contentious decision on where to route the line in downtown Jersey City, pending a supplemental study. It agreed to an Environmental Assessment to study the need and feasibility of a Bergenline Avenue station in Union City. Unofficially, NJ Transit officials agreed to re-evaluate a westerly alignment in Hoboken and study extending the line further north into Bergen County.

Mr. Downs reported that the federal ISTEA legislation earmarked enough money to make a substantial start on building the first portion of the project, but not enough to complete it. He said any complaints by municipal officials in Newark and Elizabeth, that Hudson County was gaining too much federal transit funding at the expense of their cities was not justified. "I've never believed in the begger thy neighbor theory of economic development," he said. ⁽⁶⁷⁾

The NJ Transit Board vote allowed the project to move to the Federal Transit Administration in Washington D.C. for consideration for funding. "Everybody here feels it's a very worthwhile project" said Richard Centner, spokesman for the FTA. ⁽⁶⁸⁾ He explained that the project had received high marks from FTA officials because it would improve service for both commuters who were dependant on buses and people who drove, but would use mass transit if it was available and convenient.

Mr. Centner stated that once the FTA approved the project and the preliminary engineering was completed, it would sign a "Full Funding Agreement" with NJ Transit that would guarantee sufficient federal funding to complete either the first segment of the line, or the entire project. Such an agreement would commit the FTA to providing a specific amount of money for the project on an agreed upon schedule while holding NJ Transit responsible for delays and cost overruns. All project costs beyond those agreed upon would have to be paid by the state of New Jersey.

NJ Transit officials reported that it would take another 18 months to complete preliminary engineering reports and a Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) to create a firm cost estimate in which to base the full funding agreement.

A Case of Project Envy

Near unanimous support from every quarter within Hudson County, a peaceful accord among municipal leaders and very favorable press accounts, caught the attention and perhaps ire of officials in neighboring jurisdictions with competing interests. On the very last day of the public comment period in January, Bergen County Executive William "Pat" Schuber submitted comments to NJ Transit challenging several key points of the "consensus" plan. In a written statement, Mr. Schuber gave support to the original plan prepared by NJ Transit.

Mr. Schuber complained that the revised plan ignored Bergen County and commuters from northern New Jersey in at least three areas: first, by eliminating roadway improvements and express busways to the Lincoln Tunnel, the "Hudson plan" would severely limit potential benefits to Manhattan-bound bus commuters from Bergen County. Second, by proposing to build the project from Jersey City north to the Vince Lombardi rest area, the "Hudson plan" would result in a lengthy delay in reaching Bergen County, especially if funding ran out before the project was completed. Finally, by extending the system to the south into Bayonne, rather than to extend it north into central Bergen County, potential ridership growth in Bergen would be minimized. Internal studies by Bergen County officials showed that there was more potential for shifting commuters from cars to trolleys if the project was extended north to Leonia, in Bergen County.

According to Adam Strobel, an assistant to the Bergen County Executive, Mr. Schuber's comments were "an attempt to remind NJ Transit that Bergen County is a player here too." ⁽⁶⁹⁾ Bergen officials maintained that while most of the proposed trolley line would be in Hudson, its potential benefits to the waterfront and the region depended heavily upon ridership by Bergen commuters. "We feel this line is just as important to Bergen County as it is to Hudson County, so the statement is our effort to stand up for the interests of Bergen County," said Mr. Strobel. ⁽⁷⁰⁾

The following week, in highly critical terms, Newark Mayor Sharpe James questioned the benefits of a number of transit projects and charged the needs of Newark were being "forgotten" while the state focused on major projects elsewhere. Mayor James said that he feared that the expensive plan for the Hudson waterfront project would create new commercial developments to compete with Newark and Elizabeth for ratables, jobs and economic development. He said that the state master plan specifically recommended that development be directed toward existing urban areas. He said the state should take advantage of existing infrastructure and mass transit to reduce pollution, traffic congestion and other problems related to suburban sprawl.

Mayor James said that significant mass transit investments were crucial to revitalize the City of Newark. He stressed that Newark needed the same sort of commitment from the state that Hudson County received for the light rail project. And, the mayor argued that the Newark area would receive similar benefits from the Newark-Elizabeth rail connection.

Despite unanimous support among the NJ Transit's board members, the Newark-Elizabeth project was itself the subject of criticism. Again, in a letter to the NJ Transit board, Bergen County Executive William "Pat" Schuber asserted that the Newark-Elizabeth project could "short-change" Bergen County residents. In the document, he expressed fears that NJ Transit's commitment to the $850 million project would hurt Bergen County's chances for a future extension of the Hudson waterfront light rail line into Bergen County, or the re-activation of the West Shore Line for commuters in eastern Bergen County which itself would cost between $500 to $600 million.

"I do not see the justification in allocating the dollars for the Newark-Elizabeth rail project, especially since the line is expected to draw 23,400 (passengers) per day as compared to 100,000 per day for the waterfront line between Ridgefield and Jersey City," wrote Mr. Schuber. ⁽⁷¹⁾ He further stated that NJ Transit should have considered all the potential projects on a comparative basis as well as the amount of funding likely to be available over the following years before deciding to go ahead with such an expensive project.

Commissioner Downs expressed disappointment with Mr. Schuber's statement. He said it would be a false assumption to believe that the Newark-Elizabeth project would "steal" funding from the Hudson waterfront project. He said that the earmarked funding by Congress for both transit lines could not be spent on any other projects. And, he warned that New Jersey's ability to protect those earmarked funds through Congress's annual budget-making process was very much dependent on the state's ability to present a unified front to the federal government.

But by mid-June, the problem had escalated when the Bergen Executive enlisted the support of Congressman Robert Torricelli (D-9th Dist.), Bergen County's highest ranking Democrat. The two met privately with Commissioner Downs to express their dissatisfaction with the state's transit plans. In a news conference after the meeting, they both complained that the state's rail expansion plans ignored the needs of the more than 65,000 Bergen County residents who commuted to Manhattan daily, mostly by private automobile, because bus and rail service was not an attractive alternative.

"Our feeling is that money for Newark-Elizabeth will provide minimal benefits to the state and will take away from our opportunity to fund projects in Bergen County," said Mr. Schuber. ⁽⁷²⁾ "With the way money is allocated at present, we can't see our Bergen County projects going anywhere for quite a long time, if ever," he continued. ⁽⁷³⁾

Congressman Torricelli said that no minds were changed as a result of the meeting. "We still have deeply different perceptions of the problem and deep disagreements concerning priorities," he said. ⁽⁷⁴⁾ "I suppose there is someone in New Jersey who wants to take the light rail line to the arts center, but I don't know who it would be," Torricelli quipped. ⁽⁷⁵⁾

Two weeks later, Congressman Torricelli sent a letter to Commissioner Downs, co-signed by five Bergen County mayors urging that the alignment and southern terminus of the light rail project be changed. The July 1993, letter urged the NJ DOT to move the northern terminus of the line from the Vince Lombardi park-and-ride to the Meadowlands Sports Complex in East Rutherford. Rep. Torricelli stressed that ending the line at the Sports Complex would allow over 24,000 existing parking spaces to be utilized by commuters. The letter said that ending the line at the Sports Complex would also improve access to events at the Meadowlands from Hudson County and Manhattan because the system would have various connections to ferries and PATH service.

"We urge you to reconsider your plans and amend them accordingly" Mr. Torricelli wrote. ⁽⁷⁶⁾ "Failure to extend the rail service to the Meadowlands Sports Complex would be a grave error in planning," he continued. ⁽⁷⁷⁾ The document was co-signed by Lyndhurst Mayor Louis Stellato, North Arlington Mayor Leonard Kaiser, Carlstadt Mayor Dominick Presto, East Rutherford Mayor James Plosia and Rutherford Mayor Andrew Bertone. The letter contained a subtle threat by Rep. Torricelli to disrupt New Jersey's efforts to lobby for federal transit funding if the state's mass transit priorities were not revised in Bergen County's favor.

State transportation officials did not look favorably upon the development and warned that significantly revising the plan for the transit system at that late date could jeopardize federal funding for the project. "Changing the project at this stage could seriously impede the process. We have federal approval and funds in hand and preliminary design and engineering underway," said NJ DOT Assistant Commissioner Rick Remington. ⁽⁷⁸⁾ He explained that while service at the Vince Lombardi park-and-ride had proven popular and had even been expanded over the years, ridership at the Meadowlands was much less popular because it was less convenient for most commuters from northern and western Bergen County.

Winning Concessions

In March 1993, the Board of Directors of NJ Transit adopted the largest annual capital construction budget in the state's history. The $514 million one-year spending plan called for $315 million to come from the federal government and $297 million to come from the State of New Jersey through the state Transportation Trust Fund, and two million from other sources. The proposed budget maintained capital spending on bus and rail systems and advanced several long term projects. And, it allocated $12.4 million for preliminary engineering and design of the Hudson-Bergen light rail.

In an accompanying five-year capital spending plan, the agency projected it would spend $3.27 billion for capital projects between 1993 and 1998. In what might have been viewed as a political, election-year move, $277 million was earmarked to the Hudson-Bergen light rail and another $255 million earmarked for the Newark-Elizabeth rail link. This came just two months after Newark Mayor Sharpe James' public criticism of state transit policy.

Next, the NJ Transit Board endorsed the Newark-Elizabeth rail link for further study. The $850 million Newark-Elizabeth proposal would be an 8.8 mile trolley system connecting NJ Transit's Broad Street station and Newark City Subway in the north to Newark Airport and midtown Elizabeth to the south. The "light rail" portion would have 12 stations and serve an estimated 22,000 daily riders by 2010. Like the Hudson waterfront project, the board's endorsement formally began the 18 month federal environmental study process.

In September 1993, just two months before the gubernatorial election, Governor Jim Florio met in a closed-door "transportation summit" with NJ DOT Commissioner Thomas Downs, Bergen County Executive William "Pat" Schuber, Hudson County Executive Robert Janiszewski, Newark Mayor Sharpe James and Rep. Robert Torricelli (D-9th Dist.) to try to allay those officials' concerns. The officials emerged from the 90-minute meeting pledging mutual support and cooperation. Rep. Torricelli said the meeting underlined the "common interests" of all parties concerned, and he saw "no reason to fight" over federal funding available at that time. Mayor James added "when we came together, we find that we agree more than we disagree." ⁽⁷⁹⁾

Support and Oversight by the New Jersey Legislature

After the NJ Transit Board designated its "Locally Preferred Alternative" for the Hudson- Bergen system and endorsed the study for the Newark-Elizabeth line, the projects caught the attention of the New Jersey State Legislature. Since nearly all of the funding to that date had been federal, the legislature did not play much of a role. However, in April of 1993 New Jersey General Assembly Speaker Garabed "Chuck" Haytaian led a delegation of lawmakers and business leaders down to Baltimore's to inspect that city's trolley system and announced plans to establish an ad-hoc committee in the General Assembly to oversee implementation of light rail in New Jersey.

Until that time the only action by the legislature was the adoption of a resolution a year earlier urging NJ Transit to use $290 million in federal funds to begin the first phase of the Hudson-Bergen light rail project. The resolution was sponsored by Assemblywoman Rose Heck (R-Ridgefield Park) and Assemblyman David Kronick (D-North Bergen).

Assembly Speaker Haytaian insisted that New Jersey consider using state funds, rather than federal aid for the transit projects. He said that it had saved both time and money in Baltimore. Baltimore's plan was announced in 1987 from a "sketchy" staff study and was opened for the first exhibition game between the New York Mets and Orioles in April 1992. To accelerate the project, Maryland Governor W. Donald Schaefer decided to pay for the system with State and local dollars to avoid the need for lengthy planning studies which were required for federally funded projects.

Baltimore's light rail system was simple, cheap and took only 36 months to complete. Maryland state officials had decided that it would share tracks with freight trains for half the length of the system and approximately 40 percent of the remaining system would be limited to single tracks. Both limitations prevented vehicles from running more frequently than every 15 minutes. The state used mostly existing railroad rights-of-way and city streets. They also did not encounter any significant environmental problems. While the initial cost estimates were $290 million, the first 13 mile segment actually cost over $364 million.

In January 1994, preempting newly-elected Governor Christine Todd Whitman, state Senate President Donald DiFrancesco gave a "State of the Senate Address," in which he called upon his fellow legislators and the new administration to support completion of the "Circle of Mobility" plan as proposed by former Governor Kean. Specifically, Mr. DiFrancesco, whose Republican party was in full control of both the state Assembly and the state Senate, asked the legislature to formally codify the "Circle of Mobility" through the passage of legislation. "By giving this complex, comprehensive and expensive project the force of law, the Circle of Mobility and its major economic impact on New Jersey's Urban Core will become a reality by the end of this century," Senator DiFrancesco stated. ⁽⁸⁰⁾

"What I am proposing will show the legislature's determination in having this project completed," continued Mr. DiFrancesco. While his legislation contained no earmarks and no money, Senate staff reported that the aim of the legislation was to ensure that all projects would be completed as quickly as possible and that none would be allowed to languish or be dropped for lack of commitment or funding by the state. The action would also serve as a reference point for future NJ Transit actions.

By July 1994, the "Circle of Mobility" legislation had received a unanimous vote (40-0) in the New Jersey State Senate and had made its way to the General Assembly. At an Assembly Transportation Committee hearing, the legislation received an important endorsement from the Whitman administration. However, the bill was amended from its original form to expand the definition of "Circle of Mobility" to include the proposed rail spur to the Meadowlands Sports Complex in East Rutherford; restoration of service to the West Shore commuter line in eastern Bergen and Rockland Counties; restoration of the Susquehanna and Western Railroad line from Sussex County in western New Jersey to Hoboken; restoration of the Lackawanna cutoff in Morris and Warren counties; and construction of a railroad station on the Northeast Corridor at Newark International Airport. ⁽⁸¹⁾
 
 

Table Six	List of "Circle of Mobility" Projects as amended in New Jersey legislation
I.	The "Secaucus Transfer"
II.	The "Kearny Connection"
III.	The "Waterfront Connection"
IV.	The "Northeast Corridor Signal System"
V.	The "Hudson River Waterfront Transportation System"
VI.	The "Newark-Newark International Airport-Elizabeth Transit Link"
VII.	A "Rail connection between Penn Station Newark and Broad Street Station, Newark"
VIII.	The "New York Penn Station Concourse"
IX.	The "modification and restoration of the West Shore line in Bergen County connected to the Allied Junction/Secaucus Transfer Meadowlands Rail Center"
X.	The "construction of a rail station and associated components at the Meadowlands Sports Complex"
XI.	The modification and reconstruction of the Susquehanna and Western Railway" from western New Jersey to Hoboken
XII.	And, the "modification and reconstruction of the Lackawanna Cut-off Commuter Rail Line connecting Morris, Sussex and Warren Counties to the North Jersey Transportation Rail Center"

The second significant amendment related to funding. The revised legislation called upon the State of New Jersey to fund the list of capital projects in case federal funding fell short. The bill amended the state's Transportation Trust Fund law to require the Commissioner of the NJ DOT to propose annual funding which would be necessary for the completion of the "Circle of Mobility" list of projects. In addition, the bill "committed" the legislature to annually appropriate revenues from the state's Transportation Trust Fund to complete the Circle of Mobility.

The legislation was later adopted by 72-2 margin in the General Assembly in February 1995 and signed into law on April 12, 1995. At a bill-signing ceremony held at the Hoboken train terminal, Governor Whitman said the legislation "accomplishes a lot. It directs NJ Transit to make haste with the construction of projects comprising the Circle of Mobility."

Whitman acknowledged that the legislation committed the state to fund the projects even if federal aid for mass transit was cut or eliminated. While NJ DOT Commissioner Frank Wilson expected the federal government to supply a substantial portion of the needed funding, he too conceded that significant funding by the state would be needed. Whitman administration officials said that renewal of the state's Transportation Trust Fund would be necessary for the state to fulfill its commitment.

While the legislation was a broad and sweeping policy statement by the New Jersey legislature, it actually accomplished very little. First, it was only a bill, not an amendment to the state's constitution. As such, it would have very little meaning or impact on appropriations by future lawmakers when crafting state budgets. In other words, state budgets are actual pieces of legislation which quantify the value of policies and programs by both legislators and the administration. And, budgets supercede prior legislative enactments - - legislators are not technically bound to fully fund every law on the books. Secondly, the legislation did not appropriate any amount of funds or earmark monies toward the projects. However, the bill was important for no other reason than it showed the state legislature's support for the transit projects.

Support for the "Circle of Mobility" plan and waterfront light rail line by the New Jersey state legislature came with a price: legislative "oversight." In May 1993, Speaker Haytaian had announced the creation of an "Assembly Light Rail Panel." The ad-hoc committee was comprised of three assembly members and would be chaired by Assemblywoman Rose Heck (R-Ridgefield Park). The other two members were Assemblyman Joseph Doria (D-Bayonne) and Assemblyman Alex DeCroce (R-Parsippany), who was also chairman of the Assembly Transportation Committee.

The committee's main purpose was to promote the use of light rail in New Jersey and monitor NJ Transit's light rail planning efforts. In March 1994, the panel officially recommended that NJ Transit purchase and utilize "low floor" vehicles for the various light rail systems around the state. "Low floor" cars had a floor height of just 14 inches above the top of the rail compared to standard "high floor" cars which had a floor height of 39 inches above the ground.

Low floor vehicles permitted wheelchair users and people pushing strollers or shopping carts to board more easily from lower platforms. To provide the same level boarding for high floor vehicles, NJ Transit would have to build station platforms 30 inches high as well as ramps and stairs at every station to provide access. Thus, construction of platforms needed to accommodate high floor vehicles would add a considerable amount to the final cost.

Despite the advantages of low floor vehicles, NJ Transit's decision to use them was not an easy one. High floor vehicles were the standard in both the United States and Canada. NJ Transit had spent almost a year investigating the issue related to operations, maintenance and safety. And, the agency was leaning toward ordering high-floor vehicles like the ones used on all other American light rail systems. "As an operator, you always want to go with the most service proven design," said Michael Magdziak, Director of Light Rail Transit Operations for NJ Transit. ⁽⁸²⁾

The Assembly Light Rail Panel issued a report urging NJ Transit to adopt the low floor vehicle technology. The report recommended low floor trolley cars which had been introduced and used in Europe since 1984. The panel's report "had a significant impact on the process" reported Jerome Lutin, Director of NJ Transit's Newark-Elizabeth Rail project. ⁽⁸³⁾ After nearly a year of study, NJ Transit finally decided to utilize the low floor vehicles.

Federal Dollars with 'Strings' Attached

In 1993, U.S. Transportation Secretary Federico Pena recommended that Congress allocate $652 million toward 16 new mass transit projects throughout the nation. Approximately $40 million of his request was earmarked for the Hudson-Bergen project. The other 15 projects were picked because they would be ready for funding the following year.

Secretary Pena said that the he was especially impressed with plans for the light rail designed to serve the developing Hudson River waterfront. He said the riverfront line was not only well planned and cost-effective, but also had strong and unified support from state and local officials. "You don't always get that elsewhere in the country," said Mr. Pena. ⁽⁸⁴⁾ "I feel good about getting money for New Jersey because there is a good team here," he continued, "It makes my job easier." ⁽⁸⁵⁾

One project which was did not get federal funding was the Newark-Elizabeth line. Federal officials said that it was left off the list because it was not ready. A spokesman for the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), Brian Cudahy, said the Secretary would support full funding of New Jersey's Urban Core projects over the following years.

Federal support, however, was qualified. Citing the limited amount of federal funds, the Clinton administration's top transit official, Gordon Linton said "We cannot have, and should not have, a light rail system in every city in the United States." ⁽⁸⁶⁾ "It seems to be a trend that every city seems to want a domed stadium and a light rail system, but there are some cities where light rail would not be cost-effective," claimed Mr. Linton. ⁽⁸⁷⁾

The FTA required that new rail proposals have strong community support in order to garner federal funding. Community support and "good" zoning around transit stops were essential. Mr. Linton, as administrator of the FTA, stated "When I go out and talk to people about their plans, I want to know about their land-use plans and their development plans." ⁽⁸⁸⁾ He said that transportation officials in the Clinton administration were raising land-use management as a topic for attention. Land-use had been considered "taboo" to comment on; it had been considered a local issue, not part of the federal role.

"We in the federal government are not going to go in and design local land-use and parking policies, but we have to be sure that the taxpayers get the maximum return on their investment of federal dollars, " stated Mr. Linton. ⁽⁸⁹⁾ "Before we go in and invest $400 million or more, we are going to want to know what you are doing with land-use, parking, economic development and housing development. We want to see a holistic approach aimed at making sure these proposed investments will pay off," he continued. ⁽⁹⁰⁾

Under Linton, the FTA put a strong emphasis on the need for revised community design, land-use and parking policies to reinforce transit use. The effort was part of the FTA's "Livable Communities" initiative, which essentially rewarded jurisdictions which used mass transit to reduce suburban sprawl, improve neighborhoods, expand employment opportunities and provide better access to the community for those who could not, or would not drive. The initiative came after disappointing results in some cities in which new transit lines failed to spark significant development or where it took years for the new line to attract the ridership, economic development and other benefits promised by local proponents.

Light rail advocates in New Jersey believed that a three pronged approach would lead to a successful mass transit system. The first prong was the actual establishment and operation of the light rail system. The second was corresponding land use design to support ridership. And, the third ingredient was providing pedestrian amenities. ⁽⁹¹⁾

The most difficult part of this equation is the fact that each prong is supported by a different entity. Mass transit planning and financing are the domain of federal, state and regional agencies. On the other hand, in New Jersey, municipalities have nearly sole discretion over local land-use and zoning regulations through the adoption of municipal master plans. Thirdly, pedestrian amenities, where they are considered at all, are frequently left to the discretion of the developers.

The FTA said that localities which closely coordinate their planning, zoning and parking policies with the construction of new transit lines and stations had a much better chance of capturing the anticipated economic and social benefits. The FTA promoted local decision-making, through metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs) and local governments. "I want to be sure people are looking at the bigger picture: what do we want our city or community to look like in the future and how can transit be a part of that vision?" Linton asked. ⁽⁹²⁾

This presented a bit of a problem for transit planners and local officials. While the Hudson River waterfront was near the heart of the New York metropolitan area and contained some of the most densely populated neighborhoods in America, nearly fifty years of urban design had been created to accommodate the automobile and centered around parking lots and large subdivisions. Municipal officials and developers in Jersey City and elsewhere were consequently afraid to reduce the level of parking for fear of limiting access and hampering development.

Under Mr. Linton, the FTA had also sought to regain control of project selection authority which had been preempted by Congressional earmarks. Earmarks proved to be counter-productive when designated projects were not ready for construction, but tied-up scarce funding. This created a problem whereby millions of dollars of federal transit funding could not be spent on earmarked projects, while other worthy projects ready for construction could not obtain the necessary financing. Mr. Linton and certain Congressional leaders therefore sought to return project selection and funding authority to the FTA to construct project-ready systems.

US Senator Frank Lautenberg publicly warned state transportation officials that New Jersey would lose hundreds of millions of dollars in earmarked federal transportation funding if it did not start construction of the projects. At a "transportation summit" where business executives, local officials and transit planners gathered to focused on transportation issues in the greater Meadowlands area, Mr. Lautenberg said that the mood of Congress had changed and it would not be willing to tie up earmarked funds for years while projects were delayed. "We have a new set of rules that are much tougher than before," said Senator Lautenberg. "Now the rule is: Use it or lose it," he warned. ⁽⁹³⁾

The Senator said he was facing pressure from congressional representatives from other states who were looking to take away funds earmarked from New Jersey's Urban Core project to finance projects in their own districts. "Even if a project is halfway done, but you fail to maintain your pace of construction, I don't see Congress letting your funds stay tied up," he said. ⁽⁹⁴⁾

Senator Lautenberg advised that budget pressures facing Congress would make defending New Jersey's funding difficult if progress on its earmarked projects faltered. "I can do a lot, but I can't be successful without the cooperation from the state and communities," he said. "If we don't work together, we don't get the money." ⁽⁹⁵⁾

In 1994, the Clinton administration introduced the federal budget which proposed cutting federal fare subsidies by twenty five percent and funding for the construction of new rail lines, or "new starts" by forty percent, or by $146 million. Administration officials proposed only enough funding to pay for five "new start" rail projects around the United States which had "full funding" contracts that had been signed by the FTA. Conversely, the plan would eliminate funding for another 25 mass transit projects without such contracts. Under a "full funding" contract, the FTA agrees to spend a specified amount money on the project while the local lead agency agrees to match that with a specified amount of local funds and also agrees to absorb any cost overruns.

Alfred Harf, Assistant Executive Director for Planning at NJ Transit worried that NJ Transit's Urban Core projects were in real jeopardy. NJ Transit had been expecting $65 million in Urban Core funding to complete final design and begin purchasing the rights of way for the Hudson waterfront line; $61 million in Urban Core funding to continue construction of the Secaucus Transfer station; and another $20 million for design and right-of-way acquisition for the Newark-Elizabeth system. But, if Congress did not find a way to restore the anticipated funding, "progress on all three projects would, at the least, be slowed and could be stopped,"said Harf. ⁽⁹⁶⁾

Decisions by Congress on whether to continue funding for projects must be made by an October first deadline which marks the beginning of the federal budget year. However, it normally takes 12 to 18 months between the time Congress appropriates funding for "discretionary" projects like new rail lines and the time when grant applications seeking money for the projects are approved by the FTA. Therefore, New Jersey would not feel the impact until 1996 when NJ Transit would need the funds to continue work on the projects.

Former Congressman Robert Roe said New Jersey faced a real danger of losing the $146 million because of both the White House proposal and the fact that other states were seeking money for their own projects. "We need to accelerate our projects. NJ Transit has to understand that it's not business in the same old way. We - - New York, California, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania each got major funding under the (ISTEA) bill, but now we have something that other people want," he cautioned. ⁽⁹⁷⁾

US Senator Frank Lautenberg, as chairman of the Senate subcommittee on transportation appropriations said that he and his committee made it clear to Secretary Pena that the US DOT couldn't "change rules overnight." Senator Lautenberg argued for a "transition period" to allow agencies with good projects to comply with federal funding requirements. The Senator said he believed that Secretary Pena would "work with me on it," but said, "I also need help from NJ Transit. They need to make sure they are doing whatever they can to meet FTA's new yardstick." ⁽⁹⁸⁾

NJ Transit Executive Director Shirley DeLibero complained the funding situation was "unfair to NJ Transit." She cited a 1993 letter of intent from FTA officials to NJ Transit stating the need for full funding agreements for each Urban Core project. "We had an understanding that this wouldn't be necessary," she said. "If we had thought it would be, we would have done it last year." ⁽⁹⁹⁾

According to Grace Crunican, deputy administrator of the FTA, the change was not anticipated by the FTA and forced on them by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Until 1994, the FTA had provided funding for new rail projects with and without full funding agreements. But officials from the OMB made changes seeking a way to cut transit spending and force tighter management of "new start" projects.

FTA officials anticipated signing between five and six full funding agreements around the country by the end of the 1994 federal fiscal year. The FTA wanted to work out a full funding with NJ Transit for at least the Secaucus Transfer portion of the Urban Core. But, they believed it would be nearly impossible to have full funding agreements covering the Hudson-Bergen light rail or Newark Elizabeth line since both systems were still in their preliminary design stages and reliable cost estimates were still years away.

THE GREAT METROPOLITAN PLANNING ORGANIZATION DEBATE

As stated above, metropolitan planning organizations, or "MPOs" have been in existence for some time. Their purpose and function was to create a forum among counties and cities to discuss regional issues and foster cooperation and coordination on planning projects. The power and purpose of MPOs received a boost in 1991 with the passage of the ISTEA legislation which gave MPOs additional funding and the power to rank , prioritize and essentially decide which regional transportation projects would receive federal funding.

The increased power and prestige of the MPOs around the country has proven to be a source tension and sometimes even conflict between MPOs, state Departments of Transportation and even state legislatures. Traditionally, planning, engineering and project selection has been the domain of state transportation officials. And, it was normal and quite common for a state DOT to submit its capital construction plan to the state legislature for approval.

In New Jersey, there are three MPOs: one for north Jersey, one for south Jersey and one for the Delaware River region. The MPO for northern New Jersey covers a 13 county area, which entails a third of the state's land area and seventy-five percent of the state's population. The northern Jersey MPO is one of the largest and most powerful MPOs in the United States.

There are nineteen board members. Unlike any other board in the state, fifteen of the board members are designated by each 'subregion;' thirteen members come from each member county (Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Hunterdon, Middlesex, Monmouth, Morris, Ocean, Passaic, Somerset, Sussex, Union and Warren) and two members come from the state's two largest cities (Newark and Jersey City). The Governor's office is represented by a voting member and the Governor appoints a Citizen's Representative who also votes. The NJ DOT is represented by a voting member as well as NJ Transit.

In 1994, the MPO changed its name and by-laws to reflect its new status under ISTEA. It went from being known as the North Jersey Transportation Coordinating Council or "NJTCC" to the North Jersey Transportation Planning Authority, Inc., or "NJTPA." With its incorporation, it added a twentieth seat to be occupied by a representative from the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.

Each year, the NJTPA formally updates and adopts a Transportation Improvement Plan (TIP). The document is a five year spending plan which ranks and designates federal funding for state, regional and local transportation projects. While the NJTPA has a staff of over forty planners and program administrators, engineering is still performed by the NJ DOT for state projects and by local engineers for county and municipal projects. This arrangement necessitates full cooperation for successful project selection and completion.

However, this has created an uneasy relationship with the state and an underlying tension usually exists during negotiations. First, for the NJ DOT this means crafting two sets of capital construction plans: one set of plans for state funds for state legislative approval and one set of plans for federal funds for MPO approval. This is not often easy since most transportation projects utilize and "co-mingle" both state and federal funds. Second, this process by-passes the state legislature which believes that the MPOs have usurped at least some of their authority. The only consolation for state officials is the fact that the Governor has the ability, and has on occasion, vetoed the actions of the MPOs.

In 1994, in reaction to the proposed budget cuts by the Clinton administration and the more conservative approach by Congress, the NJTPA decided to re-evaluate New Jersey's transportation plans and reconsider spending priorities. Passaic County Freeholder and NJTPA Chairman Richard DuHaime (R-Bloomingdale) complained that the state legislature was exceeding its authority by enacting the "Circle of Mobility" legislation. He questioned the wisdom of the legislation which formally committed the state to construct the various Circle of Mobility projects. He warned the legislature not to expect the NJTPA to abandon its own priorities, including highway and transit projects in the entire 13 county region, to fund an "ambitious" series of rail projects "without regard to cost efficiency, ridership, mode of transportation or geographic balance." ⁽¹⁰⁰⁾

"We will evaluate each portion of the Urban Core initiative individually, assign it a rating and see how it stacks up against the growing list of projects we are considering right now in our region," stated Mr. DuHaime. ⁽¹⁰¹⁾ He then called his comments a "cautionary yellow flag" and said "We're not against any of these projects. We think they're great, if you have money, but you'd probably find a few freeholders up here who would be concerned if you started to take funds out of their counties," he said. ⁽¹⁰²⁾ While the earmarked funding could not be used for other projects, Mr. DuHaime said it was within the NJTPA's power to "redirect" funding among the projects so that work on some might be stopped or slowed down and work on others might be speeded up.

Mr. DuHaime said he was only seeking a "balance" so that efforts to expand bus and rail service did not interfere with efforts to maintain and expand New Jersey's already congested highway network. "The cost of building mass transit is tremendous. We must look at the cost and the number of people benefitted, remembering that 91 percent of the people use their car to get to work and probably 100 percent use a car to go shopping," advised Mr. DuHaime. ⁽¹⁰³⁾

Reactions to Mr. DuHaime's statements and threats were fast and strong. A variety of state officials pressed the matter and avoided a decisive vote on the issue. State Assemblyman Alex DeCroce (R-Parsippany) feared that Mr. DuHaime's position would be costly to the state. "There will be funding from the federal government," said Assemblyman DeCroce, if New Jersey shows a strong commitment. "I'm very concerned about what message we send. I don't want to send the wrong signal to the people in Washington," Mr. DeCroce added. ⁽¹⁰⁴⁾

County Executive Janiszewski, also served as Second Vice Chairman of the NJTPA said that Mr. DuHaime had skillfully pressed an anti-mass-transit agenda as chairman of the authority by exploiting political divisions between Democrats and Republicans, as well as between the urban and suburban officials. Mr. Janiszewski said that since the Urban Core was specifically written into the federal ISTEA law, the NJTPA could not arbitrarily rescind the commitment. "We do not have the luxury of deciding. The NJTPA is not the Supreme Court of the United States, so it cannot overturn a decision of the United States Congress." ⁽¹⁰⁵⁾

Finally, NJ DOT Commissioner Frank Wilson said he was strongly in favor of moving ahead with the Urban Core projects. It's "already been decided. We're going to build the Urban Core, and that's that," Mr. Wilson said. ⁽¹⁰⁶⁾

FINALIZING STUDIES AND MAKING DECISIONS

In February 1993, when the NJ Transit Board adopted the Locally Preferred Alternative

(LPA) for the light rail, there were five contentious issues that were left unresolved. NJ Transit had formally agreed to study the cost effectiveness of a southern extension into Bayonne; to analyze downtown Jersey City and make a determination on the best possible alignment; and to study the feasibility of constructing a station in Union City above the Weehawken Tunnel. Officials informally agreed to address a Hoboken routing issue, and investigate the possibility of a northern extension into Bergen County.

The Bayonne extension had the greatest political support, the best cost-benefit ratio and was the least controversial. Since the beginning of the alternative analysis process, state Assemblyman Joseph Doria (D-Bayonne), Bayonne Mayor Richard Rutkowski, and Bayonne Councilwoman Dorothy Harrington had become very active and vocal supporters of the southern extension. In particular, Mr. Doria was the minority leader of the Assembly Democrats and had served as Speaker of the New Jersey General Assembly. He was a forceful advocate and held sway with the Florio administration, NJ DOT Commissioner Downs, and NJ Transit.

The Bayonne officials inserted the extension proposal into the Hudson County Intergovernmental Consensus Agreement which was signed by Mr. Downs in June 1992. They were also strongly urged the NJ Transit Board to conduct the supplemental study. It is probably not an exaggeration to speculate that without their diligence and influence the southern extension would not have possible.

In the spring of 1993, Mr. Robbins released preliminary findings which showed that the Bayonne extension was feasible. Officials reported that constructing the light rail line 5.2 miles south to the tip of the Bayonne peninsula would boost potential ridership by about 15 percent, or by more than 8,350 passengers per day. The study showed that the overall cost of the extension could be as low as $60 million, or less than ten percent of the estimated $657 million cost of the rest of the project.

NJ Transit officials preparing the Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statement (SDEIS) said the extension turned out to be much more cost-efficient than transit planners had originally anticipated. Mr. Robbins said that the key turned out to be extending the project's terminus further south to the tip of Bayonne. The study showed that if existing rail rights-of-way were used for the extension instead of on-street routes, commuters could make the 5.2 mile trip from Fifth Street in Bayonne to Liberty State Park in just 12 minutes. And, by adding a 1,500 space park-and-ride lot commuters would be attracted from both Bayonne and Staten Island.

It was estimated that the cost of the extension would be $119 million. However, half of that cost would be off-set by potential savings if the extension turned out to reduce parking demand at the planned park-and-ride lot near liberty State Park. While the original plan called for a 5,000 space parking garage near the park, much of the demand was anticipated from Bayonne and Staten Island residents. If those commuters were to use the extension, than the Liberty State Park lot could be reduced to 1,500 surface level parking spaces. By avoiding the construction costs of a parking garage, agency officials planned to recapture $58 million.

In 1994, there were a number of significant administrative changes at NJ Transit affecting the light rail project. First, was the departure of NJ Transit Waterfront Development Office Director Martin Robbins. Mr. Robbins had served as director of the office since 1987. Under Mr. Robbins and his predecessors, the director of the waterfront office was on par with the Executive Director of NJ Transit and reported directly to the Commissioner of NJ DOT, who sits as chairman of the NJ Transit Board. The office which was located in Jersey City, had been created in 1985 to replace the Governor's "Hudson River Waterfront Development Office."

Under the Whitman administration, the waterfront office was closed and the operations were relocated to NJ Transit's corporate offices in Newark and renamed "New Rail Construction." Mr. Robbins was eventually replaced by Frank Russo, an engineer who had followed NJ DOT Commissioner Frank Wilson from San Francisco's BART (Bay Area Rapid Transit) authority.

The Jersey City Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) was the result of a controversy which pitted two separate historic districts against one another, and local merchants against well-healed developers. Specifically, the proposed "City Center" alignment would split the historic Van Vorst neighborhood, while the proposed "City South" route would impact the historic Paulus Hook community. Local merchants favored the "City Center" route because it would better serve their patrons and businesses. Transit planners, developers and many local officials supported the "City South" alignment because the line would allow access to a 34 acre parcel of waterfront property ready for major commercial development.

Duke Holt, president of the Paulus Hook Association questioned the city's zoning, saying that the southern line would run through a strictly residential zone, while the "City Center" route would pass through only one block of residences. He also criticized the southern route because LRT vehicles would pass within only 10 feet of homes on narrow Essex Street. The frequency of trains and close proximity of the vehicles would thus make life miserable for the 130 residents of Essex Street.

The New Jersey "Historic Sites Council" temporarily denied NJ Transit's application to construct the mass transit line through one block of Jersey City's Paulus Hook neighborhood. The council voted 5-1 not to accept NJ Transit's proposal. But, the council's authority was strictly advisory and the recommendation was forwarded to the NJ Department of Environmental Protection ( NJ DEP) which had the ultimate authority to grant the necessary permits to NJ Transit.

In March 1995, the NJ Transit Board gave its preliminary approval for the entire proposed route. Board member Amy Rosen, who chaired the agency's engineering and operations committee, said the controversy was not surprising. "Finding a way through 20 miles of the most densely populated county in the most densely populated state in the nation is not easy," she said. "I am overwhelmed by the leadership of the public officials who had to deal with this." ⁽¹⁰⁷⁾ The route had been endorsed by state Senator Bernard Kenny (D-Hoboken); state Assembly majority leader Garabed "Chuck" Haytaian (R-Warren); Assembly minority leader Joseph Doria (D-Bayonne); Assemblyman Joseph Charles (D-Jersey City); Assemblyman Raul Garcia (D-Union City); Assemblywoman Rose Heck (R-Bergen); Hudson County Executive Robert Janiszewski; Bayonne Mayor Len Kiczek; Jersey City Mayor Bret Schundler; Hoboken Mayor Anthony Russo; and Weehawken Mayor Richard Turner. The plan also received the strong support of the Hudson County Chamber of Commerce and various construction unions.

In November 1995, NJ Transit published the two Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statements (SDEIS). One SDEIS was issued for the Bayonne extension and another for the Jersey City alignment. At a public hearing held the following month, opinions were split, but most speakers favored the "City Center" route. "We favor a City South alignment over City Center because we believe City South is the least intrusive, safest and most efficient of those two options," said Charles Balcer, president of the Van Vorst Park Association. ⁽¹⁰⁸⁾

Susanna Martin, co-chair of "Citizens for Responsible Transit," a group of more than 1,000 residents also spoke in favor of "City South." She said the route would broaden the transportation reach by bringing public transportation to an area of the city that was not served. And, the "City Center" alignment would duplicate existing PATH service at the Grove Street station.

Christine Sanchez, a member of the Jersey City Historic Preservation Commission supported the "City South" route because it would have the least detrimental impact on the city's historic character. She said the southern route would run along 305 feet of historic district boundary, while the central route would impact 863 feet between two historic districts. The southern route would also be less invasive because it would be built entirely above ground and could be built five months faster.

Suzanne Mack, Chair of the North Jersey Transit Advisory Committee, said that the committee concluded that the Bayonne extension and "City South" route better served the goals of transportation access and mobility.

According to NJ Transit officials, the "City Center" route was doomed by two elements: the need for a tunnel under a busy roadway and the need for a massive restructuring of the Grove Street PATH station to accommodate additional passengers. In addition, the alignment would cost an additional $14.5 million to construct, take five months longer to complete, and attract 2,000 less riders than the "City South" plan. Requests by local leaders, especially Jersey City Mayor Bret Schundler, played a large part in the decision by NJ Transit to favor the "City South" route.

The third study, involved examining the feasibility of constructing a station below Union City, in the Weehawken Tunnel. The study was an "Environmental Assessment," as opposed to an "Impact Statement;" assessments are conducted for projects which are anticipated to have a smaller, less significant impact.

The proposed station would be nothing less than an engineering feat. In order to create a platform in the tunnel, contractors would have to dig 160 feet straight down, through Palisades to the Weehawken Tunnel. To provide context, this would be deeper than the Statue of Liberty is tall. The station would include two high speed elevators capable of holding 33 people each. The elevators would take approximately 15 seconds from street level to the station platform.

The station would add tens of millions of dollars to the cost of the project. But, after thorough study, NJ Transit officials revealed that the station would generate nearly 8,000 additional riders per day by 2010. The anticipated ridership for the station would make the stop the single busiest on the line and keep the cost-benefit ratio well within the federal guidelines.

From the beginning, the Union City station had near unanimous support from a variety of north Hudson officials, including mayors and state legislators. However, the individual with the greatest impact was U.S. Representative Robert Menendez (D-Union City). In Congress, Mr. Menendez occupied an important seat on the House Transportation and Public Works Committee. As a federal official, he had a good deal of influence with Clinton administration officials and helped facilitate important approvals and grants for the state.

In January 1996, the NJ Transit Board officially accepted the supplemental studies for Bayonne, Jersey City and Union City by a 5-0 vote. By approving the draft studies, the board officially amended its Locally Preferred Alternative (LPA) to include the Bayonne Extension, Jersey City south alignment and the Union City station. The plans were then forwarded to the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) for review and approval.

In August 1996, the FTA published a "Record of Decision," for the project which was printed in the Federal Register, and given 30 days for public comment. After that period, if there were no significant problems, the Record of Decision would be issued. The Record of Decision signaled that the FTA had reviewed the Final Environmental Impact Study (FEIS) and approved it. The measure essentially allowed NJ Transit to commence construction.

Despite the Record of Decision by the federal government, NJ Transit had not resolved a contentious routing issue in Hoboken. In that city, transit planners, municipal officials and developers had favored an eastern alignment along either the bustling Washington Street or along the Hudson River where it would serve many commuters and enhance the waterfront's full development potential. On the other hand, a small but very vocal band of community activists led by former Alternatives Analysis Committee member Helen Manogue formed the "Light Rail Task Force" to campaign against the eastern alignment. The complained that the route would eliminate parking, impede pedestrian access to the waterfront, and create too much congestion in an already densely populated area. They advocated a western alignment along an existing railroad right-of-way which they said would spur development on the city's impoverished western side.

As early as April 1995, the city council had passed a resolution stating its qualified support for the light rail's eastern alignment if four issued were successfully resolved: first, the project would not cut into part of the city's waterfront development project known as "Block C;" second, the line would not impact an adjacent little league field; third, the route would not interfere with street parking on Observer Highway; and fourth, the tracks would be built at street level past Castle Point.

What followed over the ensuing two years appeared to be either a hard bargaining stance by the city government or a bout of schizophrenia by municipal officials. Eight months after the vote of qualified support, the same city council members adopted a resolution urging NJ Transit to utilize the western right of way. In March 1996, the council again changed its decision and voted to endorse the eastern route.

Some city activists accused NJ Transit of using blackmail by holding up approval of the city's waterfront development permits which were pending in Trenton before the NJ Department of Environmental Protection (NJ DEP). Both NJ Transit and Hoboken denied those allegations. Instead, city officials claimed that the (December 1995) resolution by the city council prompted NJ Transit to address Hoboken's concerns. It was estimated that complying with the city's demands would add an additional $20 and $25 million to the project's final cost.

Later that year, in response to a petition with over 2,000 signatures of residents protesting the eastern alignment, Hoboken Mayor Anthony Russo appeared to change course yet again. In December 1996, the mayor revealed the results of a poll he had commissioned which showed that out of 400 voters surveyed, 54 percent of respondents favored a western route, while 37 percent preferred an eastern alignment.

Mayor Russo then sent a letter to NJ Transit urging that the light rail be placed on the western alignment if the agency did not move or eliminate a waterfront station, and replace 130 parking spaces that would be lost due to routing. By that time, the city had already received its waterfront development permits from the NJ DEP. The city council appropriated $65,000 to hire attorneys to fight the eastern alignment and, the mayor threatened that NJ Transit would need city planning board approval for many of its initiatives.

The episode finally ended after Mayor Russo enlisted the support of attorney and Bergen County Republican strategist John Carbone. Mr. Carbone had represented real estate developers in Hoboken and had come to know the mayor. He was also close to Whitman and key members of her administration, and brought the two together.

While Mayor Russo was a Democrat, he had crossed party lines to endorse Governor Whitman in her re-election bid. In April 1997, Governor Whitman came to Hoboken for the groundbreaking of a park. At the event, the governor announced that she was directing NJ Transit to build the project on the western edge of town. Newspaper accounts attributed the switch to "an intriguing combination of political muscle and neighborhood and environmental activism." ⁽¹⁰⁹⁾ The newspaper continued "In addition, it didn't hurt at all that Hoboken Mayor Anthony Russo, a Democrat, had already endorsed Gov. Christie Whitman, a Republican, for re-election." ⁽¹¹⁰⁾

"In the beginning, nobody wanted light rail," according to NJ Transit Executive Director Shirley DeLibero. "The more we talked about it, however, people slowly came to agreement that if we were going to have light rail in one community, then we needed it in another. That's when it started rolling," she continued. ⁽¹¹¹⁾

"As time went on, it became 'Who's going to get the first segment?' I think that was the most interesting thing. This was the first time in my experience when an entire region came together on a project. There were a lot of backroom deals that went on to try to get everybody's consensus as to what they wanted," Ms. DeLibero concluded

CONTRACTS AND CONTRACTORS

In 1994, NJ Transit began almost a year of outreach to contractors to familiarize prospective bidders with the project requirements and process for a competitive bid to design and build the Hudson Bergen light rail project. The design-build process or "turnkey" as it is referred, is quit common for other types of major capital projects. The procedure had been credited with saving agencies significant amounts of time and money while helping to transfer many of the risks and much of project management responsibility from the lead agency to the contractor.

NJ Transit had expected to construct the light rail project using a conventional design-build procedure. An initial project schedule would have had the construction under way in 1995 and trains running by the end of 1999. However, the plan was delayed due to routing problems and delays in funding by the FTA. A revised schedule based upon a delayed start and reduced annual funding suggested that it might take until 2016 to complete the full project. Projected inflation over the extended period would substantially increase the total cost of the work, and the extended schedule would diminish the ridership which was necessary for the continued redevelopment of the waterfront.

NJ Transit was under enormous pressure to reduce costs while bringing at least some of the project on line as originally scheduled. The agency opted for a design-build approach and decided to shift some of the project financing to the contractor. This was done to prevent cash-flow shortages due to limited annual FTA grants. The additional costs associated with financing the project were also expected to be substantially less than the cost of inflation for the project if it was delayed.

There were many obstacles and issues that NJ Transit officials and newly appointed members of the Whitman administration had to overcome in 1994. "We had a project that was probably 15 years away from being done, we were facing two more years of environmental work and maybe three years of engineering work, about a year to determine the site, and maybe eight to ten years of construction. We had the funding coming from the federal government and from the state and from other sources. It was at that time that we decided we needed to change our deadline. That's when we focused on turnkey," explained Frank Russo, Senior Director of New Rail Construction at NJ Transit. ⁽¹¹²⁾

Under the revised plan, the contractor would construct a 9.5 mile "Initial Operating Segment" (IOS). The IOS would run from 34^th Street in Bayonne to the Hoboken Terminal and include the West Extension in Jersey City. The IOS would serve 16 of the eventual 32 stations, including four planned park-and-ride facilities and three major intermodal transfer stations. The contract included 45 light rail vehicles. The IOS would serve an estimated 25,000 riders per day. The arrangement was predicated upon the eventual completion of the "Subsequent Operating Segment" or "SOS" from Hoboken north to Ridgefield Park and from 32^nd Street south to 5^th Street in Bayonne.

The overlapping of final design and construction permitted NJ Transit to create a new schedule that included a construction start in 1996, with at least partial operation by the end of 1999. In developing the revised bid plan, NJ Transit added extended operation and maintenance to the bid requirements. This was done to assure the development of a system that would be economic to maintain and operate. Under this scenario, the contractor would be "building for himself," explained Mr. Russo. ⁽¹¹³⁾

Under the terms developed by NJ Transit, the contractor would be responsible for completing the project design, construction, supply of systems equipment, and operation of the completed system. The basic bid for the design, construction and equipment was a "fixed price contract" with allowances for some variation for the operations and maintenance portion of the agreement depending upon actual ridership.

Thus, the design-build "turnkey" contract became the nation's first design-build-operate-maintain (and finance) "DBOM" contract, or "super turnkey" project for a mass transit system. "Super turnkey" contracts had already been in use overseas for some time and they began gaining interest in the United States for a number of reasons. The biggest reason was that state and federal officials were finding it difficult to raise taxes or float bonds to pay for new public works projects.

"That puts a premium on finding cost-effective ways to deliver needed projects" said Ron Wiss, head Edwards and Kelcey, a nationally recognized engineering firm headquartered in New Jersey. ⁽¹¹⁴⁾ "By putting design and construction, and even operation and finance, under one entity, you get less conflict and fewer delays. It creates a marriage between design and construction. Changes and adjustments are easier to make. It's less adversarial. You have fewer legal difficulties and it encourages innovation and efficiency," he continued. ⁽¹¹⁵⁾

In June 1995, NJ Transit published a "Request for Expressions of Interests." The agency began evaluating prospective DBOM teams based upon their technical qualifications and financial capacity. Five teams were found to be in competitive range and were pre-qualified for the project. Over a six-month period, NJ Transit and its general engineering consultants (Parsons Brinckerhoff, Quade and Douglas, Inc.) met almost daily with the five teams to work out issues for the final "Request for Proposals" (RFP). ⁽¹¹⁶⁾

"We spent our time getting the unknowns out, things like soil conditions, toxic wastes, environmental permits, utility agreements and land acquisition," said Mr. Russo. ⁽¹¹⁷⁾ NJ Transit also worked closely with residents and local officials to determine key issues like routing, car size, platform length and station design. "We call those political risks," he continued. ⁽¹¹⁸⁾

NJ Transit issued the "RFP" in November 1995 with an initial submittal from the teams scheduled for February 1996. Bidders would be evaluated on the basis of their financial and organizational proposals, and technical considerations including their management plans, facilities, systems, vehicles, and benefits to the state. Officials later met separately with each team to discuss how their proposals could be improved for final submittal.

The DBOM contract for designing, constructing and equipping the system was a fixed price contract. In addition, it contained an opportunity for cost extras and change orders only for unforseen circumstances including wetlands mitigation, environmental remediation, utilities relocation and "political risks." While the contract was for the Initial Operating Segment (IOS), it was designed to be compatible with later contracts for the Subsequent Operating Segments (SOS) and final completion of the 20.5 mile line.

The contract's operations and maintenance component was subject to change based upon NJ Transit's ridership projections and the planned start-up date for the balance of the full system (SOS). Thus, the "income" side of the operations phase would be the responsibility of NJ Transit, while the "cost" side would be the responsibility of the contractor. "The contract is based upon an anticipation," according to Mr. Russo. "If the results are substantially different, I think we'll sit down and talk. We don't expect the contractor to gain 'windfall' profits if results exceed expectations, and we'll expect to increase our subsidy if ridership falls short." ⁽¹¹⁹⁾

The operations and maintenance component of the contract included funding for capital asset replacement as well as track and vehicle rehabilitation. This provision was inserted to insure that NJ Transit would have a system in a state of good repair at the end of the operation and maintenance period. At that point, NJ Transit could extend the original contract, re-bid it, or conduct the operation and maintenance itself.

In addition, NJ Transit inserted a "service quality index." The index included such performance measurements as trains running on time, low noise, passenger comfort, and insurance liability. If the contractor did not perform to the desired standards, it could be monetarily penalized by NJ Transit. Conversely, the contractor could also receive a small bonus for exceeding the index.

The final bids were submitted in May 1996 with separate sealed price and financial proposals. By the final round, two teams had dropped out and the proposal by a third team was found to be technically "non-responsive" and therefore not evaluated. The final two proposals were then evaluated against the project criteria on a numerical basis. Following the technical evaluation, NJ Transit publicly opened and scored the sealed bids. A weight of 40 percent was given to the technical proposals and a weight of 60 percent was given to the price proposal.

The lowest bid was submitted by Twenty-First Century Rail Corporation, a consortium headed by Raytheon Infrastructure Services, Inc., a subsidiary of Raytheon Engineers and Constructors. Other members of the consortium included Itochu Rail Car and Kinki Sharyo (USA), Inc. The total value of the contract was approximately $1.082 billion over the full contract period. This was significantly lower than the $1.433 billion proposal submitted by the second bidder Siemens Corp.

While both DBOM teams proposed full financing plans for the work, NJ Transit officials decided that it would be more advantageous if it handled the long term financing itself. This would be accomplished through the issuance of tax exempt "grant anticipation notes," borrowed against the state's Transportation Trust Fund (TTF), to finance the gap between project spending and the flow of annual FTA grants. NJ Transit anticipated receiving a total of $300 million from the FTA. The contract called for the DBOM teams to be responsible for the short term financing of the light rail vehicles, with NJ Transit only issuing payment when the cars entered service.

At its August 1996 meeting held at Saint Peter's College in Jersey City, the Board of Directors for NJ Transit gave final approval and awarded the DBOM contract to the Twenty First Century Rail Corporation. The consortium's proposal included a three year period for construction of the IOS and a 15 year period for operation and maintenance. Specifically, the contract included $476 million for design, construction and systems; $434 million for maintenance and operations of the system; $93 million for vehicles; and, $100 million for separate work related to the Newark City Subway.

The contract was the single largest public works contract ever awarded in New Jersey and the first largest DBOM contract for a new rail system in North America. Ben D. Redd, Jr., president and CEO of Raytheon Infrastructure Services, Inc. said the all inclusive contract was likely to become a model for future public works contracts in the United States. "There's a lot of value added with this approach," he said. ⁽¹²⁰⁾ "The bottom line is that we can do it much faster and at less cost." ⁽¹²¹⁾ Mr. Redd estimated that the contract would save NJ Transit over $150 million over the life of the contract. ⁽¹²²⁾ Additionally, indirect savings from a compressed engineering and construction schedule was estimated to save NJ Transit over $50 million in interest alone.

NJ DOT Commissioner Frank Wilson was credited for being the main proponent for adopting the "super turnkey" approach. From the beginning, he wanted to execute a DBOM contract. He was an engineer who had been in the transportation industry for years and had done similar things on a smaller scale at BART, San Francisco's Bay Area Rapid Transit authority, where he had been general manager.

"When he came to NJ Transit, he wanted to convince the Governor that it doesn't have to take years and years to complete a project," said Ms. DeLibero, Executive Director of NJ Transit. ⁽¹²³⁾ "It takes a long time to get consensus to do something like this. Before Commissioner Wilson came here, Hudson-Bergen had gone through planning and planning and planning. I still believe, had the decision not come from the Commissioner's office to make this a DBOM and get this thing done, it wouldn't be where it is today." ⁽¹²⁴⁾ In fact, it was estimated that New Jersey had spent $127 million on consultant's fees for planning and engineering for the light rail project since 1985. ⁽¹²⁵⁾

FINANCING AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

At a ceremony on the lawn of the White House, in March 1996, President Clinton announced that his administration was granting "Full Funding Agreements" to ten cities across the United States, including one for the Hudson-Bergen LRT project. The agreement would cover the Initial Operating Segment (IOS) and allow for additional funds to be received for phase two of the project. Hudson County Executive Robert Janiszewski, who had served as President Clinton's campaign manager in New Jersey, was present for the occasion. For him, the President's announcement was "the culmination of a decade of dreams and a lot of hard work." ⁽¹²⁶⁾

Several months later, in October 1996, US Transportation Secretary Federico Pena visited the US Military Ocean Terminal in Bayonne, one of the planned LRT stops. Before a crowd of federal, state and local officials, business leaders, labor representatives and residents, Mr. Pena signed the Full Funding Agreement worth $604 million. "I have always enjoyed being back in New Jersey, because I believe that people here understand the importance of transportation, " the Secretary said. ⁽¹²⁷⁾ He then told everyone that the federal government was committed to completing the system.

In March 1997, the NJ Transit Board authorized $350 million in temporary financing to allow the project to move forward. The action was in anticipation of the $604 million FTA grant. NJ Transit officials were confident that they would receive the full amount of federal grants according to a prescribed schedule. "It's the highest commitment you can get from the federal government," said Charlie Wedel, NJ Transit's treasurer and chief financial officer. ⁽¹²⁸⁾ He explained that the borrowing was also backed by the state Transportation Trust Fund, which would be utilized to make up any shortfall in repayment of the agency's debt.

The agency made plans to sell the $350 grant anticipation notes quickly to take advantage of favorable interest rates. Officials estimated that the interest would total nearly $60 million by the time the debt was retired in 2004. NJ Transit chose the investment firm of Paine Webber to underwrite the issue.

However, NJ Transit officials learned that a Full Funding Agreement was not an absolute guarantee by the federal government. Funding was still subject to the annual budget making process by Congress. Despite the agreement, for fiscal year 1998, the project's funding schedule was reduced by $10 million, from $60 million to $50 million, creating a shortfall. In fiscal year 1999, the project was allocated $70 million, and for fy2000 the administration recommended a $99 million installment.

The Full Funding Agreement applied to the Initial Operating Segment (IOS) only. This meant that the Subsequent Operating System (SOS) would also be eligible for a second federal grant. The SOS was expected to cost approximately $600 million to build. However, the project would have to compete with over 200 other proposals from other cities around the nation. FTA Administrator Gordon Linton, called phase two of the light rail a "strong candidate," but cautioned that the federal government had only $6 billion for new projects, compared to $30 billion worth of proposals.

In June 1998, President Clinton signed the renewal of the surface transportation authorization entitled the "Transportation Equity Act for the Twenty First Century" (TEA-21, formerly ISTEA). At a bill signing ceremony at the White House, President Clinton said that the $203 billion transportation spending plan would "strengthen America by modernizing and building roads, bridges and transit systems." ⁽¹²⁹⁾ The enactment ended months of contentious wrangling that pitted lawmakers from New Jersey and other Northern states against representatives from the South and West who wanted to divert New Jersey's share of transportation funding. Overall, the state's highway funding would rise from $518 million annually to $675.7 million per year. On the transit side, New Jersey mass transit funding would also rise from an average of $168 million annually to $265 million, an increase of $96.7 million per year.

The "TEA-21" legislation made no mention of either the Hudson Bergen Light Rail Project or the New Jersey Urban Core. However, it did include a $5 million earmark to conduct an environmental study for the "Cross County Connection." The line item was a victory for officials in Bergen County who pitched the "Cross County Connection" as the northern of extension of the light rail from Ridgefield Park through Hackensack to Maywood.

DIRT FLIES WHEN CONSTRUCTION BEGINS

On April 21, 1997 Governor Christine Todd Whitman "officially" broke ground on the billion dollar light rail project at the Gateway Park-and-Ride near Liberty State Park. With a panoramic view of the New York City skyline in the background and the sights and sounds on an active construction site in the foreground, Governor Whitman declared that the groundbreaking marked "the most significant public transit project ever undertaken in New Jersey." ⁽¹³⁰⁾ Echoing a line used by President Bush nearly seven years earlier, Governor Whitman said the transportation project would mean "jobs, jobs, jobs." ⁽¹³¹⁾ Despite the fact that construction had actually begun several months before, 1997 was a gubernatorial election year, and the event coincidently made for good photo opportunity and press story.

Twenty First Century Rail Corporation (Twenty First Century) was headed by long-time engineer and project manager John Johnston. Mr. Johnston, a Briton, had 45 years of project experience around the world including the construction of a similar system in Bangor, India. He said that the project was a true public-private partnership between Twenty First Century and NJ Transit. "In all of my experience, I've never seen anything like this where the project is king," he said. ⁽¹³²⁾ As contractor, the biggest challenge has been the relocation of utilities, issuance of permits and granting of easements.

The DBOM contract is "time certain" and "place certain." In other words, the contract gave Twenty First Century 40 months from the date of execution of the contract to complete the project and begin service. The frustrating thing for the contractor has been the 'business as usual' pace of local governments. It sometimes takes months to obtain permits to close roads, open streets, relocate utilities, and lay tracks.

The list of smaller problems which have plagued Twenty First Century reads like a combination of thriller movies and plagues from the Book of Exodus. First, there was the great "Chainsaw Massacre" as reported by The Jersey Journal. ⁽¹³³⁾ The problem occurred when work crews from cut down hundreds of trees on a 12 foot to 15 foot swatch land between 34^th Street and 48^th Street in Bayonne. The trees, which were all on NJ Transit property, had buffered approximately 60 homes from the sights, sounds of smells of Route 169, a major truck thoroughfare. Nobody had given the residents notice before the work was began, and it became a public relations problem for NJ Transit and the contractor.

Then came the horror story "Rat Invasion," as reported by The Jersey Journal ⁽¹³⁴⁾ The episode occurred when Twenty First Century began cleaning and excavating the Western Extension in Jersey City. Construction workers removed approximately 8,500 cubic yards of debris from the former railroad cut. The material including: tires, appliances, vegetation and household garbage had served as a breeding and nesting ground for rodents for many years. Officials acknowledged that the problem was typical of large construction projects, and hired exterminators to put down poison bate boxes in the construction area to combat the vermin problem.

In June 1998, construction workers uncovered "Buried Treasure" as reported by The Jersey Journal. ⁽¹³⁵⁾ The chapter unfolded when shards of glassware and pottery were found when work crews began replacing sewer lines on Essex Street in Jersey City. Jersey City activist Richard Boggiano and Jersey City Preservation Commissioner Guy Catrillo reported a red brick foundation and flag stone floor were visible at the bottom of one excavation. Nineteenth-century maps showed the site as the location of a glassware manufacturing plant and possibly part of a Civil War hospital.

Historic Paulus Hook had been the site of a Revolutionary War battle and had long been fertile ground for history buffs looking for evidence of the past. However, Mr. Johnston said the red-brick structure was nothing more than a century old sewer line that would be replaced by workers. "Our archeologist, Joan Geismar, and an associate were down there a week, since the first day we began digging and found nothing," reported Mr. Johnston. "The soil has been dug down to 14 feet sometime back, there's no shards of anything." ⁽¹³⁶⁾

The sequel to "Buried Treasure," was called the "Underground Railroad Link." ⁽¹³⁷⁾ It occurred when Ted Brunsen, a consultant to the Jersey City Afro-American Historical Society Museum and several residents suggested that the vault might have been a hiding place in the secret network that harbored and transported fugitive slaves. Again, archaeologist Joan Geismar said there was no evidence indicating the underground chamber was used to hide slaves. However, NJ Transit used the occasion to announce that it had commissioned two artists to create sculptures commemorating the Underground Railroad.

Then came the sound and the fury of "Light rail racket: Construction noise plagues Paulus Hook." ⁽¹³⁸⁾ The incident also took place on Essex Street in Jersey City. This time residents were irrate about the noise, vibration and disturbance of having work crews dig a wide, 2-foot-deep trench down a city block. The trench, where two sets of tracks were to be laid, was expected to remain open for up to eight weeks. Residents complained that the digging created vibrations higher than what was allowed. However, the contractor said there was no way of getting around the fact that construction means noise.

A problem which temporary halted the project involved "toxic" dust particles in the air. Again, excavation of Essex Street in Jersey City caused more than noise and vibration problems for the residents. It caused annoying dust with higher levels of airborne contaminants, including carcinogens. In fact, Jersey City health officials reacted by issuing a cease-and-desist order to the contractor. The order called for additional soil and air samplings and better methods of controlling construction dust.

For months, the Essex Street residents had complained of eye irritations, sore throats and respiratory problems, and claimed the light rail construction was to blame. Local officials suspected toxins given the area's history as a former industrial site and because most of the area had been covered with landfill. In fact, an air quality report by an independent company found levels of chromium, beriyllium, barium, aluminum and lead in the air. ⁽¹³⁹⁾ "There are nearly 3,000 children attending schools and day-cares centers within several blocks of the light rail construction in Paulus Hook who could be affected by the dust," said local parent Carol Lester. "We should consider blood testing children." ⁽¹⁴⁰⁾

However, the report also showed that the amount of contaminants, ranging from .65 parts per million to 2.20 parts per million fell below federal Occupational Safety and Health standards which were set at 5 parts per million. In addition, the levels fell within the acceptable limits set by the US Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA). Jersey City officials lifted the ban and said the quantity of contaminants was very low and the short term effects of seven months of construction dust would not be harmful. Despite the high emotions of residents, and the sensationalized headlines, the events only cost the contractor three work days.

Next, the Jersey City Planning Board sent a letter to NJ Transit about a "galling breach of protocol" for its handling of the light rail development. The planning board complained about the site standards and specifications NJ Transit and Twenty First Century were using at a particular development site. "I think everyone is very offended by the apparent failure to communicate or by NJ Transit's lack of respect for the planning board and its position," said planning board attorney William Netchert. ⁽¹⁴¹⁾

Planning board members complained that NJ Transit had never come before them as a courtesy to show them what they were planning in the city, and they believed it to be a violation of the state Municipal Land Use Law. Officials said that NJ Transit essentially began building the light rail without the city's approval. And, officials did not rule out legal action if NJ Transit refused to come before them. "We can't deny the light rail ever being there, but could perhaps attempt to impose design standards," Mr. Netchert continued, "We're entitled to some respect." ⁽¹⁴²⁾

The final and most daunting challenge for Twenty First Century was something in which the contractor had very little control. In February 1999, officials admitted that the system would end about a mile short of its destination when it opened in the year 2000. The problem arose because NJ Transit had not been able to successfully negotiate an easement through a small but necessary parcel of property. "NJ Transit has to complete the property acquisition and there's a new office building going up on Washington Boulevard that has to be completed," said Mr. Johnson. ⁽¹⁴³⁾

NJ Transit was negotiating for an easement under a pedestrian bridge connecting Newport Office Center 3 and the Newport Mall. The site was near Pavonia Avenue in the heart of the 600 acre Newport tract in Jersey City. The land was essential because the Port Authority (PANY&NJ) had agreed to construct an underground pedestrian walkway from the Pavonia PATH station under Washington Boulevard, and to the Newport Mall light rail station. The land was the last remaining piece of real estate NJ Transit needed to connect the line to the Hoboken Terminal.

Today, the project is three months behind schedule. "Utilities have got to be relocated, and we've been working on that for a long time. But I'm confident that we will be in business in 11 months time," assured Mr. Johnston. ⁽¹⁴⁴⁾ But, without the vital link at Newport, the LRT will only run from 34^th Street in Bayonne to Exchange Place in Jersey City...

ANALYSIS & EVALUATION

The saga of the Hudson Bergen light rail transit project highlights the challenges, pitfalls, obstacles, and difficulties officials face when implementing an urban mass transit system. It is no easy task. There are three distinct processes officials must recognize and navigate before construction and implementation may commence. The first process involves the establishment of policy guidelines, usually by some higher authority, and attempts to commit resources; the second process involves the more technical planning and engineering studies to determine the project's feasibility; and the

third process involves community acceptance and political consensus.

"Implementation may be viewed as a process of interaction between the setting of goals and actions geared to achieving them," according to Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky in their work Implementation. ⁽¹⁴⁵⁾ Unlike the federal economic development program, described in Implementation, which was plagued by contradictory and restrictive legislative criteria, the Hudson Bergen light rail transit project was fortunate to have corresponding legislation which was complimentary. First, Governor Kean's "Circle of Mobility" plan provided valuable resources and direction for the project, while the subsequent legislation committed essential state funding from the "Transportation Trust Fund." Secondly, the federal Clean Air Act amendments targeted regions, like northern New Jersey, for reduced auto emissions and promoted mass transit use. Thirdly, the federal Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act, or "ISTEA" provided an important promise of federal support.

"Implementation, under the best of circumstances, is exceedingly difficult." ⁽¹⁴⁶⁾ Using terminology from Implementation, there were numerous 'acts of agreement' (decision points) and 'clearances' which had to be obtained from a variety of participants. Formally, decision points occurred on a number of occasions when the NJ Transit Board adopted or amended the "Locally Preferred Alternative." The formal clearances occurred when the Federal Transit Administration accepted NJ Transit's plans and officially granted a "Record of Decision."

However, capital transportation projects are also subject to numerous informal decision points by planners themselves, in choosing what and what not to study; as well as officials, like the Commissioner of the NJ DOT, who unilaterally have influence over everyday decisions. There are many more informal clearances, any of which could delay or jeopardize a project. First, projects which need multiple grants, need the continual support of Congress which enacts annual appropriations. Similarly, projects which need state funding require the support of the New Jersey legislature. Projects also need the approval of "Metropolitan Planning Organizations" (MPOs) which rank and prioritize federal funds. Most importantly, projects need the support and acceptance of the immediate stakeholders, including, local governments, the community, and property owners who must grant easements. Most notably, local stakeholders may doom a project through direct legal action.

In The City Planning Process, author Alan A. Altshuler writes that it is the job of professional planners "to propose a course of action, (but) not execute it." ⁽¹⁴⁷⁾ While NJ Transit and its consultants acted as the primary planners for the transit project, the success of their efforts ultimately depended upon the acceptance and approval from both officials and stakeholders. In several case studies from the Minneapolis-St. Paul area, Altshuler describes how planners must craft plans which promote the public interest, while addressing the concerns of engineers, politicians and the community. Likewise, NJ Transit must negotiate with a fairly complex network of offices, agencies, and officials in order to advance projects. While NJ Transit planners formulated a course of action, they did not have the wherewithal, intrinsic know-how, or acumen to facilitate a much-needed political consensus.

Similarly, Edward G. Banfield, in his work, Political Influence, describes the Chicago and Cook County governments as a web of many boards and commissions which, in effect, create a system of "checks and balances." ⁽¹⁴⁸⁾ In that environment, Banfield writes, nothing can get done if anyone opposes it. While the formal 'fragmentation' of authority limits officials to accomplishing very little formally, it necessitates the centralization of authority informally. In other words, the system creates the need for officials to use their influence and political persuasion informally, to achieve an objective or facilitate a decision. In this system, nearly every outcome must be an "elaborate compromise if not a stalemate." ⁽¹⁴⁹⁾

In New Jersey, there is no Mayor Daly to engineer an outcome. Instead, our system relies upon the interest of many players including the Governor, Commissioner of Transportation, numerous federal and state legislators, as well as many local officials. State officials could not facilitate, but had to accept an "elaborate compromise" on a number of occasions in order to advance the project. For example, NJ Transit, had to accept the conditions of the Hudson County "Intergovernmental Consensus Agreement" in order to proceed. Facing demands by other jurisdictions with competing projects, state officials had to promote other projects like the Newark-Elizabeth rail link, and Bergen County's West Shore line.

Any study of implementation necessitates the inclusion of an evaluation. In this regard, Pressman and Wildavsky write "how would we know whether a program embodying a policy had been well or poorly implemented? - by observing the difference between the intended and actual consequences, i.e., by evaluation." ⁽¹⁵⁰⁾ Proponents of the project have created some lofty goals over the years, (over 100,000 daily commuters, 33 million square feet of commercial development, 58,000 new jobs, 40,000 new housing units, and cleaner air). It is still premature to measure the affects of the project in order to conduct an evaluation, because the system is not yet in operation. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that anticipation of the project has sustained development and led to what many officials had promised: "jobs, jobs, jobs."

In conclusion, the history of the Hudson Bergen Light Rail Transit project highlights the many challenges and opportunities which can and often do affect public officials when implementing a mass transit project. This research design focused primarily upon the process of implementation. It tried to detail and accentuate the various components of policymaking, planning, and political influence in the transportation arena. The project would not have been possible without the confluence of several federal and state policy initiatives. Likewise, it relied upon the skill and determination of many professional planners and engineers. And, it ultimately depended upon the political consensus forged by numerous key political figures.
 
 

ENDNOTES

1. Kean, Thomas, "Executive Order 53," November 21,1983.

2. Kean, Thomas, "Executive Order 70," April 25,1984.

3. NJ Transit, "Hudson River Waterfront Study: Draft Transportation Plan," November 1985

4. NJ Transit, "Hudson River Waterfront Study: Draft Transportation Plan," November 1985 50.

5. NJ Transit, "Hudson River Waterfront Study: Draft Transportation Plan Technical Report," April 1986.

6. Remington, Richard, "State Purchasing Conrail Spur for Hudson Waterfront Mass Transit," The Star-Ledger May 31, 1989.

7. Ibid.

8. Baehr, Guy T., "Conrail, NJ Transit Sign Deal for Hudson 'Trolley, " The Star-Ledger June 9, 1989.

9. Ibid.

10. Baehr, Guy T., "Bold Hartz Proposal Awaits State Scrutiny," The Star-Ledger June 19, 1989.

11. Ibid.

12. Wyckoff, P.L. , "Mobility Plan for North Jersey Designed to Mine 'Motherlode,'" The Star-Ledger June 27, 1989.

13. Ibid.

14. NJ Transit, "Draft Environmental Impact Statement," November 1992 S-7.

15. Baehr, Guy T., "New Jersey Transit Clears $2 Million for Hudson Waterfront Study," The Star-Ledger May 19, 1989.

16. Orr, J. Scott, "Lautenberg Criticizes Mass Transit Aid Rules," The Star-Ledger July 12, 1989.

17. Wyckoff, P.L., "Circle of Mobility- Pike to map its role in Mixed Transit Plan," The Star-Ledger July 19, 1989.

18. Wyckoff, P.L., "Hudson Exec Readies Panel to Study Kean's Plan for Meadowlands Link," The Star-Ledger

19. Wyckoff, P.L., "Circle of Mobility- Pike to map its role in Mixed Transit Plan," The Star-Ledger July 19, 1989.

20. Baehr, Guy T., "Waterfront Transit Panel Formed to Study Improvements Along the Hudson," The Star-Ledger August 22, 1989.

21. Baehr, Guy T., "Policy Dispute Threatens Circle of Mobility," The Star-Ledger September 24, 1989.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Kean, Thomas, "Executive Order Number 218," October 12, 1989. 

25. Ibid.

26. Baehr, Guy T., "Rail Advocates Blast Plan for Highway Extension to Hudson Waterfront," The Star-Ledger December 17, 1989.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Baehr, Guy T., "Courter, Florio take different routes on mass Transit," The Star-Ledger October 17, 1989.

30. Baehr, Guy T., "Funding for Meadowlands Project would come from Turnpike tolls," The Star-Ledger February 25, 1990.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Remington, Richard, "Transportation Chief mapping new Direction," The Star-Ledger May 6, 1990.

36. Baehr, Guy T., "Council Backs Transit Projects; Work Would Require Toll Hikes," The Star-Ledger December 13, 1990.

37. Ibid.

38. Baehr, Guy T., "NJ Transit Rethinking its Riverfront 'Wish List,'" The Star-Ledger June 17, 1990.

39. Baehr, Guy T., "Don't Count on U.S. Aid for Transit, State Warned," The Star-Ledger June 2, 1991.

40. Ibid.

41. Baehr, Guy T., "New Legislation Revives Hope for State Rail Plan," The Star-Ledger June 24, 1991.

42. United States Congress, "Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991," H.R. 2950 - Sec.1 1991.

43. Ibid.

44. Orr, J. Scott, "Roe Acts for Transportation Measure that Holds Billions for Jersey," The Star-Ledger July 19, 1991.

45. United States Congress, "Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991," H.R. 2950 - Sec.3031 1991.

46. Orr, J. Scott, "Measure would Provide Jersey with $4 Billion over Five Years," The Star-Ledger July 27, 1991.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. Orr, J. Scott, "House Panel Clears $153 Billion Transit Package," The Star-Ledger July 26, 1991.

50. Ibid.

51. Orr, J. Scott, "Transport Bill Survives Its First Big Test," The Star-Ledger August 1, 1991.

52. Orr, J. Scott, "House Allots $65 Million for Jersey Rail Linkup," The Star-Ledger July 25, 1991.

53. Orr, J. Scott, "Jersey Transit Millions Advance in Senate," The Star-Ledger September 19, 1991.

54. Orr, J. Scott, "Senate Clears '92 Transportation Bill with $200 Million in Jersey Funding," The Star-Ledger September 18, 1991.

55. Orr, J. Scott, "Roe Strikes Bargain, Drops Gas Tax Hike," The Star-Ledger September 19, 1991.

56. Orr, J. Scott, "Big Transportation Bill Signed by President," The Star-Ledger December 19, 1991.

57. Baehr, Guy T., "NJ Transit Lays Out Plan to Lay Down Rail for Hudson Waterfront Trolley," The Star-Ledger October 23, 1991.

58. Ibid.

59. Baehr, Guy T., "Group Criticizes Plan for Hudson 'Busway, " The Star-Ledger October 18, 1990.

60. Baehr, Guy T., "Clang Clang Clang of Hudson Trolley Nearing as Officials Get on Board," The Star-Ledger July 23, 1992

61. Ibid.

62. Baehr, Guy T., "Light Rail Plan for Hudson county Waterfront Wins Wide-Ranging Support," The Star-Ledger January 7, 1993.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

66. Baehr, Guy T., "NJ Transit Approves Trolley Line to Serve the Hudson Waterfront," The Star-Ledger February 11, 1993.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

69. Baehr, Guy T., "Schuber Says Hudson Shortchanges Bergen With Trolley Line Plan," The Star-Ledger January 29, 1993.

70. Ibid.

71. Baehr, Guy T., "NJ Transit Board Backs Planned Newark-Elizabeth Line," The Star-Ledger April 28, 1993.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid.

76. Baehr, Guy T., "Sportsplex is Boosted as Trolley Line Terminus," The Star-Ledger July 21, 1993.

77. Baehr, Guy T., "Sportsplex is Boosted as Trolley Line Terminus," The Star-Ledger July 21, 1993.

78. Ibid.

79. Baehr, Guy T., "On Track, Meadowlands Plan Due in 6 Months," The Star-Ledger September 18, 1993.

80. Baehr, Guy T., "DiFrancesco Will Press for Mass Transit Projects," The Star-Ledger January 10, 1994.

81. State of New Jersey, "Committee Amendments," Senate Bill 10 June 16, 1994

82. Baehr, Guy T., "NJ Transit to Buy Low-Floor 'Light Rail' Trolleys," The Star-Ledger September 18, 1994.

83. Ibid.

84. Baehr, Guy T., "NJ Transit Reaps Federal Millions for Hudson Waterfront Projects," The Star-Ledger October 19, 1993.

85. Ibid.

86. Baehr, Guy T., "Some Question Must Be Answered Before Feds Fund State Transit Plans," The Star-Ledger October 2, 1994.

87. Ibid.

88. Baehr, Guy T., "Transit chief Links Jersey Rail Funds to Approval by Local Communities," The Star-Ledger October 6, 1993.

89. Baehr, Guy T., "Some Question Must Be Answered Before Feds Fund State Transit Plans," The Star-Ledger October 2, 1994.

90. Ibid.

91. Jennings, John, "Major Transit Initiatives for Centers," APA New Jersey Planners' Journal Fall 1997.

92. Baehr, Guy T., "Transit Chief Links Jersey Rail Funds to Approval by Local Communities," The Star-Ledger October 6, 1993.

93. Baehr, Guy T., "Lautenberg Warns State May Lose Transit Funds," The Star-Ledger December 17, 1993.

94. Ibid.

95. Ibid.

96. Baer, Guy T., "Federal Funding Cuts Threaten Rail Projects," The Star-Ledger March 6, 1994.

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid.

99. Baehr, Guy T., "Pena Says U.S. Seeks Agreement to Fund Key Rail Projects in Jersey," The Star-Ledger March 8, 1994.

100. Baehr, Guy T., "Roe Fears Jersey Will Lose U.S. Aid Without Mass Transit Commitment ," The Star-Ledger June 14, 1994.

101. Ibid.

102. Ibid.

103. Ibid.

104. Ibid.

105. Baehr, Guy T., "Roe Fears Jersey Will Lose U.S. Aid Without Mass Transit Commitment ," The Star-Ledger June 14, 1994.

106. Ibid.

107. Baehr, Guy T., "Waterfront trolley on track with final approvals," The Star-Ledger March 29, 1995.

108. Journal Staff, "Light rail route through downtown still an issue," The Jersey Journal December 21, 1995.

109. "Plan to make good use of western light rail route," editorial, The Jersey Journal April 23, 1997.

110. Ibid.

111. Duffy, Jim, "Inside New Jersey Transit's $1.1 Billion Hudson-Bergen DBOM Light Rail Project," Mass Transit September/October 1998. 12.

112. Duffy, Jim, "Inside New Jersey Transit's $1.1 Billion Hudson-Bergen DBOM Light Rail Project," Mass Transit September/October 1998. 20.

113. Middleton, William D., "NJ Transit Chooses Super-Turnkey," Urban Rail Planner's Guide February 1997. G5.

114. Baehr, Guy T., "DBOM Takes NJ Mass Transit Industry by Storm ," The Star-Ledger June 23, 1996.

115. Ibid.

116. Middleton, William D., "NJ Transit Chooses Super-Turnkey," Urban Rail Planner's Guide February 1997. G6.

117. Baehr, Guy T., "DBOM Takes NJ Mass Transit Industry by Storm ," The Star-Ledger June 23, 1996.

118. Ibid.

119. Middleton, William D., "NJ Transit Chooses Super-Turnkey," Urban Rail Planner's Guide February 1997. G7.

120. Baehr, Guy T., "Hudson Trolley Contract Advances ," The Star-Ledger July 30, 1996.

121. Ibid.

122. Duffy, Jim, "Inside New Jersey Transit's $1.1 Billion Hudson-Bergen DBOM Light Rail Project," Mass Transit September/October 1998. 16.

123. Duffy, Jim, "Inside New Jersey Transit's $1.1 Billion Hudson-Bergen DBOM Light Rail Project," Mass Transit September/October 1998. 23.

124. Ibid.

125. Ibid.

126. Baehr, Guy T., "President's backing gives extra boost to trolley line already on fast track ," The Star-Ledger March 14, 1996.

127. Kalcanides, Steven, "Light rail gets check from feds," The Jersey Journal October 16, 1996.

128. Larini, Rudy, "$350 million approved for light rail system ," The Star-Ledger March 26, 1997.

129. Piore, Adam, "Mass transit bonanza for N.J.," The Record June 10, 1998.

130. Office of the Governor, "Governor Whitman Breaks Ground for Initial Phase of Hudson-Bergen Light Rail Transit System," Press Release April 21, 1997.

131. Torres, Agustin C., "Light Rail on the Move," The Jersey Journal March 27, 1998.

132. Twenty First Century Rail Corporation President John Johnston, Personal Interview, November 23, 1998.

133. Torres, Agustin C., "Chainsaw Massacre: Hundreds of Bayonne trees killed for rail line," The Jersey Journal February 1, 1997.

134. Torres, Agustin C., "Rat Invasion: Light rail construction moves rodents into back yards," The Jersey Journal June 27, 1997.

135. Torres, Agustin C., "Buried Treasure? Light rail prep work in area rich in history," The Jersey Journal June 8, 1998.

136. Ibid.

137. Petrick, John, "Undergound Railroad Link? Light rail urged to name station after Jersey City brothers," The Jersey Journal September 9, 1998.

138. Torres, Agustin C., "Light rail racket: Construction noise plagues Paulus Hook," The Jersey Journal October 21, 1998.

139. Torres, Agustin C., "Health Department Shuts Down Light Rail Site," The Jersey Journal January 30, 1999.

140. Torres, Agustin C., "City lets light rail proceed," The Jersey Journal February 4, 1999.

141. Park, Michael P. "NJ Transit hit for ignoring Jersey City plan board on light rail," The Jersey Journal March 25, 1999.

142. Ibid.

143. Torres, Agustin C., "Rail line coming up short," The Jersey Journal February 12, 1999.

144. Ben-Ali, Russell, "Bergen-Hudson light rail rolls out for a test ride," The Star-Ledger March 23, 1999.

145. Pressman, Jeffrey L., Wildavsky, Aaron, Implementation, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984) xxiii.

146. Pressman, Jeffrey L., Wildavsky, Aaron, Implementation, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984) xxi.

147. Altshuler, Alan A., The City Planning Process, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965) 1.

148. Banfield, Edward C., Political Influence, (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961) 235.

149. Banfield, Edward C., Political Influence, (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961) 235.

150. Pressman, Jeffrey L., Wildavsky, Aaron, Implementation, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984) xv.

Author and Copyright Information

Copyright 2000 By Author

Stephen D. Marks